Longenette v. Krusing

• Citation: 322 F.3d 758
• Decision Date: 07 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. 00-3690.,00-3690.
• Parties: William LONGENETTE, Appellant v. Peter KRUSING; William E. Perry, Special Agent FBI; Federal Bureau of Investigation
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

322 F.3d 758

William LONGENETTE, Appellant v. Peter KRUSING; William E. Perry, Special Agent FBI; Federal Bureau of Investigation

No. 00-3690.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued September 17, 2002.

Filed: March 7, 2003.

Keith Noreika (Argued), Covington & Burling, Washington, DC, for Appellant.

Bonnie R. Schlueter, Esquire, Paul E. Skirtich (Argued), Office of United States Attorney, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellees.

Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, SCIRICA and McKEE, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.

This case involves an administrative forfeiture proceeding of a motor vehicle allegedly used in certain drug transactions. The pro se prisoner's claim of ownership was dismissed as untimely. At issue is whether to apply the prison mailbox rule.

I.

On August 30, 1990, federal authorities arrested William Longenette on drug-related charges. One day later, special agents of the FBI seized his 1985 Dodge B250 Custom Van, under § 881 of the Controlled Substances Act. 21 U.S.C. § 881. The government initiated administrative forfeiture proceedings against Longenette's van on March 27, 1992, advising him to "file a claim of ownership and a bond ... by May 12, 1992" to contest the forfeiture.¹ Longenette did not receive the initial notice immediately since it was mailed to an incorrect prison location. On April 16, Longenette claimed ownership of the van in a letter to the FBI. Longenette also asserted an inability to post the mandatory bond and requested an in forma pauperis declaration to provide in lieu of the bond.

The FBI mailed Longenette an in forma pauperis form on April 17, responding to a separate request from Longenette's former attorney, who had received a copy of the initial notice. The FBI's letter accompanying the form provided a deadline extension and directed Longenette to "return" the form to the FBI by May 29. The record does not indicate when Longenette received the IFP form. On May 27, he handed the completed form to prison authorities for mailing to the FBI, but wrote the date of May 9 next to his signature. The FBI did not receive the form until June 2, four days after the May 29 deadline. On July 6, the FBI sent a letter to Longenette advising him that his bond was untimely and that the administrative forfeiture proceedings would continue.

On September 15, 1992, Longenette filed suit to contest the administrative forfeiture. On June 6, 1994, the District Court dismissed Longenette's claim based on lack of jurisdiction and insufficient service of process. On November 9, 1995, we reversed, finding jurisdiction on due process grounds, and remanded for further consideration. Longenette v. Krusing et al., No. 94-3321 (3d Cir. filed Aug. 25, 1995) (table). On September 26, 2000, after several delays in securing counsel for Longenette, the District Court granted the government's motion for summary judgment.² Longenette filed a timely appeal.³

II.

A.

The Controlled Substances Act permits seizures and subsequent forfeitures of motor vehicles used to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of illegal drugs. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a). For seized property valued less than $500,000, the Act and accompanying regulations authorize civil forfeiture through an administrative action rather than through a judicial proceeding. Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 1316.77(b).

An administrative forfeiture proceeding requires the FBI or DEA, whichever is relevant, to notify any person with an interest in the property. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.77. The government accomplishes notification by sending a letter via certified mail to the person's last known address and by advertising a notice of forfeiture in a local publication on three separate occasions. See 19 U.S.C. § 1607(a); 21 C.F.R. § 1316.75(a). Any person claiming ownership has twenty days in which to file a claim stating his interest "with the appropriate customs officer." 19 U.S.C. § 1608. The individual also must provide a bond "to the United States" to cover the costs and expenses of judicial proceedings. Id. Individuals who cannot afford to post a bond may file an in forma pauperis declaration. 19 C.F.R. § 162.47(e). Once an individual properly contests the administrative forfeiture, the matter automatically is forwarded to the courts for judicial proceedings.⁴ 19 U.S.C. §§ 1608, 1610; 21 C.F.R. §§ 1316.76(b), 1316.78.

