Lombard v. Baker

Decision Date06 March 2023
Docket Number2:22-cv-328-ECM-JTA (WO)
PartiesWILTON IRVON LOMBARD, JR., Plaintiff, v. DARLENE MARIE LOMBARD BAKER, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JERUSHA T. ADAMS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the court are the following motions: Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Affidavit of Mary Crabtree (Doc No. 71); Defendants' Motion for Protective Order Sanctions, and Request for an Immediate Hearing (Doc. No 75); Plaintiff's Motion to Sanction (Doc. No. 78); Plaintiff's Motion to Consider Proposed Order (Doc. No. 81); Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Doc. No. 89); Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Submitted Affidavits and Supplement to Motion for Protective Order (Doc. No. 91); Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery and Pretrial Settlement Conference (Doc. No. 96); Defendants' Renewed Motion to File Documents Under Seal (Doc. No. 102); Plaintiff's Reply to False, Defamatory, Stigmatizing, and Injurious Allegations and Motion to Seal (Doc. No. 103); Plaintiff's Reply to False, Defamatory, Stigmatizing, and Injurious Allegations and Motion to Strike and Motion to Seal (Doc. No. 104); and Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery, Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories, and Motion to Set for Jury Trial (Doc. No. 107).

For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Renewed Motion to File Documents Under Seal (Doc. No. 102) is due to be GRANTED and the remaining motions (Docs. No. 71, 75, 78, 81, 89, 91, 96, 103, 104, and 107) are due to be DENIED.

I. JURISDICTION

The court exercises jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The value of Plaintiff's claims exceeds $75,000.00 and the parties are completely diverse. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and the court finds sufficient allegations to support both in the Middle District of Alabama.

II. ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Affidavit of Mary Crabtree (Doc. No. 71)

On October 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Affidavit of Fact from Mary Crabtree. (Doc. No. 69.) Plaintiff submitted the Affidavit in support of his argument that the statute of limitations on his claims was equitably tolled because of his disability. Defendants seek to strike the Affidavit of Mary Crabtree because it was filed out of time for responding to Defendants' dispositive motion, because Plaintiff did not establish Crabtree as an expert, and because the Affidavit allegedly fails to sufficiently set forth the basis of Crabtree's personal knowledge of the facts to which she attests.

In the affidavit, Crabtree, a friend of Plaintiff's, explains that Plaintiff is disabled. However, as more fully explained in the Recommendation and Order entered February 22, 2023, being disabled is not alone sufficient to equitably toll the statute of limitations; the disability must have presented an extraordinary circumstance that prevented Plaintiff from exercising his right to file suit. (See Doc. No. 106 at 17-21 (discussing the requisite level of disability to meet equitable tolling requirements and the requirements of Alabama's general tolling provision, Ala. Code 1975 § 6-2-8).) As further explained in the February 22, 2023 Recommendation and Order (Doc. No. 106), the undisputed evidence demonstrated that Plaintiff's disability did not prevent him from filing and meaningfully participating in litigation during the limitations period and thus did not equitably toll the statute or trigger the tolling provision of § 6-2-8. (Id. at 17-21, 26-27, 29-30, 34-35.)

Crabtree's affidavit contains no facts from which it could reasonably be inferred that Plaintiff's disability prevented him from filing suit during the limitations period.[1]At most, it merely provides additional evidence to confirm Plaintiff's allegation that he currently suffers from various mental and physical disabilities. However, even without the benefit of the Crabtree's affidavit, in considering Plaintiff's tolling argument, the court assumed as true Plaintiff's allegations that he is disabled and that he suffered from disabilities during the limitations period. (Id. at 17-21, 26-27, 29-30, 34-35.) Accordingly, the affidavit of Mary Crabtree was not necessary to the disposition of the motion for summary judgment and would have made no difference to the outcome of the February 23, 2023 Recommendation and Order (Doc. No. 106) had the court considered it.

Because the Affidavit of Mary Crabtree was not considered in the Recommendation and Order, and because the Affidavit would have had no effect on the outcome of the February 23, 2023 Recommendation and Order (Doc. No. 106), Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's Affidavit of Mary Crabtree (Doc. No. 71) is due to be denied as moot.

B. Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, Sanctions, and Request for an Immediate Hearing (Doc. No. 75)

Also pending before the court is Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, Sanctions, and Request for an Immediate Hearing. (Doc. No. 75.) Defendants seek redress for Plaintiff's allegedly vituperous rhetoric toward Defendants' counsel, threats to post accusations of racism online, threats to file motions for sanctions, and threats to file additional lawsuits. The alleged motivation for Plaintiff's statements toward Defendants' counsel is his anger at Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Affidavit of Mary Crabtree. (Doc. No. 71.) Plaintiff claims, incorrectly, that the motion to strike was misogynist, racist, and sexist toward Crabtree. That is not the case. The motion to strike (Doc. No. 71) contains arguments concerning Crabtree's alleged lack of personal knowledge to testify as a lay witness and her alleged lack of qualifications to testify as an expert. Defendants also object to the substance of Crabtree's testimony and to the fact that the affidavit was filed out of time insofar as Plaintiff sought to use it to bolster his arguments in opposition to Defendants' then-pending dispositive motion. Nothing in Defendants' motion to strike was even remotely directed at Crabtree's gender or race, nor did anything in the motion mock Crabtree.[2]Plaintiff's allegations of racism by defense counsel in this instance are wrongheaded at best.

In their Motion for Protective Order, Sanctions, and Request for an Immediate Hearing (Doc. No. 75), Defendants seek the following relief:

(A) Immediately order Plaintiff to cease and desist from threatening Defendants, Defendants' counsel, prospective witnesses, or anyone else related to this matter in any manner;
(B) Order that Plaintiff cease and desist from publicly maligning Defendants, their counsel, and related parties;
(C) Immediately Order Plaintiff to refrain from publishing any material which maligns Defendant, Defendants' counsel, prospective witnesses or anyone related to this matter;
(D) Order that Plaintiff refrain from filing any further matters in opposition to Defendants' pending Motion to Dismiss without seeking leave of this [c]ourt;
(E) Order that Plaintiff's claims in this matter are due to be dismissed due to his continued and intentional violation of this [c]ourt's Orders;
(F) Order that Plaintiff compensate Defendants' counsel for the amounts of legal fees expended to respond to Plaintiff's threatened actions.

(Doc. No. 75 at 10.)

The court declines to enter sanctions that amount to a prior restraint on speech. See United States v. McGregor, 838 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1260 (M.D. Ala. 2012) ([A]ny system of prior restraints of expression ... bear[s] a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.” (quoting New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam)). Accordingly, the court will not order the relief requested in items (A) through (C) of Defendants' requested relief. Plaintiff is again admonished, however, that, despite his pro se status, in his communications with defense counsel as well as the court, he is to conduct himself in a manner appropriate to maintaining the dignity of the court and these proceedings. In addition, Plaintiff should also be mindful that, as a pro se litigant, he is bound by Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure[3]and may be sanctioned under Rule 11(c) if he violates that Rule.[4] Rule 11(b) provides as follows:

By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper- whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it-an ... unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:

(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).

The court will not order Plaintiff to refrain from filing further matters in opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 33), which was subsequently converted to a motion for summary judgment. A Recommendation and Order (Doc. No. 106) has been entered recommending that the court grant the motion for summary judgment. Hence, item (D) of Defendants' requested relief is moot.

Defendants' motion does not provide sufficient legal justification for item (E)...

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