Long v. Sealed Air Corp..

• Decision Date: 26 January 2011
• Docket Number: No. 4783.,4783.
• Citation: 391 S.C. 483,706 S.E.2d 34
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Leslie M. LONG, Respondent,v.SEALED AIR CORPORATION, Employer, Liberty Insurance Corporation, Carrier, Appellants.

391 S.C. 483

706 S.E.2d 34

Leslie M. LONG, Respondent,

v.SEALED AIR CORPORATION, Employer, Liberty Insurance Corporation, Carrier, Appellants.

No. 4783.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard Sept. 16, 2010.Decided Jan. 26, 2011.

Jeffrey S. Jones, of Greenville, for Appellants.R. Scott Dover, of Pickens, for Respondent.FEW, C.J.

Leslie Long commenced this workers' compensation action alleging an injury to her cervical spine while working for Sealed Air Corporation. The single commissioner held Long failed to report the injury within ninety days as required by section 42–15–20 of the South Carolina Code (Supp.2010). An appellate panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission affirmed. Initially, the circuit court affirmed. However, Long filed a motion for reconsideration, which the circuit court granted. In its reconsideration order, the circuit court found Long complied with the notice requirement, reversed the appellate panel, and remanded “for further investigation.” Sealed Air and its carrier Liberty Insurance Corporation appeal the circuit court's order. We dismiss the appeal because the circuit court's order is not immediately appealable.

In Montjoy v. Asten–Hill Dryer Fabrics, 316 S.C. 52, 446 S.E.2d 618 (1994), our supreme court dismissed an appeal from a circuit court order remanding to the Workers' Compensation Commission and stated “we have consistently held that an order of the circuit court remanding a case for additional proceedings before an administrative agency is not directly appealable.” 316 S.C. at 52, 446 S.E.2d at 618. In Leviner v. Sonoco Products Co., 339 S.C. 492, 530 S.E.2d 127 (2000), the supreme court cited Montjoy in dismissing a circuit court order remanding to the commission even though the supreme court characterized the order as “final.” The court stated: “While final, this order was not directly appealable since it remanded the matter to the single commissioner for further proceedings.” 339 S.C. at 494, 530 S.E.2d at 128. As we have been required to do, this court has consistently followed Montjoy when deciding the appealability of circuit court orders in workers' compensation cases. See, e.g., Foggie v. Gen. Elec., 376 S.C. 384, 388, 656 S.E.2d 395, 398 (Ct.App.2008) (quoting above passage from Montjoy in holding remand order unappealable).

However, we have distinguished Montjoy in limited situations, which are not applicable on the facts of this case. In Hicks v. Piedmont Cold Storage, Inc., 324 S.C. 628, 479 S.E.2d 831 (Ct.App.1996),¹ this court found the circuit court's order remanding to the commission appealable because “additional proceedings [were] not required....” 324 S.C. at 632 n. 2, 479 S.E.2d at 834 n. 2. Noting the “order remanded the case merely for a mathematical calculation of death benefits, rather than for any judgment on the merits,” this court stated “further proceedings on remand are purely ministerial and do not require the exercise of independent judgment or discretion on the part of the commission.” Id.

In this case, the commission's finding that Long did not report the injury within the statutory notice period ended the action. Under the circuit court's order in this case, the commission must determine on remand whether the injury occurred during the scope and course of employment, set the claimant's average weekly wage and compensation rate, and answer other questions which may arise. Therefore, we find no basis on which to distinguish Montjoy as we did in Hicks. Rather, we find the commission must conduct additional proceedings before a final judgment is reached. Thus, Montjoy controls, and this order is not appealable.

We find support for this conclusion in the recent decision of Charlotte–Mecklenburg Hospital Authority v. South Carolina Department of Health & Environmental Control, 387 S.C. 265, 692 S.E.2d 894 (2010). In Charlotte–Mecklenburg, the supreme court dismissed an appeal from the Administrative Law Court because its order was “not a final decision which is immediately appealable under [section] 1–23–610 [of the South Carolina Code (Supp.2010) ].” 387 S.C. at 267, 692 S.E.2d at 895. The court held that the general appealability provisions in section 14–3–330 of the South Carolina Code (1976), which sometimes allow appeal of interlocutory orders, are “inapplicable” because section 1–23–610 is a more specific statute and “limits review to final decisions of the ALC.” 387 S.C. at 266, 692 S.E.2d at 894. The reasoning of Charlotte–Mecklenburg applies to appeals from the Workers' Compensation Commission, which are governed by section 1–23–380 of the South Carolina Code (Supp.2010). Like its ALC counterpart relied on in Charlotte–Mecklenburg, section 1–23–380 is a more specific statute that limits review to “a final decision....” Id.² Under the reasoning of Charlotte–Mecklenburg and in light of section 1–23–380, the general appealability provisions of section 14–3–330 are “inapplicable” to the extent they “permit the appeal of interlocutory orders of ... an administrative agency.” 387 S.C. at 266, 692 S.E.2d at 894.