Here, the government initiated administrative forfeiture proceedings against Longenette's van on March 27, 1992. Longenette filed his ownership claim on April 16 and requested IFP status. By letter of April 17, the FBI forwarded an IFP form to Longenette and provided a "return" deadline of May 29, 1992. Longenette submitted his completed IFP form to federal prison authorities on May 27, but the FBI did not receive the form until June 2. The timeliness of Longenette's submission, therefore, depends on the application of the prison mailbox rule.

B.

Nearly fifteen years ago, the Supreme Court promulgated the prison mailbox rule. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988). Houston involved a pro se prisoner's appeal of a district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The prisoner gave a notice of appeal to prison authorities on the twenty-seventh day following the district court's judgment. But the district court did not receive the filing until the thirty-first day, one day beyond the permitted period. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal because the prisoner had filed it outside of the permitted thirty days.

The Supreme Court reversed, crafting a prison mailbox rule whereby the date on which a prisoner transmitted documents to prison authorities would be considered the actual filing date. The Court designed the rule specifically for pro se prisoners. Id. at 275, 108 S.Ct. 2379 ("[A] pro se prisoner has no choice but to hand his notice over to prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk."). The Court cited several policy considerations for its decision: a pro se prisoner may only communicate with the district court through prison authorities; a tardy prisoner is not free to "walk" papers to the district court; and the prevention of an intentional delay in transmission by prison authorities. Id. at 274, 108 S.Ct. 2379. The Court also noted the "well-developed procedures" at federal prisons that record the date and time of prisoner submissions, making reference to prison mail logs a "straightforward inquiry." Id. at 275, 108 S.Ct. 2379.

The dissenting justices in Houston remarked that the "decision obliterates the line between textual construction and textual enactment." Id. at 277, 108 S.Ct. 2379 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted that "the Court's rule makes a good deal of sense [but] it is not the rule that we have promulgated through congressionally prescribed procedures." Id.

C.

Five years after Houston, the Supreme Court returned to the prison mailbox rule in Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 113 S.Ct. 1085, 122 L.Ed.2d 406 (1993). The State of Michigan sought to try a prisoner detained by the State of Indiana. Under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, a prisoner may file a request for final disposition in the prosecuting state.⁵ The Agreement provides for dismissal with prejudice if the prosecuting state does not bring the prisoner to trial within 180 days of receiving such a request. Here, Michigan brought the prisoner to trial 196 days after he delivered his request to prison authorities, but only 177 days after the Michigan prosecutor received the request.

The Court held the prison mailbox rule did not protect the detainee, focusing on the Agreement's specific language: "[the detainee] shall be brought to trial within one hundred and eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer ... written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition ...." Id. at 45 n. 1, 113 S.Ct. 1085 (quoting 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, Art. III(a) (emphasis added)). The Court concluded this language meant the 180-day period could not begin to run until the prosecuting officer received the request for final disposition. Because, under the statute, the time period specifically commenced after delivery to the prosecuting officer, the prison mailbox rule did not apply.

The line between Houston and Fex is a narrow one. The distinguishing factor appears to be the specificity of the "service" language in the statute at issue. Before we examine the statutory language of civil forfeitures, it is instructive to look at three recent appellate decisions.

D.

In Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir.1999), a prisoner filed an administrative claim of excessive force under the Federal Tort Claims Act. He delivered the claim to prison authorities within the Drug Enforcement Administration's two-year regulatory period, but the DEA did not receive the claim until one day beyond the permitted time. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found no difference between the filing of a court action and the filing of an administrative claim, so it applied the prison mailbox rule to make the plaintiff's filing timely. Id. But the court did explain that "Houston does not apply, of course, when there is a specific statutory regime to the contrary." Id. at 152 n. 1.

The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have rejected the prison mailbox rule's application to administrative proceedings when precluded by a specific statutory or regulatory regime. Smith v. Conner, 250 F.3d 277 (5th Cir.2001); Nigro v. Sullivan, 40 F.3d 990 (9th Cir.1994). Nigro involved a pretrial detainee who tested positive for illegal drug use. Following the Bureau of Prisons' prescribed administrative remedies, the detainee filed his appeal with the General Counsel's Office. But that office did not receive his appeal until thirty-one days after the initial...