Longan v. Gilbert
| Decision Date | 07 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. C16-6053 BHS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
| Parties | DANIEL RAYMOND LONGAN, Petitioner, v. MARGARET GILBERT, Superintendent of the Stafford Creek Corrections Center, Respondent. |
This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation ("R&R") of the Honorable Karen L. Strombom, United States Magistrate Judge (Dkt. 8), and Petitioner Daniel Raymond Longan's ("Longan") objections to the R&R (Dkt. 9). Having reviewed the R&R, the parties' pleadings, and the remainder of the record, the Court adopts in part and declines in part the R&R.
On March 20, 2007, Longan was arrested upon the conclusion of a high-speed car chase where multiple shots were fired at police from the fleeing vehicle. Dkt. 7, Ex. 2 at 1-2. Longan was the driver of the vehicle. Id. On July 2, 2008, Longan was convicted on three counts of first degree assault with firearm enhancements and the trial court sentenced Longan to 480 months confinement. Id., Ex. 1.
Longan appealed his convictions to the Washington Court of Appeals. Id., Exs. 3-5. On August 25, 2009, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. Id., Ex. 2. As one of his assignments of error, Longan claimed that the voir dire of a prospective juror in a private courtroom hallway violated his right to a public trial. Regarding this claim, the Court of Appeals concluded:
Longan argues that the trial court denied him his right to a public trial by questioning a potential juror in the hallway during voir dire. But the trial court did not close the courtroom, as the judge did in Orange. He conducted the questioning of the potential juror in the hallway, which was just as open to the public as was the courtroom. Longan does not show that he was denied his right to a public trial.
Longan moved for reconsideration of this decision, indicating that the record on appeal actually showed that the hallway where the voir dire took place was closed to the public. Id., Ex. 6. However, the Court of Appeals denied reconsideration, indicating that this was an issue more appropriately brought as a personal restraint petition. Id., Ex. 8. On November 30, 2009, Longan petitioned for review by the Washington Supreme Court. Id., Ex. 9. On March 30, 2010, the Washington Supreme Court denied review. Id., Ex. 11. On April 14, 2010, the Washington Court of Appeals issued its mandate. Id., Ex. 12.
On December 2, 2009, Longan filed a personal restraint petition in the Washington Court of Appeals. Id., Ex. 13-31. On September 29, 2015, after a lengthy stay of the proceedings, the Washington Court of Appeals denied the personal restraint petition. Id., Exs. 28, 32. The Court of Appeals noted that, although prejudice is presumed on directappeal, collateral review of an alleged public trial violation requires a showing of actual and substantial prejudice. Id., Ex. 32 at p. 6 n.6. Denying the petition, the Court of Appeals concluded that Longan's claim must fail "because Longan cannot show actual and substantial prejudice resulting from the trial procedure." Id., Ex. 32 at p. 7.
On October 29, 2015, Longan moved for discretionary review by the Washington Supreme Court. Id., Ex. 33. On June 6, 2016, the Commissioner of the Washington Supreme Court denied review on the same grounds as the Court of Appeals; namely, that Petitioner could not show prejudice resulting from the alleged denial of his right to a public trial. Id., Ex. 34 at pp. 1-3. On July 6, 2016, Longan moved to modify the Commissioner's ruling. Id., Ex. 35. On August 31, 2016, the Washington Supreme Court denied the motion to modify. Id., Ex 36. On September 8, 2016, the Washington Court of Appeals issued a certificate of finality. Id., Ex. 37.
On December 23, 2016, Longan filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Dkt. 1. On February 8, 2017, Respondent Mary Gilbert (the "State") filed a response. Dkt. 5. On April 4, 2017, Judge Strombom issued the R&R denying the petition. Dkt. 9. On April 17, 2017, Longan objected to the R&R. Dkt. 9. On April 18, 2017, the State responded to the objections. Dkt. 10.
The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
First, the Court addresses Longan's argument regarding the supposed vagueness of the R&R. Specifically, Longan complains that Judge Strombom mischaracterized his first ground for relief as an ineffective assistance counsel claim based on counsel's "failing to raise a public trial." See Dkt. 9 at 2. Petitioner states: "Apart from the vagueness of what is meant by the R&R's use of the phrase 'raise a public trial,' the fact of the matter is that the R&R's mischaracterizes Ground One of the Petition." Dkt. 9 at 2. Aside from the fact that Longan actually misquotes the R&R to create an issue over a trivial spelling error—an error that notably does not actually exist—this argument lacks merit. The R&R actually describes Longan's first ground for relief as a claim for "ineffective assistance by failing to raise a public trial violation . . . ," which is exactly what Longan's claim is. Dkt. 9 at 1. To quote Longan's own description of his first ground for relief in his petition, his claim is that: "[w]here IAC is asserted under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, for counsel's failure to raise issue of public trial violation, prejudice to the defendant should be presumed and need not be proven." Dkt. 1 at 6. Therefore, to the extent Longan argues that the R&R is vague or mischaracterizes his petition, those objections are rejected.
Longan also argues that he was deprived of the right to a public trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel and that the Washington Court of Appeals improperly required him to show actual and substantial prejudice resulting from his counsel's failureto inform him of his right to a public trial or to object to a nonpublic voir dire of a prospective juror.
In Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-10 (1991), the Supreme Court differentiated between two categories of constitutional errors in criminal cases: "trial errors" and "structural errors." Distinguishing between these two types of errors is often critical on review of a conviction for the following reason: While trial errors may be "quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt," id. at 308, structural errors "defy analysis by harmless error standards" because they "affect[] the framework within which the trial proceeds" and are not "simply an error in the trial process itself," id. at 309-310. See also United States v. Cazares, 788 F.3d 956, 970 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2484 (2016).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that denying a defendant's right to a public trial constitutes a structural error not subject to harmless error review. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 (2006) () (emphasis added and internal citations omitted); Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310 () (emphasis added and internal citations omitted). The NinthCircuit has also unequivocally stated that "[t]he denial of the right to public trial has been categorized as a structural defect." Cazares, 788 F.3d at 970 (citing Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149).
The Supreme Court has also recognized that the right to a public trial extends "not only to the trial as such but also to the voir dire proceeding in which the jury is selected." Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (1984); see also Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 209 (2010); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside Cty., 464 U.S. 501, 505 (1984). Although it is clear that some circumstances will warrant closing voir dire to the public during jury selection, the Supreme Court has directed that "in those cases, the particular interest, and threat to that interest, must 'be articulated [by the trial court] along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered.'" Presley, 558 U.S. at 215. Additionally, the Court must consider all reasonable alternatives to closure on the record. Id. at 216. As noted by the Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise, a trial court's failure to expressly consider alternatives to the closure of voir dire during jury selection will result in constitutional error, regardless of whether there otherwise existed adequate findings to justify closure. 464 U.S. at 511. Accordingly, "[a] district court violates a defendant's right to a public trial when it totally closes the courtroom to the public, for a non-trivial duration, without first complying with the four requirements established by the Supreme Court's Press-Enterprise and Waller decisions." United States v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1063 (9th Cir. 2011). In such circumstances, failure to engage in the necessary analysis will result in automatic reversal and a new trial, regardless of whether "the trial court hadan overriding interest in closing voir...
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