Long Lake Twp. v. Maxon
| Decision Date | 15 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 349230 |
| Parties | LONG LAKE TOWNSHIP, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TODD MAXON and HEATHER MAXON, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Grand Traverse Circuit Court LC No. 18-034553-CE
Before: Jansen, P.J., Gleicher, C.J., and Ronayne Krause, J.
ON REMAND
This case is before us on remand from our Supreme Court. In the original action, Todd and Heather Maxon appealed a trial court order denying their motion to suppress aerial photographs taken by Long Lake Township using a drone without the Maxons' permission, a warrant, or any other legal authorization. The township relied on these photos to support a civil action against the Maxons for violating a zoning ordinance, creating a nuisance, and breaching a previous settlement agreement. Long Lake Twp v Maxon, 336 Mich.App. 521, 524-525; 970 N.W.2d 893 (2021) (Long Lake I). This Court determined that the use of the drone violated the Fourth Amendment and reversed the trial court order denying the Maxons' motion to suppress. Id. at 525, 542. The Supreme Court vacated our previous opinion and remanded to this Court "to address the additional issue of whether the exclusionary rule applies to this dispute." Long Lake Twp v Maxon, __ Mich. __; 973 N.W.2d 615 (2022) (Long Lake II).
The exclusionary rule does not apply in this civil matter. Accordingly, even if the township violated the Maxons' constitutional rights, suppression was not supported. We affirm the lower court's order.
Todd and Heather Maxon own a five-acre parcel in Long Lake Township. In 2007, the township brought a zoning action against Todd Maxon arising from his storage of junk cars on the property. That case settled in 2008 with an agreement that no further zoning action would be brought if Todd maintained the status quo-the same number of junked cars. See Long Lake I, 336 Mich.App. at 525.
According to the township, neighboring property owners reported that the Maxons had expanded their junk yard. This allegation could not be confirmed from ground level because buildings and trees obstructed views of the landscape. The township hired Zero Gravity Aerial to take aerial photographs of the Maxons' property with a drone in 2010, 2016, 2017, and 2018. The photographs allegedly show that the dimensions of the Maxons' junkyard had swelled, contrary to the settlement agreement. The township filed a civil action against the Maxons seeking the abatement of the junkyard nuisance. Id. at 525-526.
The Maxons moved to suppress the drone photos, invoking the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the drone surveillance was not a search. Id. at 526-527. This Court granted the Maxons' application for leave to appeal on a single issue-whether the trial court erred when it held that the warrantless search of the Maxons' property with a drone did not violate their Fourth Amendment rights. Long Lake Twp v Maxon, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 18, 2019 (Docket No. 349230). We then reversed the trial court's suppression denial, holding that "drone surveillance of this nature intrudes into people's reasonable expectations of privacy, so such surveillance implicates the Fourth Amendment and is illegal without a warrant or a traditional exception to the warrant requirement." Long Lake I, 336 Mich.App. at 538.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. [US Const, AM IV.]
This constitutional provision guarantees people the right "to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures." People v Cartwright, 454 Mich. 550, 557; 563 N.W.2d 208 (1997). The majority in Long Lake I determined that the township's actions violated the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court has not asked us to address that issue on remand. Because the Supreme Court limited our review to the exclusionary rule's role in this dispute, we proceed by assuming that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred.
"The introduction into evidence of materials seized and observations made during an unlawful search is prohibited by the exclusionary rule." People v Stevens, 460 Mich. 626, 634; 597 N.W.2d 53 (1999), citing Weeks v United States, 232 U.S. 383; 34 S.Ct. 341; 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), overruled on other grounds in Elkins v United States, 364 U.S. 206; 80 S.Ct. 1437; 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960); Silverman v United States, 365 U.S. 505; 81 S.Ct. 679; 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961). But suppression of illegally obtained evidence "is not an automatic consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation." Herring v United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137; 129 S.Ct. 695; 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009). Rather, once a violation is found, the court must consider whether the exclusionary rule demands suppression of the illegally obtained evidence. The exclusionary rule "is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." United States v Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348; 94 S.Ct. 613; 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). "[T]he 'prime purpose' of the rule, if not the sole one, 'is to deter future unlawful police conduct.'" United States v Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446; 96 S.Ct. 3021; 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976), quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347.
We are now asked to consider whether the exclusionary rule applies in zoning cases such as the one at hand. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the application of the exclusionary rule in civil cases. The United States Supreme Court has explained that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is twofold: to deter police misconduct, and to provide a remedy where no other remedy is available. When analyzed under the federal or the Michigan Constitution, suppression of the drone evidence does not serve these goals.
We begin with discussing an outlying case as it assists in explaining away any confusion here. In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700; 85 S.Ct. 1246; 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965), the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule applied in a civil forfeiture action, characterizing the proceeding as "quasi-criminal" in nature. The Court's analysis linked the underlying Pennsylvania civil forfeiture proceeding to a criminal trial. George McGonigle, the car's owner "was arrested and charged with a criminal offense against the Pennsylvania liquor laws." Id. The "object" of the forfeiture action, "like a criminal proceeding," was "to penalize" McGonigle for the criminal offense. Id. Conviction would have subjected McGonigle "to a minimum penalty of a $100 fine and a maximum penalty of a $500 fine." Id. at 701. Yet in the forfeiture proceeding McGonigle stood to lose his sedan, valued at approximately $1,000-double the maximum fine in the criminal case. Id. The Court reasoned: "It would be anomalous indeed, under these circumstances, to hold that in the criminal proceeding the illegally seized evidence is excludable, while in the forfeiture proceeding, requiring the determination that the criminal law has been violated, the same evidence would be admissible." Id. (emphasis added).
The legality of McGonigle's possession of the sedan underpinned the Supreme Court's rationale for applying the exclusionary rule. The Court distinguished between the return of McGonigle's car and a hypothetical return of seized "contraband," such as narcotics or "unregistered alcohol." Id. at 698-699. Application of the exclusionary rule in the latter circumstances, the Court reasoned, "would clearly have frustrated the express public policy against the possession of such objects." Id. at 699. In other words, had the forfeiture action involved an item that McGonigle could not have legally possessed, the outcome may well have been different.
A quartet of civil exclusionary rule cases followed One 1958 Plymouth Sedan. In none of these cases did the Supreme Court uphold the use of the exclusionary rule. Rather, in each case the Supreme Court emphasized that the central purpose of the exclusionary rule-deterrence of police misconduct-counsels against its application in civil cases.
Calandra 414 U.S. 338, involved grand jury proceedings. The Supreme Court firmly nixed use of the exclusionary rule in that setting, stressing the rule's deterrence function. "The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim," the Court explained. Id. at 347. "Instead, the rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]" Id. The Court reiterated that "the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,...
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