Lone Star Coll. Sys. v. Committee, CIVIL ACTION H-14-529
| Decision Date | 12 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION H-14-529 |
| Parties | LONE STAR COLLEGE SYSTEM, Plaintiff, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM.., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Pending before the court is defendant Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("E.E.O.C.") motion to dismiss plaintiff Lone Star College System's ("Lone Star") complaint. Dkt. 14. After considering the motion, responses, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that the motion should be GRANTED.
This case stems from an E.E.O.C. investigation into a charge against Lone Star to determine whether there was reasonable cause to believe that Lone Star was engaged in unlawful employment practices. During the investigation, the E.E.O.C. issued subpoenas to Lone Star that sought information and witness interviews. Lone Star did not fully comply with the subpoenas because it believed, and still believes, that the investigation is unauthorized by law and is being conducted improperly. E.E.O.C. has not sought judicial enforcement of the subpoenas. Lone Star filed this lawsuit alleging that the E.E.O.C. did not follow its own procedures, regulations and enabling statutes in the launch and execution of the investigation. Dkt. 11 at 1-2. Lone Star claims the lawsuit is fundamentally about when the E.E.O.C. can launch a federal investigation and subject anemployer to the same; and what procedures the E.E.O.C. must follow in arriving at its ultimate conclusion. Id. at 3.
Lone Star alleges eleven different claims against the E.E.O.C.: 1) Opening an investigation against a potential aggrieved party without an authorizing rule or regulation (Id. at 34); 2) Violation of the E.E.O.C.'s duty to verify an aggrieved party to a charge (Id. at 45-46); 3) Attempting to interview management employees outside the presence of counsel (Id. at 48); 4) Attempting to depose Lone Star's General Counsel and former Associate General Counsel generally, and for attempting to question both persons about matters protected by the attorney-client privilege (Id. at 51-52); 5) Allowing conflicted employees to participate in the investigation in violation of ethics standards for Executive Branch employees (Id. at 53-54); 6) Disclosing information obtained from the investigation of Lone Star to a third-party; (Id. at 55-56); 7) Demanding that Lone Star provide a third-party database technician to help the E.E.O.C. access Lone Star's records (Id. at 58-59); 8) Continuing its investigation without particularized facts (Id. at 89-60); 9) Requiring compliance with investigations that are an undue hardship on Lone Star (Id. at 60-61); 10) Violation of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures (Id. at 62-64); 11) Violation of the Fifth Amendment right against takings by demanding a database technician to access Lone Star's data (Id. at 65-67).
The E.E.O.C. filed the instant motion to dismiss all claims against it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Dkt. 14 at 1. Alternatively, the E.E.O.C. moves for summary judgment in its favor. More specifically, the E.E.O.C. claims that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the case is not ripe for review, the plaintiff lacks standing, and none of the statutes or law cited allowsfor the causes of action asserted. Additionally, the E.E.O.C. asserts that Lone Star has failed to sufficiently plead its causes of action. Finally, the E.E.O.C. claims that Lone Star has failed to demonstrate that equitable relief, including injunctive and declaratory relief, is warranted. Lone Star has responded to the motion to dismiss and it is ripe for consideration.
A court may dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) when it "lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case." Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). Parties may use this rule to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case. Ramming v. United States, 284 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). Generally, "[w]hen a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits." Id. "The burden of proof in such a challenge is on the party asserting jurisdiction." Id. However, "there is no mandatory sequencing of jurisdictional issues," and "a federal court has leeway to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits." Sinochem Intern. Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Intern. Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431, 127 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). "A motion under 12(b)(1) should be granted only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Home Builders, 143 F.3d at 1010.
A court may dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Gines v. D.R. Horton, Inc.,699 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As part of the Twombly-Iqbal analysis, the court proceeds in two steps. First, the court separates legal conclusions from well-pled facts. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Second, the court reviews the well-pled factual allegations, assumes they are true, and then determines whether they "plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief." Id. at 679.
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Carrizales v. State Farm Lloyds, 518 F.3d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 2008). A fact issue is "material" if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action. Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Grp., Inc., 482 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2007). "[A]nd a fact is genuinely in dispute only if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the [nonmovant]." Fordoche, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 463 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2006). Ultimately, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the [nonmovant], there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
When the movant bears the burden of proof on an issue, he must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claims or defenses to warrant judgment in his favor. Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original). But when themovant does not bear the burden of proof on a claim or affirmative defense, he bears the initial burden of production to show an absence of evidence to support the non-movant's claim. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James, 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002). If the movant makes this showing, the ultimate burden to avoid summary judgment shifts to the non-movant who "must go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial." Davis-Lynch, Inc., v. Moreno, 667 F.3d 539, 550 (5th 2012). Conclusory allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation are no substitute for specific facts showing a genuine dispute for trial. TIG Ins. Co., 276 F.3d at 759.
Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed to prevent the courts from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies. Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807-08, 123 S. Ct. 2026, 2030 (2003). It protects agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties. Id.
The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") authorizes judicial review of final agency action when a relevant administrative agency statutory provision does not directly provide for judicial review. 42 U.S.C. § 704. Without a statutory provision or final agency action, however, a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an APA claim. Am. Airlines v. Herman, 176 F.3d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 1999). Therefore, when considering the ripeness of a dispute in the administrative agency context, the court must determine whether there is final agency action. The elements to establish the ripeness of a claim under the APA are: "(1) whether the issues are purely legal; (2) whether the issues are based on a final agency action; (3) whether the controversy has a direct and immediateimpact on the plaintiff; and (4) whether the litigation will expedite, rather than delay or impede, effective enforcement by the agency." Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. F.C.C., 183 F.3d 393, 410 n.11 (5th Cir. 1999).
A final agency action must 1) "mark the 'consummation' of the agency's decisionmaking process,...
To continue reading
Request your trial