Long v. Union R. Co.
Decision Date | 13 April 1949 |
Docket Number | No. 9829.,9829. |
Citation | 175 F.2d 198 |
Parties | LONG v. UNION R. CO. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
John E. Evans, Jr., Pittsburgh, Pa. (Evans, Ivory & Evans and Wm. D. Hilldorfer, Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief), for appellant.
Chauncey Pruger, Pittsburgh, Pa. (John W. Wishart and Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.
Before GOODRICH, WALLER, and McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judges.
Appellant sued to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by him while employed by appellee. The trial below resulted in a defendant's verdict and this appeal is from the judgment entered thereon.
The complaint specifically stated that it was based on negligence. That negligence allegedly consisted of an inefficient brake, failure to warn plaintiff thereof, failure to make inspections in connection with same and failure to furnish plaintiff with a safe place to work. There was some evidence on behalf of the plaintiff supporting that charge; for example, Long himself testified regarding the brake that Though the Safety Appliance Acts1 were not named in the complaint, the district judge rightly thought that the charge and proof of an inefficient brake brought into the case the absolute duty of the defendant to provide the particular car with an efficient brake. With this in mind he, as indicated by what he said in disposing of plaintiff's motion for a new trial, intended to instruct the jury "that if plaintiff established by the fair weight of the evidence that he was injured by reason of the failure of the defendant to provide a car with an efficient hand brake, he was entitled to recover for the full amount of his injuries." And the real question before us is whether he did this fully and correctly or whether the charge was so confusing in its presentation of the governing principles of liability as to substantially prejudice the plaintiff.
Though the summations of counsel are not with the record and apparently were not reported, appellant's brief states that his case was submitted to the jury in the closing address upon the theory that if the hand brake he was operating "did not work efficiently and if he was injured as a result of such, their only concern was then with the question of damages." Appellee seeks to turn the problem into one of proof, namely, whether plaintiff produced evidence sufficient to permit a jury to find that his injury was caused by a brake which was not efficient. In so doing appellee, among other things, seemingly overlooks the fact that this was precisely the query given the jury for decision and that there was no motion on behalf of the defendant for a non-suit at the end of the plaintiff's case or for a direction of verdict in favor of the defendant at the end of the whole case; also that no point for charge was submitted on behalf of the defendant which requested the jury be instructed that they were not to consider whether the brake was efficient. To add its bit to the generally unsatisfactory situation there was an oral request by the plaintiff's attorney after the charge of the court had been completed, that the court "instruct the Jury as to the nature and extent of the Railroad's obligation to provide an efficient brake under the Safety Appliance Act." This the court refused.
The problem confronting us arises primarily from the manner in which plaintiff's cause of action was pleaded and tried. It was the complaint which alleged the inefficient brake and the lack of inspection thereof as negligence. It was not until after the judge had charged the jury that there was any mention to him of the contention that the Safety Appliance Acts governed and that the jury should be so instructed. The trial court realized that the assertion of an inefficient brake coupled with supporting testimony raised the issue of absolute liability on the part of the defendant and he endeavored to give the jury the correct resulting picture. He did so after a fashion but in combining plaintiff's theory of negligence which included lack of inspection as a vital part of that claim, with the principle of absolute liability, the net result unfortunately was confusing and may have misled the jury. If the negligence features of the charge were its only difficulty these might perhaps be said to have been absorbed by the later strong language which though placed under the head of negligence, unmistakably applied the test of absolute liability to the condition of the brake. However, there are other elements which cannot be thus eliminated.
In the charge, the trial court first told the jury that the plaintiff in order to recover "must prove by the fair preponderance of evidence, that this Defendant was negligent and that it led to the injury claimed by him." The court went on to say that:
And, continued the court, the only claim by the plaintiff to be decided by the jury was whether ...
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