Long v. Jasper Land Co.

• Decision Date: 24 May 1928
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 141
• Citation: 217 Ala. 593,117 So. 210
• Parties: LONG, Judge, v. JASPER LAND CO.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

117 So. 210

217 Ala. 593

LONG, Judge, v. JASPER LAND CO.

6 Div. 141

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 24, 1928

Appeal from Circuit Court, Walker County; R.L. Blanton, Judge.

Petition of the Jasper Land Company for mandamus to E.W. Long, as Judge of Probate of Walker County, to require respondent to receive and record a deed of conveyance without payment of a license or privilege tax. From a judgment awarding the writ respondent appeals. Affirmed.

Coleman D. Shepherd, of Jasper, for appellant.

Arthur Fite, of Jasper, for appellee.

GARDNER J.

The Jasper Land Company tendered to the probate judge of Walker county a deed for filing and record, which recited that it was executed for the purpose of perfecting the title of the grantee to the real estate described therein, and disclosed upon its face that the consideration was nominal; the grantee at the time being the equitable owner of the property. The probate judge declined to accept the deed for record without the payment of a privilege or license tax, which was not tendered, and mandamus proceedings followed, resulting in a judgment for the petitioner, from which the probate judge prosecutes this appeal.

The privilege or license tax for recording deeds was first provided for by the Act of September 14, 1923 (General Acts 1923, p. 318), and has received construction in the following, among other cases: State ex rel. Blue v Stiles, 212 Ala. 468, 102 So. 901; State ex rel Hamilton v. Williams, 214 Ala. 89, 106 So. 500; Garrison v. Hamlin, 215 Ala. 39, 109 So. 106.

The substance of this act has been brought forward as a part of the General Revenue Act (General Acts 1927, p. 139), and constitutes section 21 1/2 thereof. Some changes were made in the original enactment, and the act of 1923 repealed thereby. Among the changes made was the exception from the requirement of the payment of any such tax, "deeds or instruments executed for a nominal consideration for the purpose of perfecting the title to real estate." As appears upon the face of the deed here involved and offered for record, as well as upon the undisputed proof, it comes within the very language of the above-quoted exception, and no tax was required. No argument is required to sustain such conclusion, as the recitals of the deed, supported without conflict by the proof, bring the case squarely within the excepted provision of the Act.

The question is discussed by counsel for appellant as...