Long v. Crossan

• Citation: 21 N.E. 450,119 Ind. 3
• Parties: Long et ux. v. Crossan.
• Decision Date: 10 May 1889
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

119 Ind. 3

21 N.E. 450

Long et ux.

v.Crossan.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

May 10, 1889.

Appeal from circuit court, Benton county; P. H. Ward, Judge.

Straight & Wiley, for appellants. Walker & Phares, for appellee.

Mitchell, J.

The following facts present the question for decision: Mattie Long, wife of James Long, being the owner in her own right of a certain lot in the town of Fowler, in Benton county, executed a deed, in which her husband joined, by which she conveyed the lot to John Dempsy, for the nominal consideration of $1,500. Dempsy, on the same day, for a like consideration, conveyed the property to James Long, husband of Mattie Long. There was no consideration actually paid, or agreed to be paid, for either of the foregoing conveyances; they having been made merely to invest James Long with the title, so that he might secure a loan of $500, which he desired to make for his own benefit. Afterwards, on the 17th day of October, 1881, Crossan, upon the recommendation and solicitation of Dempsy, made a loan of $500 to Long, and took a mortgage upon the property owned and conveyed as above, in which both Long and wife joined, as security. Dempsy, who knew of the purpose for which the property had been transferred from Mrs. Long to her husband, furnished Crossan $250 of the money thus loaned to Long and took his note for the amount. The title had stood in the name of James Long some six months at the time Crossan made the loan, and there was evidence tending to show that he took the security upon the faith of an abstract of title furnished him, and that he had no knowledge that the title had been transferred merely to enable Long to make the loan, and to evade the statute which prohibits a married woman from entering into any contract of suretyship, by pledging her property for the debt of another or otherwise. The title has remained in the husband ever since the above-mentioned conveyances were made, in April, 1881. The foregoing facts appeared in a suit by Crossan, to foreclose his mortgage taken as above. Upon the facts thus summarized, the court below gave judgment of foreclosure against both the mortgagors. The wife prosecutes this appeal, and on her behalf it is insisted that the facts show nothing more than an indirect attempt to do that which is prohibited by section 5119, Rev. St. 1881, which declares, in effect, that a married woman shall not, in any manner, enter into any contract of suretyship, and that all such contracts as to her shall be void.

We fully concur in the view that the statute which removes the disabilities of married women, to the extent that it does, was designed for their more complete protection, and to enable them the better to use and employ their separate property. The above section, which prohibits married women from entering into contracts of suretyship, was intended to secure to them or their estates the exclusive benefit of their...