Long v. State
Decision Date | 28 May 1904 |
Citation | 81 S.W. 387,72 Ark. 427 |
Parties | LONG v. STATE |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Hempstead Circuit Court, JOEL D. CONWAY, Judge.
Reversed.
Reversed and remanded.
John N Cook, for appellant.
Appellant's motion for certiorari should have been granted. 19 Ark. 178; 15 Ark. 395; 13 Ark. 720. A witness is protected from testifying as to any communication he may have made to his attorneys in confidence. 21 Ark. 387; 33 Ark. 771; 65 Ark 389. The defendant's silence is not subject to comment. Sand. & H. Dig. § 2910. It was error to compel appellant to answer the question as to what he had heard concerning witness McDaniel. 1 Greenleaf, Ev. §§ 99-101; 22 Ark. 477; Sand. & H. Dig. § 2958; 70 Ark. 272; 49 Ark 156; 58 Ark. 277. No predicate for impeachment had been laid. 65 Ark. 475; 70 Ark. 272. The fact that a witness was convicted of an infamous crime cannot be proved by hearsay. 70 Ark. 272; 49 Ark. 156; 58 Ark. 277; 1 Greenleaf, Ev. § 375. Nor can it be proved by proof of association with felons. 58 Ark. 473; 46 Ark. 141; 66 Ark. 286; 56 Ark. 345; 25 Ark. 89; 69 Ark. 648; 69 Ark. 653. It was error to refuse to permit appellant to introduce testimony as to the dangerous character of deceased. 43 Tex. 242; 15 Tex.Crim. 96; 20 Id. 1 28 Id. 17; 61 S.W. 124. And that deceased constantly went armed. 61 S.W. 124. The instruction on the question of self-defense was erroneous. 67 Ark. 594; 22 Ark. 356; 29 Ark. 263; 69 Ark. 148. The jury should consider all the evidence. 62 Ark. 312. Instruction No. 15 was erroneous. 62 Ark. 312; 55 Ark. 594; 29 Ark. 348. The sixth instruction asked by appellant should have been given. The argument of the prosecuting attorney was clearly prejudicial, and the admonitions of the court were of no effect. 58 Ark. 353, 473; 62 Ark. 126; 61 Ark. 157; 70 Ark. 285, 305; 69 Ark. 643; 65 Ark. 389, 486, 619; 63 Ark. 174; 67 Ark. 365.
George W. Murphy, Attorney General, for appellee.
Levi Long was indicted by a grand jury of the Miller circuit court for murder in the first degree, committed by killing E. G. Garrett. The defendant filed a motion to quash the indictment and a demurrer, both of which were overruled. On his motion for change of venue the cause was transferred to the Hempstead circuit court. A transcript of the record and proceedings in the case was filed in that court, but the defendant suggested that it was defective because it did not contain copies of his motion and demurrer, and asked that a writ of certiorari be issued, directing the clerk of the Miller circuit court to complete it in that respect, which motion the court denied.
In a trial by jury the testimony of Napoleon H. McDaniel, taken and reduced to writing in an investigation before a justice of the peace, was read as evidence, by consent, on the part of the state, which, in part and substantially, is as follows: On the 2d day of January, 1903, witness met the defendant and the deceased at Texarkana, in this state. He saw the deceased and defendant conversing frequently during the day. "Late in the afternoon deceased, defendant and witness took a drink in a saloon, and deceased started out, saying that he had to go." They went out of the saloon, and walked down Broad street until they reached the 16 to 1 saloon, and stopped there, and deceased and defendant had another conversation, which witness did not hear, and after this defendant invited deceased and witness to take a drink, which they did. The deceased then bade witness and defendant "Good-bye" and left, going each down Broad street, saying that he was going home. Shortly afterwards witness and defendant mounted horses and rode down the same street, going to College Hill. At a particular time, after going some distance, witness, when he was riding a short distance ahead, heard a noise behind, and, looking back, saw a man approaching on horseback, looking like he had been riding in a gallop, and heard him hollo, "Where in the hell are you fellows going?" and witness replied, "We are going over on the hill." The man was the deceased. He rode alongside of the defendant. About this time a pistol was fired. Witness looked back, and saw deceased lying on the pommel of his saddle, and saw a pistol in the hand of the defendant.
The evidence clearly and conclusively proved that Garrett was killed by the defendant at the time of the shooting related by McDaniel.
The appellant, in testifying in his own behalf, stated that, at the time the deceased overtook them, McDaniel said to him, "Look out, he is going to shoot you!" The state, in cross-examining him, asked if he had instructed his attorneys to ask McDaniel, while he was testifying in the investigation before a justice of the peace, if he (McDaniel) made such statement, and the defendant objected, and the court held that the question was proper, but that the defendant could answer or not as he might elect, and he refused to answer.
In cross-examining the defendant, the state interrogated him about his association with McDaniel, which being admitted, asked, for the purpose of impeaching him as a witness, if he had not heard that McDaniel had been convicted of train robbery and murder in Texas and sentenced to the penitentiary for life and pardoned, which, being compelled to answer over his objections, he answered in the affirmative.
On direct examination he testified that one Van Williams, in the evening of the day on which Garrett was killed, informed him that the deceased at that time was angry, and attempted to borrow a pistol, and he thought had succeeded. On cross-examination he was asked if he had process issued for Van Williams, who was absent and did not testify. He offered the testimony of witness to explain Van Williams' absence, and the court would not allow him to do so.
The defendant offered to prove by witness that the deceased had the general reputation in the community in which he lived of going constantly armed, which the court excluded. He was, however, allowed to and did prove that the deceased had the general reputation of being a dangerous man.
One of the attorneys for the state in the closing speech of the jury in the case said: "Napoleon McDaniel (the witness whose testimony in the investigation before a justice of the peace was read in evidence) has not only been convicted of train robbery and murder, but is now confined in the jail of Bowie county, Texas, for murdering a poor old Confederate soldier." Defendant objecting to the remark, the court reprimanded the attorney, and told the jury not to consider it. "Whereupon," says the record in this case, Other improper remarks were made by the same attorney in his speech before the jury, which were excluded by the court from their consideration.
The defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree, and he appealed.
There was no reversible error in the refusal to issue a writ of certiorari to the clerk of the Miller circuit court, directing him to complete the transcript of the record and proceedings of that court, so as to show copies of his motion to quash the indictment and demurred to the same. The record shows that the indictment is sufficient, and that it was regularly and properly found, returned into court, numbered and filed.
The question asked appellant, on cross-examination, as to his instructing his attorneys to ask McDaniel, when testifying in the investigation before the justice of the peace, if he (McDaniel) said at the time deceased was killed, "Look out, he is going to shoot you," and the remarks of the court as to the same, were not prejudicial. The testimony of McDaniel, which was read to the jury, shows that he did not testify as to what he said...
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