Further, Charlotte–Mecklenburg specifically overruled two decisions of this court in which we found interlocutory orders appealable under section 14–3–330. 387 S.C. at 266, 692 S.E.2d at 894. The court stated:

To the extent Canteen v. McLeod Regional Medical Center, 384 S.C. 617, 682 S.E.2d 504 (Ct.App.2009) and Oakwood Landfill, Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, [381] S.C. 120, 671 S.E.2d 646 (Ct.App.2009) rely on § 14–3–330 to permit the appeal of interlocutory orders of the ALC or an administrative agency, those cases are overruled.

387 S.C. at 266, 692 S.E.2d at 894. Canteen is an appeal from the Workers' Compensation Commission, 384 S.C. at 619, 682 S.E.2d at 504, and Oakwood Landfill is an appeal from the Board of the Department of Health and Environmental Control reviewing the decision of the ALC. 381 S.C. at 127, 671 S.E.2d at 650. In Canteen we quoted at length from this court's opinion in Brown v. Greenwood Mills, Inc., 366 S.C. 379, 622 S.E.2d 546 (Ct.App.2005). We relied on Brown in finding the order appealable, stating “we find this case is similar to ... Brown because the Appellate Panel finally determined the brain injury issue on the merits by denying compensation for Canteen's brain injury.” ³Canteen, 384 S.C. at 624, 682 S.E.2d at 507. As Canteen is based on the same reasoning as Brown, the supreme court's decision in Charlotte–Mecklenburg expressly overruling Canteen is at least an implicit rejection of Brown. In light of Charlotte–Mecklenburg, we can find no basis on which to distinguish any decisions, including Brown,⁴ which rely on section 14–3–330 in finding a decision of the commission appealable. Accordingly, we believe the supreme court has effectively overruled Brown, and we will no longer apply it.

In this case, the order on appeal remands the case to the commission for additional proceedings. Accordingly, it is not a final judgment and the order is not immediately appealable. The order may be appealed after final judgment.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

HUFF, J. concurs.GEATHERS, J. (dissenting).

Respectfully, I dissent. The majority dismisses this appeal on the ground that the circuit court's order is interlocutory. I disagree because I believe the circuit court's decision touches upon the merits and therefore constitutes a final judgment for purposes of our jurisdiction over a workers' compensation appeal. For a complete understanding of our jurisdiction in this matter, it is necessary to begin with the governing statute, S.C.Code Ann. § 1–23–390 (Supp.2010), and then to trace the evolution of published opinions interpreting this statute.

Section 1–23–390 states:

An aggrieved party may obtain a review of a final judgment of the circuit court or the court of appeals pursuant to this article by taking an appeal in the manner provided by the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules as in other civil cases.

(emphasis added). Our supreme court quoted this statute in its opinion in Montjoy v. Asten–Hill Dryer Fabrics; however, in determining if the circuit court's order was appealable, the supreme court focused only on whether the order included language remanding the case for additional proceedings. 316 S.C. 52, 446 S.E.2d 618 (1994). The court did not expressly evaluate the nature of the issues raised on appeal. Id. Under section 1–23–390, it was logical for our supreme court to hold that a circuit court ruling remanding a case to the Commission was not immediately appealable when the appeal challenged only the propriety of the remand. See Owens v. Canal Wood Corp., 281 S.C. 491, 491–92, 316 S.E.2d 385 (1984); Hunt v. Whitt, 279 S.C. 343, 343–44, 306 S.E.2d 621, 622 (1983). Such an appeal does not involve the merits of the case. On the other hand, a circuit court ruling on the merits has finality with respect to the issue decided and will become the law of the case if it is not immediately appealed.⁵ Therefore, it is untenable to label such a ruling as interlocutory merely because it is accompanied by language remanding the case for further proceedings.

More recent published precedent, beginning with Brown v. Greenwood Mills, Inc., has carefully scrutinized the language in remand orders, recognizing the benchmark set forth by Montjoy's predecessors—whether an order “involves the merits”—and thus reaffirming the legislative intent behind the term “final judgment” as set forth in section 1–23–390:

The question here is whether the circuit court order is a “final judgment” under section 1–23–390. Generally, an order is a final judgment on one or more issues if it constitutes an ultimate decision on the merits. In Owens v. Canal Wood Corp., 281 S.C. 491, 316 S.E.2d 385 (1984), one of the two cases cited by the Montjoy court,⁶ the supreme court found the order of the circuit court does not involve the merits of the action. It is therefore interlocutory and...