Lonberg v. City of Riverside

• Decision Date: 29 January 2004
• Docket Number: No. ED CV 97-237 RT.,ED CV 97-237 RT.
• Citation: 300 F.Supp.2d 942
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: John LONBERG v. CITY OF RIVERSIDE

300 F.Supp.2d 942

John LONBERG v. CITY OF RIVERSIDE

No. ED CV 97-237 RT.

United States District Court, C.D. California, Eastern Division.

January 29, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Terence J. Kilpatrick, San Diego, CA, Page Wellcome, Cardiff-by-the-Sea, Rick R. Rothman, Heather C. Beatty, McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enerson, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff.

Gregory F. Hurley, Michael J. Mills, Paul F. Donsbach, Kutak Rock LLP, Newport Beach, CA, for Defendant.

PROCEEDINGS: ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT CITY OF RIVERSIDE'S MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 56

TIMLIN, District Judge.

The court, Judge Robert J. Timlin, has read and considered defendant City of Riverside (the "City")'s motions (the "Motions") for partial summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 ("Rule 56"), Plaintiff John Lonberg ("Plaintiff")'s oppositions, and the City's replies.

The City filed two motions. One motion is for partial summary judgment on the issue whether Plaintiff is entitled as a matter of law to multiple statutory damages under California Civil Code, Section 54.3 ("Section 54.3") based on a single course of allegedly discriminatory conduct. The second motion is for partial summary judgment on the question whether Plaintiff is entitled as a matter of law to an award of damages against City under the Second Claim of the Complaint for violations of Civil Code, Section 54, et seq., since the California Tort Claims Act ("CTCA") provides City immunity from claims for damages and because Plaintiff cannot establish intentional conduct in violation of Section 54.3. The Court concludes as follows:

I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a complaint in this court alleging City violated Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act [42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.] (the "ADA") and Section 54.3. The gist of the complaint is that the City has failed to provide wheelchair accessible curb ramps ("curb cuts") on city controlled property to the extent necessary to satisfy federal and state law. Plaintiff alleges that this conduct constitutes a violation of Section 54.3.

II.

UNCONTROVERTED MATERIAL FACTS¹

Neither the City nor Plaintiff has provided the court with any material facts supported by admissible evidence which create genuine issues of material fact.²

III.

ANALYSIS

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court may grant summary judgment where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

In contrast, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) ("Rule 12(c)") governs motions for judgment on the pleadings. A Rule 12(c) motion is functionally identical to a motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)"). See Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir.1989). Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate if, assuming all facts in the complaint to be true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir.1989). As with Rule 12(b)(6) motions, in addition to assuming the truth of the facts pled, the court must construe all reasonable inferences drawn from these facts in the plaintiff's favor. See Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Seventh-Day Adventist Congregational Church, 887 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir.1989). Finally, although Rule 12(c) does not mention leave to amend, courts have discretion both to grant a Rule 12(c) motion with leave to amend, see Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 982 F.Supp. 1396, 1401 (N.D.Cal.1997), and to simply grant dismissal of the action instead of entry of judgment. See Moran v. Peralta Cmty. Coll. Dist., 825 F.Supp. 891, 893 (N.D.Cal.1993).

Because the City's motions assert contentions relating solely to the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint, and because no evidence relevant to these contentions has been submitted to the court, the court construes these motions as motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c).

The City contends, as a matter of first impression, that judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff's claim for violation of Section 54.3 because Section 54.3 does not provide liability for public entities.³ In the alternative the City contends that if public entities may be held liable for violation of Section 54.3, Plaintiff failed to allege a required element of Section 54.3 claim: intentional conduct. Finally, the City contends that if it may be, and is held liable under Section 54.3, it is liable only for a single statutory damage award not less than $1000 because its conduct constituted a "single course of conduct."

