Lolley v. Citizens Bank

• Decision Date: 18 July 1986
• Citation: 494 So.2d 19
• Parties: Dewey LOLLEY v. The CITIZENS BANK. 84-1145.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 19

494 So.2d 19

Dewey LOLLEY v. The CITIZENS BANK.

84-1145.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

July 18, 1986.

D. Bruce McLean, Enterprise, for appellant.

James H. Weatherford, Enterprise, for appellee.

STEAGALL, Justice.

Dewey Lolley executed four promissory notes to Citizens Bank of Enterprise during May and July of 1984. Citizens Bank subsequently declared a default as to all four notes and filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Coffee County seeking a judgment against Lolley for the amounts due on the notes, plus court costs and attorney's fees of fifteen percent (15%) of the unpaid debt. On June 13, 1985, after trial without a jury, the court entered a judgment in favor of Citizens Bank in the amount of $58,963.25, plus attorney's fees of $8,850.00, plus court costs. Lolley appeals that portion of the judgment pertaining to the award of attorney's fees.

Specifically, Lolley contends that the award of attorney's fees in this case should be vacated and set aside as being based on insufficient evidence. The record before this Court shows that Danny Adams, collections manager for Citizens Bank, was the sole witness to testify at the trial. Adams testified to the balance due on the four notes, and he confirmed that each of the notes contained a provision stating that Lolley would pay court costs and attorney's fees in the event he had to be sued. Although Adams stated that the notes specified an attorney's fee of fifteen percent (15%), on cross-examination he admitted that he was mistaken in that the notes called for a "reasonable" attorney's fee, with no stated percentage.

The standard to be used in determining the reasonableness of an attorney's fee was stated by this Court in King v. Keith, 257 Ala. 463, 60 So.2d 47 (1952):

"The guiding rule in the fixation of attorney's fees is that the trial court, in connection with a consideration of the opinion evidence proffered by qualified experts, may call to his aid his own estimate of the value of such services and the amount of the allowance rests within the sound judicial discretion. Dent v. Foy, 214 Ala. 243, 107 So. 210 [ (1925) ].

"And though, in reviewing the propriety of the fixation of such fees by the lower court, this court will be guided by its own judgment upon a consideration of the whole record, Frazer v. First National Bank of Mobile, 235 Ala. 252, 178 So. 441, 126 A.L.R. 1; Dent v. Foy, supra, we make such review with a presumption in favor of the ruling of the court below and will not set aside its decree unless we are convinced that that court abused the discretion wisely vested in it."

257 Ala. at 470, 60 So.2d at 52.

The criteria to be considered in determining a reasonable attorney's fee in Alabama are set forth in Peebles v. Miley, 439 So.2d 137 (Ala.1983). In Peebles, we adopted five additional criteria to expand the list of criteria that were already a part of our law. Ingalls v. Hare, 266 Ala. 221, 96 So.2d 266 (1957); King v. Keith, 257 Ala. 463, 60 So.2d 47 (1952); Frazer v. First National Bank of Mobile, 235 Ala. 252, 178 So. 441 (1938); Faulk & Co. v. Hobbie Grocery Co., 178 Ala. 254, 59 So. 450 (1912). Regarding these legal principles dealing with reasonable attorney's fees, we have said: "We do not suggest that all of these criteria must be met. Indeed, there would hardly ever be a case where the application of attorney's fees brought into play every criterion. But they are available for the trial judge to use in connection with each claim for attorney's fees." Graddick v. First Farmers & Merchants National Bank of Troy, 453 So.2d 1305, 1311 (Ala.1984).

This Court provided additional guidance with regard to reasonable attorney's fees in Peebles:

"Having briefly discussed the most current legal principles dealing with reasonable attorney's fees, we would like to add one caveat. We agree with the admonition of the American Bar Association to the effect that 'a fee is clearly excessive when after review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm...