Longacre v. State
| Decision Date | 31 December 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 3703,3703 |
| Citation | 448 P.2d 832 |
| Parties | 70 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2646, 1 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 635, 1 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9939 Bob F. LONGACRE and Hattie Longacre, Appellants (Defendants below), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Dean W. Borthwick, Cheyenne, for appellants.
Sterling A. Case, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Lynn R. Garrett, Deputy Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, Robert A. Gish, County and Prosecuting Atty., Basin, for appellee.
Before HARNSBERGER, C. J., and GRAY, McINTYRE, and PARKER, JJ.
This case brings into question the validity of the provision contained in ch. 162, § 1, S.L. of Wyoming 1963 (§ 12-20, W.S.1957, 1967 Cum.Supp.), which states, 'No female shall be employed as a bartender in a room holding a retail liquor license.'
In a civil action initiated by the county attorney of Big Horn County the district court found appellants, Bob F. Longacre and Hattie Longacre, in violation of the laws of Wyoming for employing a woman bartender. A suspension of the retail liquor license of the Longacres was ordered for one week. The licensees have appealed claiming the prohibition against the employment of a woman bartender is unconstitutional and void; and that such prohibition is also void because it has been superseded by subsequent legislation.
Appellants suggest the prohibition against the employment of women bartenders has been impliedly repealed by the subsequent enactment, in 1965, of the Fair Employment Practices Act, §§ 27-257 to 27-264, W.S.1957, C.1967. If that be so, we will not need to decide whether the prohibition was constitutional prior to its implied repeal.
Section 27-261, W.S.1957, C.1967, states:
'It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment practice: (1) For an employer to refuse to hire, to discharge, to promote or demote, or to discriminate in matters of compensation against, any person otherwise qualified, because of sex, race, creed, color, national origin or ancestry.
'(2) For a person, an employment agency, a labor organization, or the employees or members thereof, to discriminate in matters of employment or membership against any person, otherwise qualified, because of sex, race, creed, color, national origin or ancestry.'
To us, the Fair Employment Practices Act is plain and unambiguous. It contains no exceptions. It clearly makes it unlawful for an employer to:
1. Refuse to hire any person otherwise qualified because of sex;
2. Discharge any person otherwise qualified because of sex;
3. Promote or demote any person otherwise qualified because of sex; or
4. Discriminate in matters of compensation against any person otherwise qualified because of sex.
Where the legislature enacts two laws and such laws contain conflicting provisions and are so repugnant to each other that they cannot stand together, the later enactment will prevail over the earlier one. State v. Cantrell, 64 Wyo. 132, 186 P.2d 539, 542; State v. Mayer, 81 Idaho 111, 338 P.2d 270, 273; State ex rel. Hughes v. State Board of Land Commissioners, 137 Mont. 510, 353 P.2d 331, 336-337; In re Martinez' Will,47 N.M. 6, 132 P.2d 422, 424.
The directive in § 27-261 that an employer must not discriminate on account of sex, and must not refuse to hire a person otherwise qualified on account of sex, clearly contradicts and is repugnant to that sentence in ch. 162, § 1, S.L. of Wyoming 1963 (§ 12-20, W.S.1957, 1967 Cum.Supp.), which states no female shall be employed as a bartender in a room holding a retail liquor license.
We do not pretend to say the Alcoholic Beverages Act and the Fair Employment Practices Act relate generally to the same subject. However, the provision within the Alcoholic Beverages Act which prohibits the employment of female bartenders and the provision within the Fair Employment Practices Act which prohibits discrimination on account of sex, when persons are employed, do deal with the same subject. That subject is the employment of females.
In Union Pac. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 103 Utah 186, 134 P.2d 469, 474, recognition was given to the fact that part of a particular act effected an implied repeal of all acts and parts of acts which were in conflict therewith. See also Ex parte Sweeden, 84 Okl.Cr. 127, 179 P.2d 695, 697-699, where the court held a statute was repealed by implication 'insofar' as it conflicted with a part of a subsequent enactment. The Supreme Court of Colorado, in Thompson v. People, 136 Colo. 336, 316 P.2d 1043, 1044, held the provision for sentence of a person under 21 years of age, contained in the robbery statute passed in 1931, controlled over a particular provision contained in the Reformatory Act of 1889.
We are not unmindful of the rule of statutory construction that, where there is a conflict between a special statute and a general statute, the special statute may control. However, rules of statutory construction are usually only guidelines to aid courts in arriving at the legislative intent. The ultimate thing to be...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Nehring v. Russell, 4831
...Wyo.1977, 569 P.2d 1235, reh. den.; Thomas v. State, Wyo.1977, 562 P.2d 1287; Hutchins v. State, Wyo.1971, 483 P.2d 519; Longacre v. State, Wyo.1968, 448 P.2d 832; Doyle v. Schroeder, 1956, 76 Wyo. 178, 301 P.2d 379, and while such implicit repeals have at times been found, Thomas v. State,......
-
State v. Sodergren, 83-110
...not favored, State v. Cantrell, supra, 186 P.2d at 543; but this court has not hesitated to apply this in a proper case, Longacre v. State, Wyo., 448 P.2d 832, 834; Blount v. City of Laramie, Wyo., 510 P.2d 294, 296; Tucker v. State ex rel. Snow, 35 Wyo. 430, 251 P. 460, 465. If the statute......
-
Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 4752
...We are without authority to modify § 1-7.7 by writing into it an exception which the legislature did not express. Cf. Longacre v. State, Wyo., 448 P.2d 832, 834 (1964). In Ivey v. Wiggins, 276 Ala. 106, 159 So.2d 618 (1964), the Supreme Court of Alabama was faced with the question of whethe......
-
Sorenson v. State, 5118
...application, it repeals by implication earlier laws dealing with only a small part of the same subject. (Citations.)" Longacre v. State, Wyo., 448 P.2d 832, 834 (1968). And see Hutchins v. State, Wyo., 483 P.2d 519 (1971). If the parole is mandated by the court at a specific time after inca......