Long v. Cnty. of Saginaw & William Federspiel
| Decision Date | 27 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 12-cv-15586 |
| Parties | LAURENCE LONG, Plaintiff, v COUNTY OF SAGINAW and WILLIAM FEDERSPIEL, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Honorable Thomas L. Ludington
Laurence Long, an attorney, alleges that members of the Saginaw County Sheriff's Office violated his Fourth Amendment rights by videorecording his meeting with a client in a classroom at the Saginaw County Jail.
Defendant Federspiel1 has moved for summary judgment on Long's claims against him in his individual and official capacity.2 Because Sheriff Federspiel is entitled to qualified immunity in his individual capacity, and because the Sheriff's Department is not a cognizable "person" for § 1983 claims, his motion for summary judgment will be granted.
Laurence Long is an attorney licensed to practice in Michigan. Long has been in private practice since November 25, 1986, and practiced in several areas of law. As part of his practice, Long accepted appointments pursuant to the Saginaw County Circuit Court's Plan forAppointment of Counsel for Indigent Parties. Three months before the events of this case, in December 2011, Long qualified to be placed on a list to be appointed by the Saginaw County Circuit Court to represent criminal capital offenses.
A
In February 2012, Diane Messing retained Long to represent her in her divorce case. Long was subsequently appointed to Ms. Messing's criminal case after she was arrested on two counts of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. After her arrest, Ms. Messing was detained in the Saginaw County Jail.
On March 25, 2012, Long visited Ms. Messing and another client in the Saginaw County Jail. Upon his arrival, Long asked Corrections Officer Stanley Powell if Ms. Messing had been seen by medical personnel as Long had requested on the previous Friday, March 23, 2012. Officer Powell responded that Ms. Messing had been seen by medical personnel.
Sergeant Ebony Rasco, who was also present during Long's inquiries into Ms. Messing's condition, became "alarmed" because Long "asked if his client received medical attention and the frequency with which he visited his client." Concerned with Long's behavior, Sergeant Rasco had corrections officers place Long in a room known as the "small classroom," which is commonly used for court video arraignments.
Sergeant Rasco acknowledged that she placed Long in the small classroom because she would be able to observe Long's interaction with Ms. Messing through video surveillance. Long's meetings with Ms. Messing were videotaped and recorded from a remote location by Defendants. The recordings were silent; they did not record any audio.
Neither Sergeant Rasco nor any other corrections officer informed Long that they were recording his meetings. Saginaw County Jail does not have any signs indicating that the smallclassroom's surveillance camera is on or that it is recording. Moreover, at least two other criminal defense attorneys acquainted with the Saginaw County Jail were surprised to learn that their client meetings had been recorded.
Sergeant Rasco watched the video feed as officers brought Ms. Messing to the small classroom. She explains that Long and Ms. Messing greeted each other with a hug and then sat down "very close to one another in a familiar sort of way." Sergeant Racso "thought the hug was inappropriate for an attorney and his client." She observed Long and Ms. Messing walk out of view of the camera for several minutes, and then Long pressed the call button so that the officer could retrieve Ms. Messing.
After observing Long's interaction with Ms. Messing, Sergeant Rasco went back to view prior video footage of Long's visits with Messing. She discovered that on March 19, 2012, Ms. Messing had hugged Long and kissed him on the cheek during a meeting.
Sergeant Rasco informed the jail administrator, Captain William H. Gutzwiller, that she had observed inappropriate contact between Long and Messing. Captain Gutzwiller banned Long from visiting Ms. Messing inside the Saginaw County Jail and also decided that if Long wanted to see Ms. Messing, a court transport officer could bring her to the courthouse for a meeting.
Captain Gutzwiller then spoke with Judge Kaczmarek, the Saginaw County Chief Circuit Judge at the time, regarding the allegations against Long. During the conversation, Captain Gutzwiller denied that Long and Ms. Messing had engaged in any "sexual stuff": "I said I didn't say it was sexual, sir, I said it was inappropriate."
After the conversation with Captain Gutzwiller, Judge Kaczmarek requested an investigation into Long's conduct on the video recording. Judge Kaczmarek removed Long fromthe Saginaw County Circuit Court's Plan for Appointment of Counsel for Indigent Parties. Long was also replaced as Ms. Messing's attorney of record in her criminal cases. Even though he had been replaced as Ms. Messing's criminal defense attorney, Long continued to represent Ms. Messing in her divorce proceedings.
On November 1, 2012, the Attorney Grievance Commission decided that the investigation into Long's alleged improper conduct did not warrant further action by the Commission and closed the investigation.
A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the "movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the initial burden of identifying where to look in the record for evidence "which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the opposing party who must set out specific facts showing "a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (citation omitted). The Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant and determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52.
Having already challenged the merits of Long's Fourth Amendment claim in their previous motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment, Defendant Federspiel now contends that the claims against him in his individual and official capacities must be dismissed. Specifically, Sheriff Federspiel contends that: (1) he had no personal involvement in the videorecording; (2) he is entitled to qualified immunity from the individual capacity claim; and (3) the claim against him in his official capacity is duplicative of the claim against Saginaw County.3
Sheriff Federspiel first contends that he cannot be liable in his individual capacity because he was not actively involved in the video recording of Long's meeting with his client in the jail. Personal involvement is a prerequisite to the assessment of damages in § 1983 actions; the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to a § 1983 theory of liability. "At a minimum, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate." Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984).
Here, Federspiel's liability under 1983 is premised on Long's allegation that he maintained a jail policy that facilitated violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Indeed, former Undersheriff Robert Karl acknowledged that the Saginaw County Jail had a "standard operating procedure" where officers would attempt to place attorneys and clients in rooms that had recording capabilities:
Karl: Yes.
Q: Is that standard operating procedure written?
Karl: I believe it is. I'd have to look it up, I would have to refer to the policies and procedures.
Resp., Ex. 7 at 7, ECF No. 53.
Moreover, Sheriff Federspiel explained that his preference was to have every room in the jail amenable to video surveillance—even rooms where attorneys could meet with clients:
In light of Undersheriff Karl's testimony that placing attorneys meeting with clients in rooms with recording capabilities was "standard operating procedure," and Sheriff Federspiel's testimony indicating his desire to have cameras in all areas, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that Sheriff Federspiel maintained a policy that could allow a violation of the Fourth Amendment to occur.
Sheriff Federspiel next contends that, even if he had some active involvement in the recording of Long's meeting, he is entitled to qualified immunity. Specifically, Sheriff Federspiel asserts that Long has not shown that the right in question was "clearly established" as required to defeat a qualified immunity defense.
Although violations of constitutional rights by government officials acting under color of state law are generally redressable through an action under § 1983, the doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from...
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