Long v. Kuhn (In re Kuhn's Estate)

• Decision Date: 27 October 1904
• Citation: 125 Iowa 449,101 N.W. 151
• Parties: IN RE KUHN'S ESTATE. LONG v. KUHN.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

125 Iowa 449

101 N.W. 151

IN RE KUHN'S ESTATE.

LONG

v.KUHN.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 27, 1904.

Appeal from District Court, Keokuk County; J. T. Scott, Judge.

The plaintiff herein, Chas. Kuhn, Sr., is the father of Chas. Kuhn, Jr., who died on the 4th day of September, 1900, from the effects of poison unlawfully and feloniously administered to him by the appellant, Sarah Kuhn. State of Iowa v. Kuhn, 117 Iowa, 216, 90 N. W. 733. This is an action in probate, brought by the plaintiff to determine the right of the defendant, Sarah Kuhn, to take the distributive share of her deceased husband's estate, provided for by section 3366 of the Code. There was a judgment determining the issue adversely to the defendant, and she appeals. Reversed.D. W. Hamilton and C. M. Brown, for appellant.

W. C. Gamble and J. P. Talley, for appellee.

SHERWIN, J.

The question of first importance in this case, and the only one which we feel called upon to determine, is whether the defendant, Sarah Kuhn, is denied the right to a distributive share of her deceased husband's estate by section 3386 of the Code. The section is in the following language, so far as the same is material here: “No person who feloniously takes or causes or procures another so to take the life of another shall inherit from such person, or take by devise or legacy from him, any portion of his estate; * * * but in every instance mentioned in this section, all benefits that would accrue to any such person upon the death * * * of the person whose life is thus taken shall become subject to distribution among the other heirs of such deceased person, according to the foregoing rules of descent and distribution in case of death.” The language of the statute is that the murderer shall not inherit or take by devise or legacy from the deceased person. The law is well settled in this state that the distributive share which the widow takes under section 3366 of the Code goes to her as a matter of contract and of right, and not by inheritance. Phillips v. Carpenter, 79 Iowa, 600, 44 N. W. 898;French v. French, 84 Iowa, 655, 51 N. W. 145, 15 L. R. A. 300;Smith v. Zuckmeyer, 53 Iowa, 14, 3 N. W. 782;Burns v. Keas, 21 Iowa, 257; Rausch v. Moore, 48 Iowa, 611, 30 Am. Rep. 412. It is apparent, therefore, that section 3386 does not, by its express terms, prohibit the guilty spouse from taking the distributive share provided for in section 3366.

It is insisted, however, that it was the intention of the statute to prohibit any person from taking or receiving any benefits which might come to him as the result of his criminal act, and that it should be so construed in the interest of justice and public policy. It cannot be doubted that the statute must be regarded as penal. It imposes a forfeiture of a property right which becomes vested upon the death of the ancestor or testator. It is not strictly a criminal statute, but so much in the nature of one that we have held that such statutes must be strictly construed. Hanks v. Brown, 79 Iowa, 560, 44 N. W. 811;Bond v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 67 Iowa, 712, 25 N. W. 892. And such is the general rule recognized by the authorities. Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29, 23 L. Ed. 196;Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wells, 65 Ohio St. 318, 62 N. E. 332, 58 L. R. A. 651. And see cases cited in note in 26 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, 661.

It is said by the appellee that, notwithstanding this rule, the statute should be given an equitable construction so as to bring the defendant within the scope of its purpose. But we are cited to no authority which goes to the length of holding that a penal statute should be given such a construction for the purpose of bringing within its purview persons or acts which are not within the legitimate intendment thereof as determined by the words of the statute itself. Such statutes are inelastic, and cannot, by construction, be made to embrace cases plainly without the letter, though within the reason and policy, of the law. The State v. Lovell, 23 Iowa, 304. In United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 5 L. Ed. 37, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking of this rule of construction, said: “The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals, and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the Legislature, not in the judicial department. It is the Legislature, not the court, which is to define crime and ordain its punishment. It is said that, notwithstanding this rule, the intention of the lawmakers must govern in the construction of penal as well as other statutes. This is true, But this is...