Lone Star Steel Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 86-1475

• Decision Date: 06 July 1988
• Docket Number: No. 86-1475,86-1475
• Citation: 851 F.2d 1239
• Parties: 128 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2974, 109 Lab.Cas. P 10,604 LONE STAR STEEL COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA and its Local Union 9313, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 1239

851 F.2d 1239

128 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2974, 109 Lab.Cas. P 10,604

LONE STAR STEEL COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA and its Local Union 9313 Defendants-Appellees.

No. 86-1475.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

July 6, 1988.

John J. Carwile (Lynn P. Mattson, Doerner, Stuart, Saunders, Daniel & Anderson, with him on the brief), Tulsa, Okl., for plaintiff-appellant.

Earl V. Brown, Jr., Washington, D.C. (Maynard I. Ungerman of Ungerman, Connor & Little, Tulsa, Okl., of counsel, Michael H. Holland, Washington, D.C., with him on the brief), for defendants-appellees.

Before McKAY, MOORE, and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal by Lone Star Steel Company from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma in favor of the United Mine Workers of America and its Local Union No. 9313, hereinafter referred to as the Union. The proceeding in the district court was a consolidation of an action by Lone Star against the Union for monetary damages pursuant to Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 187 (1982), and a second action filed several years after the first by Lone Star seeking treble damages from the Union pursuant to the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts, as amended, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1, et seq. (1982).

These consolidated actions have their genesis in a strike by the Union at Lone Star's Starlight Mine near McCurtain, Oklahoma. The strike began in November, 1974. On December 5, 1974, the Union and the Bituminous Coal Operators Association ("BCOA") entered into the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1974 ("1974 NBCWA"). Lone Star, however, was not a member of the BCOA, and hence Lone Star and the Union proceeded to negotiate their On March 5, 1975, Lone Star filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") challenging the Union's activities and strike at its Starlight Mine. The NLRB filed a petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma seeking a temporary injunction against the Union. Following a hearing, the temporary injunction was granted on May 5, 1975. The court found the strike at the Starlight Mine was precipitated by the Union's insistence upon the "Successorship Clause" of the 1974 NBCWA, which clause the court found was probably prohibited by Section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act. The court's order did not address the legal status of other clauses of the 1974 NBCWA.

own agreement. The Union sought to have Lone Star accept the 1974 NBCWA and in December, 1974, and January, 1975, there were several meetings between the parties concerning the 1974 NBCWA and its various provisions. On January 3, 1975, there was an interim agreement between Lone Star and the Union, and work at the Starlight Mine temporarily resumed on January 8. However, thereafter the parties failed to reach an accord during the so-called "truce period," and the strike resumed on March 8, 1975.

In the interim, on April 11, 1975, Lone Star filed a civil action against the Union seeking damages under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 187. By agreement of the parties, Lone Star's civil suit was held in abeyance pending disposition of the unfair labor charges. Lone Star's unfair labor charges were litigated before an Administrative Law Judge by the Regional Director of the NLRB. The Regional Director, Lone Star and the Union appealed various aspects of the ALJ's decision to the NLRB, which issued its decision in August, 1977, finding in favor of the Union. United Mine Workers of America, 231 N.L.R.B. 573 (1977). Lone Star appealed the NLRB's decision to this court, which affirmed in part and reversed in part the NLRB's decision. Lone Star Steel Company v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 545 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911, 101 S.Ct. 1349, 67 L.Ed.2d 335 (1981).

On February 6, 1979, Lone Star filed a second action against the Union, based on the same underlying facts which were the basis for its earlier action, alleging a violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1, et seq., and seeking treble damages. On motion, Lone Star's two actions against the Union were consolidated for trial by the district court. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and both motions were denied on the ground that certain issues of material fact were in dispute.

On March 14, 1984, the district court held an evidentiary hearing, at which time representatives of both Lone Star and the Union testified. The parties also submitted to the district court portions of the transcripts made in the earlier NLRB proceedings before the ALJ and in the 1975 temporary injunction proceeding.

The district court by an order and judgment of February 21, 1986, 691 F.Supp. 1280 (E.D.Okl.1986), found in favor of the Union and against Lone Star, and it is from this judgment that Lone Star appeals.

The district court's order is a detailed sixty-one page memorandum, wherein it found, inter alia, that the "Coal Lands" and "Royalty" clauses of the 1974 NBCWA were "objects" of the Union's strike at the Starlight Mine, but that neither clause violated Section 8(e) of the Labor Management Relations Act. The "Successorship" clause of the 1974 NBCWA had also been challenged by Lone Star as one basis for its civil action, but under our decision in Lone Star, 639 F.2d 545, the legality of that clause was no longer an issue.

In its order the district court also held that the "Contracting and Subcontracting," "Construction Work" and "Leasing, Subleasing and Licensing Out of Coal Lands" clauses of the 1974 NBCWA were not objects of the Union's strike at the Starlight Mine. The district court rejected Lone Star's antitrust claims, holding that Lone Star did not have standing to challenge the Union's activities under those acts. The findings of the district court concerning the On appeal, Lone Star argues that the district court erred in finding that the Leasing clause in the 1974 NBCWA was not an object of the Union's strike at the Starlight Mine. Lone Star does not challenge any other finding in the district court's lengthy order involving other aspects of the strike, including the true "objects" of that strike and the "legality" of those "objects."

"Leasing, Subleasing and Licensing Out of Coal Lands" (hereinafter "Leasing") provision of the 1974 NBCWA and whether the inclusion of such a provision in an agreement between Lone Star and the Union was an "object" of the Union's strike are attached to this opinion as Attachment A.

Section 303 of the Labor Management Act of 1947 provides that it is unlawful for a labor organization to engage in any activity or conduct defined as an unfair labor practice in 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(b)(4), and that a person injured by reason of such conduct may sue in any district court of the United States and recover damages caused by such conduct. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 187.

Section 8(b)(4) of the Act provides in pertinent part that it is an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to induce or encourage employees of a person engaged in interstate commerce to strike where "an object thereof is forcing or requiring any employer ... to enter into any agreement which is prohibited by subsection (e) of this section." 29 U.S.C. Secs. 158(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(A) (1982) (emphasis added).

Section 8(e) of the Act provides in pertinent part as follows:

(e) It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible and void.

29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(e) (1982)

As above stated, the district court held that the Union struck with the "object" of coercing Lone Star into acceding to an agreement which contained the "Coal Lands" and "Royalty" clauses contained in the 1974 NBCWA, but went on to hold that neither of those clauses violates Sec. 8(e). As indicated, the district court did not have to consider the "Successorship" clause in the 1974 NBCWA, since we had held it to be outside the scope of Sec. 8(e). Lone Star Steel Co. v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 545 (10th Cir.1980) ¹. The district court rejected Lone Star's contention that there were other "objects" of the strike, and specifically held that the Leasing clause in the 1974 NBCWA was not an "object" of the strike. ² Lone Star argues that the district court's finding on that one issue of fact is "clearly erroneous." We do not agree. For this court to disturb that finding of fact concerning the "purpose" and "object" of the strike would inject us into the fact-finding field, which is not within our province.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) provides that findings of facts by a district court shall not be set aside by an appellate court unless "clearly erroneous." A factual finding is " 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746, reh'g denied, 333 U.S. 869, 68 S.Ct. 788, 92 L.Ed. 1147 (1948). In the instant case we do not have a "definite and firm conviction" that the In Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985), the Supreme Court considered the "clearly erroneous" standard mentioned in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., supra, and spoke as follows:

district court erred in the finding here challenged.

This standard plainly does not entitle a...