A. Public Entity Liability For Violations of Section 54.3

In addressing the issue of whether the City can be held liable for a violation of Section 54.3, the parties brief extensively the effect Cal. Govt.Code § 815 ("Section 815") of the CTCA [Cal. Govt.Code § 810 et seq.] has on the claim.⁴ As an initial matter, the court notes that Section 815, and the case law interpreting it, is only tangentially relevant to resolving the question whether the City can be held liable for violating Section 54.3. The passage of Section 815 was designed to eliminate public entity liability based upon common law tort claims. See Williams v. Horvath, 16 Cal.3d 834, 838, 129 Cal.Rptr. 453, 548 P.2d 1125 (1976); Legislative Committee Comment — Senate to Section 815. Accordingly, Section 815(a) provides that: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute: [a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person." But Plaintiff does not allege a common law tort claim, he alleges the violation of a statute — Section 54.3.

So the question is not whether Section 815 shields the City from Section 54.3 liability, because clearly it does not; rather the issue is whether Section 54.3 provides for liability by public entities. Accordingly, the court will turn to the language of Section 54.3.

1. Rules of Statutory Construction

Because the court is interpreting a California statute, it must follow California rules of statutory interpretation. See In re Anderson, 824 F.2d 754, 756 (9th Cir.1987); Batterton v. Texas General Land Office, 783 F.2d 1220, 1222-23 (5th Cir.1986).

California's general canons of statutory construction do not vary significantly from those applied in this circuit. The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. See White v. Ultramar, Inc., 21 Cal.4th 563, 572, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 19, 981 P.2d 944 (1999). "The statute's plain meaning controls the court's interpretation unless its words are ambiguous. If the plain language of a statute is unambiguous, no court need, or should, go beyond that pure expression of legislative intent." Id. (citations omitted). "If, however, the terms of a statute provide no definitive answer, then courts may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history. We must select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences." People v. Coronado, 12 Cal.4th 145, 151, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 906 P.2d 1232 (1995) (citations omitted).

California has adopted a special canon of construction to determine whether statutes creating liability should be applied to public entities: while "in California, all government tort liability must be based on statute...the statute providing for liability need not be part of the Tort Claims Act itself. Nor must the statute provide on its face that it is applicable to public entities. Rather, a liability is deemed `provided by statute' if a statute defines the tort in general terms." Lopez v. Southern California Rapid Transit, 40 Cal.3d 780, 785 n. 2, 221 Cal.Rptr. 840, 710 P.2d 907 (1985) (citations omitted); see also Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal.3d 920, 933-937, 101 Cal.Rptr. 568, 496 P.2d 480 (1972); Levine v. City of Los Angeles, 68 Cal.App.3d 481, 487, 137 Cal.Rptr. 512 (1977) ("the phrase as `provided by statute' [in Section 815] is given its broadest possible meaning by our Supreme Court."). The exception to this rule is provided by People v. Crow, 6 Cal.4th 952, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 864 P.2d 80 (1993). A statute should not be interpreted as applying to public entities where such application would infringe upon the public entities' sovereign powers. See Crow, 6 Cal.4th at 959 n. 6, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 864 P.2d 80 ("governmental agencies are generally held subject to legislation that applies to any `person,' so long as the legislation does not impair the government's sovereign powers."); Nestle, 6 Cal.3d at 933, 101 Cal.Rptr. 568, 496 P.2d 480 ("[G]enerally worded code sections are applied to governmental bodies if no impairment of sovereign powers would result.").

2. Application

Section 54.3 identifies potential violators, stating: "any person or persons, firm or corporation who denies or interferes with admittance to or enjoyment of the public facilities as specified in Section 54 and 54.1... is liable for each such offense." California Civil Code § 14 in turn, defines the word "person" as "includ[ing] a corporation as well as a natural person."

Plaintiff asserts that Section 54.3 is a statute that defines a wrongful act in general terms, and the court agrees. The City appears to contend that the language of Section 54.3 is not general because it defines possible violators as "person or persons, firm or corporation" and because Civil Code § 14 defines person as including "a...