Lomholt v. Iowa

Decision Date29 April 2003
Docket NumberNo. 02-2236.,02-2236.
Citation327 F.3d 748
PartiesMark Edward LOMHOLT, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of IOWA, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Rockne O. Cole, argued, Iowa City, IA, for appellant.

Robert P. Ewald, argued, Asst. Atty. Gen., Des Moines, IA, for appellee.

Before WOLLMAN, HEANEY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

State prisoner Mark Edward Lomholt, Sr., appeals the district court's1 denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. He alleges violation of his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights based on the use of sequestered, closed-circuit testimony from the two children who were victims of his sexual abuse. The district court rejected his claims under the deferential standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1218. We affirm.

I.

An Iowa jury convicted Lomholt on two counts of second degree sexual abuse under Iowa Code §§ 709.1 and 709.3. Lomholt's victims were B.G., his four-year-old niece, and N.P., her five-year-old, female friend. Evidence against Lomholt included his signed confession as well as testimony from B.G. and N.P. The confession was corroborated by testimony from N.P.'s mother regarding a change in N.P.'s personality following the period of abuse. The confession was also corroborated by evidence that during identified periods of time Lomholt, as a babysitter, was alone with the children and had the opportunity to commit abuse.

The victims were allowed to testify at trial via closed-circuit television pursuant to Iowa Code § 910A.14 (now codified as § 915.38(1)) which permits a court to "protect a minor ... from trauma caused by testifying in the physical presence of the defendant where it would impair the minor's ability to communicate ..." and where there has been "a specific finding by the court that such measures are necessary to protect the minor from trauma." Id. Before admitting the closed-circuit testimony from the victims, the Iowa trial court held an evidentiary hearing and set forth factual findings as required by Iowa Code § 910A.14 and Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 856, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990) (holding face-to-face confrontation to be an important but dispensable element of Sixth Amendment confrontation rights and setting forth the requirement that trial courts must make case-specific findings regarding trauma to child victims before the use of testimony via closed circuit television may be admitted).

At the evidentiary hearing, Lomholt presented no evidence nor witnesses to rebut the testimony of the prosecution's only witness, the victims' sex abuse counselor, Ms. Patricia A. Tomson. The Iowa trial court specifically noted that it found Ms. Tomson to be credible. Based on Ms. Tomson's unrebutted testimony, which we discuss in some detail below, the Iowa trial court concluded:

the State produced credible testimony that testifying in the physical presence of the defendant would be traumatic to each of the alleged victims. In addition, the evidence was convincing that the trauma experienced in testifying would impair the ability of the witnesses to communicate. The court finds that testimony by closed circuit equipment is necessary to protect the alleged victims from trauma.

Iowa v. Lomholt, No. 4311 at 3 (Iowa Dist. Ct. for Mitchell County July 8, 1996) (Ruling on Motion to Permit Testimony by Closed Circuit Television).

Following conviction and denial of a request for post-trial relief, Lomholt advanced his Sixth Amendment argument before the Iowa Court of Appeals. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's rulings and held the factual findings sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Craig, 497 U.S. at 855-56, 110 S.Ct. 3157. The Iowa Court of Appeals held in the alternative that, had the admission of the children's testimony been a Sixth Amendment violation, it would have been harmless error in light of Lomholt's corroborated confession. The Iowa Supreme Court declined further review, and federal habeas proceedings followed.

The district court expressly noted that it believed the factual findings of the Iowa courts to be incorrect. Lomholt v. Burt, 219 F.Supp.2d 977, 992 (2002) ("In short, this court agrees with [the federal magistrate's report and recommendation] that the trial court's findings were `wrong,' or at least, were based on evidence that this court would not find satisfactory if this court were the finder of fact."). Nevertheless, the district court carefully reviewed the evidence of record, found support for the factual findings, and held the findings to be reasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Accepting the Iowa courts' factual findings as reasonable, the district court proceeded to find the Iowa courts' application of Craig to those facts reasonable under the standard set forth in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).

II.

In the habeas setting, a federal court is bound by the AEDPA to exercise only limited and deferential review of underlying state court decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under this deferential standard, the federal court may not grant habeas relief to a state prisoner merely because the federal court might have reached a conclusion different than that reflected in the state courts' factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1). Similarly, the federal court may not grant habeas relief to a state prisoner merely "because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Williams, 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Rather, in the interest of furthering the goal of finality and respecting the principles of federalism,

[t]he Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) mandates that habeas relief "shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless" the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

Robinson v. Crist, 278 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir.2002).

A state court decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent if "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the] Court on a question of law or ... decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495. A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. Finally, a state court decision involves "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court proceedings," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), only if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the state court's presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Boyd v. Minnesota, 274 F.3d 497, 501 n.4 (8th Cir.2001) ("There is sufficient record evidence to support such a finding and, thus, it would not constitute an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at trial.").

III.

The Iowa courts correctly identified Craig as the controlling and clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Under Craig, before a defendant may be deprived the opportunity to confront a child witness face-to-face, there must be a case-specific finding that the "use of the one-way, closed circuit television procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child witness who seeks to testify," "that the child witness would be traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant," and "that the emotional distress suffered by the child witness in the presence of the defendant is more than de minimis, i.e., more than `mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify.'" Craig, 497 U.S. at 855-56, 110 S.Ct. 3157 (citations omitted). The Court did not attempt to define the minimum level of trauma required but noted that the level of trauma would be sufficient if it "would impair the child's ability to communicate." Id. at 857, 110 S.Ct. 3157.

Lomholt attacks the reasonableness of the Iowa courts' factual findings and application of Craig. There is no allegation that the Iowa courts' legal conclusion was contrary to Craig or any other clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, our review is limited to two questions: (1) did the Iowa courts make an unreasonable factual determination in light of the evidence presented, or (2) did the Iowa courts unreasonably apply Craig to these facts.

We will first examine the Iowa court's factual findings. Lomholt argues that the findings were unreasonable because there was no showing that the children would be more traumatized specifically by his presence than generally by the courtroom experience and because Ms. Tomson's projections of likely harm to the children described only de minimis anxiety rather than trauma as required under Craig. While Lomholt attacks the factual bases of Ms. Tomson's testimony and alleges that she was biased, he does not attack her qualifications.

A careful review of the trial court's findings and Ms. Tomson's unrebutted hearing testimony is necessary to address Lomholt's arguments. The Iowa Court of Appeals described her testimony from the evidentiary hearing:

Tomson testified B.G. became anxious when...

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