Long v. Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P'ship, 12–09–00189–CV.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Citation: 330 S.W.3d 749
• Docket Number: No. 12–09–00189–CV.,12–09–00189–CV.
• Parties: Larry T. LONG, L. Allan Long, And B. Virginia Long, in their Capacity as Trustees of the Lawrence Allan Long Trust, The Charles Edward Long Trust, The Larry Thomas Long Trust and the John Stephen Long Trust d/b/a The Long Trusts, Appellants,v.CASTLE TEXAS PRODUCTION LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Appellee.
• Decision Date: 30 December 2010

330 S.W.3d 749

Larry T. LONG, L. Allan Long, And B. Virginia Long, in their Capacity as Trustees of the Lawrence Allan Long Trust, The Charles Edward Long Trust, The Larry Thomas Long Trust and the John Stephen Long Trust d/b/a The Long Trusts, Appellants,
v.
CASTLE TEXAS PRODUCTION LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Appellee.

No. 12–09–00189–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Tyler.

Dec. 30, 2010.Rehearing Overruled Jan. 25, 2011.

[330 S.W.3d 750]

F. Franklin Honea, The Law Offices of Franklin Honea, Dallas, TX, Ron L. Adkison, Wellborn, Houston, Adkison, Mann, Sadler & Hill, L.L.P., Henderson, TX, for Appellants.Michael E. Jones, Ronald D. Stutes, Potter Minton, A Professional Corporation, Tyler, TX, for Appellee.Panel consisted of WORTHEN, C.J., GRIFFITH, J., and HOYLE, J.

OPINION BRIAN T. HOYLE, Justice.

Larry T. Long, L. Allan Long, and B. Virginia Long, in their capacity as trustees of the Lawrence Allan Long Trust, the Charles Edward Long Trust, the Larry Thomas Long Trust, and the John Stephen Long Trust d/b/a the Long Trusts (collectively the Long Trusts) appeal from the judgment of the trial court. In their sole issue, the Long Trusts challenge the trial court's determination of the accrual date for postjudgment interest. We affirm.

[330 S.W.3d 751]

Background

The Long Trusts sued Castle Texas Production Limited Partnership (Castle) in 1996.¹ Castle thereafter filed a counterclaim against the Long Trusts. After a jury trial, the trial court signed its final judgment on September 5, 2001 (the 2001 judgment). The Long Trusts prevailed and Castle prevailed on its counterclaim. Castle appealed to this court, and the Long Trusts cross-appealed. See Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P'ship v. Long Trusts, 134 S.W.3d 267 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2003, pet. denied). We reversed and remanded the trial court's judgment on the Long Trusts' claims. As to Castle's counterclaim, the claim that we are concerned with in this appeal, we suggested a remittitur on attorney's fees and damages. Castle complied. We then reformed the trial court's judgment, and affirmed the judgment as reformed. Additionally, we instructed the trial court to sever Castle's counterclaim, and by limited remand, ordered the trial court to properly calculate prejudgment interest. After the severance on remand, and after the denial of Castle's petition for writ of mandamus in this court,² Castle affirmatively waived any claim for prejudgment interest at a hearing on March 25, 2009. During that hearing, the trial court rendered another judgment, signing it on the same day (the 2009 judgment). This judgment ordered that Castle recover postjudgment interest from September 5, 2001, the date of the original judgment. The Long Trusts appealed.

Postjudgment Interest

In their sole issue, the Long Trusts contend that postjudgment interest began to accrue on March 25, 2009, the date of the most recent judgment,³ instead of September 5, 2001, the date of the original judgment, as found by the trial court.

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Postjudgment interest is regulated by statute, and as such, its application is a question of law that we review de novo. See Advanced Messaging Wireless, Inc. v. Campus Design, Inc., 190 S.W.3d 66, 71 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2005, no pet.) (citing Columbia Medical Center v. Bush ex rel. Bush, 122 S.W.3d 835, 865 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied)).

Postjudgment interest is recoverable on any money judgment in this state as long as the judgment specifies the postjudgment interest rate. Tex. Fin.Code Ann. § 304.001 (Vernon 2006). Postjudgment interest is compensation allowed by law for the use or detention of money, computed from the date of rendition of judgment until the date of satisfaction. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word v. Dunsmoor, 832 S.W.2d 112, 119 (Tex.App.-Austin 1992, writ denied); see also Tex. Fin.Code Ann. § 304.005(a) (Vernon 2006). Generally, a judgment is rendered when the decision is officially announced orally in open court, by memorandum filed with the clerk, or otherwise announced publicly.

[330 S.W.3d 752]

Garza v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 89 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex.2002).

Discussion

The Long Trusts argue that when we ordered the trial court to sever Castle's counterclaim and determine the prejudgment interest issue, the September 5, 2001 judgment became interlocutory. In other words, they urge that the September 5, 2001 judgment lost its status as a final judgment and the monetary award became uncertain. Because of this procedural posture, the Long Trusts contend, postjudgment interest did not begin to accrue until the trial court rendered its second judgment on March 25, 2009–the day that Castle affirmatively waived its entitlement to prejudgment interest in open court. ⁴

Castle argues that our opinion in Lewis v. Hill controls the disposition of this case. Lewis v. Hill, 429 S.W.2d 572 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1968, no writ). In that case, Hill brought suit against Lewis for dissolution of their partnership. Id. at 573. Hill prevailed and obtained a judgment...