Long v. Vielle

Decision Date04 August 1989
Citation549 So.2d 968
PartiesAthalie D. LONG v. Yvonne VIELLE f/k/a Yvonne Vielle Bowers. 87-1338.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Thomas M. Galloway of Collins, Galloway & Smith, Mobile, for appellant.

Julie L. Christie, Mobile, for appellee.

MADDOX, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment reforming a deed to real property located in Mobile County.

The facts are as follows. In February 1979, Yvonne Vielle, formerly known as Yvonne Vielle Bowers, was the grantee in a deed, executed by Athalie D. Long pursuant to a contract for the sale of real property for $10,000. Long also conveyed the property adjoining Vielle's property to Vielle's mother. Specifically, Long conveyed to Vielle a parcel of land consisting of two lots, which we will refer to as lots one and two. 1 Vielle was actually put in possession of, and claimed to own lots one, two, and three. The land in question here is lot three. Vielle and Long agree that the deed conveyed to Vielle lots one and two; Vielle contends that the deed should be reformed to include a description of lot three. She argues that it was the intent of the parties that Long convey these three lots and that by mutual mistake the deed referred to only lots one and two.

The record reveals that shortly after purchasing the property, Vielle undertook to clear off the property with a tractor and a large mower. After clearing off the property, Vielle installed a septic tank and placed a mobile home and a wooden storage building on the property. Long never voiced any complaints concerning the improvements made on the property.

Approximately one year after Vielle obtained possession of the subject property, Long received a property tax assessment for the property on which Vielle's mobile home was situated. Long forwarded the assessment to Vielle. Vielle, in turn, went to the courthouse to check on the status of her property taxes. No error in the assessments Vielle had previously received was discovered, nor was there any indication that she was delinquent in the payment of property taxes.

In May 1986, Vielle discovered that Sharon Long, daughter-in-law of Athalie Long and neighbor of Vielle, had recently purchased lot three from the State of Alabama for back taxes owed.

Vielle sued Athalie D. Long, seeking reformation of the deed description so that it would reflect what Vielle contended had been the true intentions of the parties.

The trial court, after hearing testimony, entered an order on March 25, 1988, reforming the deed. That order provided as follows:

"This is an action to reform a deed. Defendant-seller and Plaintiff-purchaser viewed the property in question and both agreed that what was to be conveyed lay between point 'x' and point 'y'. The problem is that Defendant believed that the land to be conveyed consisted of fewer lots than was the case. Defendant's price for the conveyance was based on that belief and the deed was drafted based on that belief. The description in the deed did not, therefore, include all of the property between point 'x' and point 'y'.

"Clearly, the parties mutually agreed on the actual property to be conveyed. The failure of the deed to reflect that agreement was a mutual mistake. The fact that Defendant was misinformed as to the number of lots she owned does not alter her expressed intention to convey all of the property between the agreed points."

I

The first issue we address is whether there was sufficient evidence before the trial court of a mutual mistake on which to base a reformation of the deed.

It is readily apparent, from a reading of Athalie Long's testimony at trial, that both parties were under the mistaken belief that the deed conveyed the property from the Burns property line (i.e., the line of a certain neighboring landowner) to within 100 feet of the Grand Bay water tower. In essence, the description contained within the deed erroneously omitted a portion of the property intended to be conveyed. The following testimony of Athalie Long, given on cross-examination, clearly exposes her intentions regarding the conveyance:

"Q. Do you remember your conversation regarding what the boundary lines were?

"A. I owned--I told her I owned the property from the Burns line to the water works. That was in the section that I owned. But I sold the property to her from that plat and it was the same plat that was shown here because it's the only one I have ever had. We sat right on my porch and came to these conclusions.

"Q. You testified earlier that you intended to sell all of that property that you owned; is that correct?

"A. I was willing to sell it all. I did not know that there was three lots there instead of two.

"Q. So is it a fair and accurate statement that a mistake was made on the deed and you intended at that time to sell all the property that you owned on that--

"A. I would have sold it but the price would have been different. The price was figured on the size of the lot.

"THE COURT: Let me see if I understand what you have said. You have told Ms. Vielle that you owned all of the property from the Burns line to the water tower?

"THE WITNESS: Right.

"THE COURT: And that's all you thought you owned?

"THE WITNESS: Well, that's all I owned, but--

"THE COURT: All right. Then was it your intention to sell her what you thought you owned there?

"THE WITNESS: My intention was to sell her two lots, which is all that I thought I owned. It did not come up until this--

"THE COURT: You told me that you thought you owned the property from the Burns line to the water tower.

"MR. GALLOWAY: Judge, she has got to explain that. There is more to it that hasn't been brought out as to why she thought that.

"THE COURT: Let me ask her the questions for a moment.

"MR. GALLOWAY: All right.

"THE COURT: You said that you owned all the property from the Burns--that you thought you owned all the property from the Burns line to the water tower?

"THE WITNESS: Yes, I owned it.

"THE COURT: Let me finish.

"THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.

"THE COURT: You thought you owned that, right? And that it was your intention to sell her all that you owned?

"THE WITNESS: I was willing to sell all that I owned, but the plat said those two lots and I had thought that Ladner got the third lot.

"THE COURT: Well, I understand that it's divided up into more lots than you thought.

"THE WITNESS: Yes, right. There was an extra lot there that I didn't know about, but the price and everything was figured from the plat.

"Q. So it's your testimony the negotiations were based on lots and not boundary lines?

"A. Right.

"Q. Even though you took Ms. Vielle over there and showed her boundary lines and discuss[ed] your property and the price that you wanted for that property? You have testified that you, Ms. Vielle, Ms. Vielle's mother, Frances Vielle, and Ms. Vielle's ex-husband, Mr. Bowers, [rode] to the property and at that time you discussed the boundaries to the property that you wanted to sell Ms. Vielle; is that correct?

"A. Yes, um-hum.

"Q. Okay. You never told Ms. Vielle that she was on property that you owned, did you?

"A. No.

" * * * *

"Q. Were you aware that Ms. Vielle was placing a trailer on that property?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Did you ever direct her not to place a trailer on that property?

"A. No, because I thought the footage that I sold came that far. That's the whole thing. We should have had it surveyed, I am sure. But I thought the footage--

" * * * *

"Q. Didn't you have the deed prepared?

"A. Yes, um-hum.

"Q. Okay. So it's true you never requested Ms. Vielle to stop clearing that property?

"A. No.

"Q. You never directed her to take her trailer off?

"A. No. I stated that I thought that the two lots included that area.

"Q. Okay.

"A. That was my understanding.

"Q. Did you ever request that Ms. Vielle pay rent for lot [three]?

"A. No, I didn't.

"Q. So, you thought she purchased lot [three]; is that true?

"A. I thought that it was included in the two lots."

It is axiomatic that a court in Alabama may exercise its equitable jurisdiction to reform a deed that does not accurately reflect the intentions of the parties. "One ground for reformation of a written instrument is mutuality of mistake." Powell v. Evans, 496 So.2d 723, 725 (Ala.1986). (Citations omitted.) With regard to mutuality of mistake, this Court in Palmer v. Palmer, 390 So.2d 1050, 1053 (Ala.1980), stated:

"Mistake of fact is a well-recognized ground for interposition of a court of equity. 13 Am.Jur.2d Cancellation of Instruments § 31 (1964). Where it appears that by a mutual mistake of all parties the instrument does not conform to or express their intention or agreement, as where by mistake some material part of the instrument is omitted or the deed is drawn to convey a different interest or a greater or lesser estate than was agreed upon, relief may be had in equity against the other party to the conveyance or his privies. 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds §§ 155, 158 (1965).

"Although a deed in terms expresses the intention of the parties, if there is a material mistake as to the property to which those terms apply, such as to its identity, situation, boundaries, title, amount, value, and the like, a court of equity may grant appropriate relief. Goodrich v. Lathrop, 94 Cal. 56, 29 P. 329 (1892)."

The trial court did not err in reforming the deed.

II

We must next determine whether Sharon Long was a bona fide purchaser for value. Reformation should not be granted if a bona fide purchaser has since acquired legal title to the disputed property "in good faith for value without notice, either actual, constructive, or inquiry, of the grounds for reformation." Lee v. Brown, 482 So.2d 293, 297 (Ala.1985).

Alabama Code 1975, § 35-4-153, provides:

"When, through fraud, or a mutual mistake of the parties, or a mistake of one party which the other at the time knew or suspected, a deed, mortgage or other conveyance does not truly express the intention of the parties, it may be revised by a court on the application of the party...

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