Longest v. Sledge

• Decision Date: 19 September 2013
• Docket Number: No. 47A05–1211–CT–594.,47A05–1211–CT–594.
• Citation: 992 N.E.2d 221
• Parties: Matthew LONGEST, Deceased, by Robert LONGEST, Administrator of the Estate and Parent of Matthew Longest, and Robert Longest, Jr., Administrator of the Estate of Maribel Longest, Deceased and Parent of Matthew Longest, Appellants–Plaintiffs, v. Lisa M. SLEDGE, a minor, and Roger Brown and Donna Sledge, a/k/a Donna Sledge Brown, Appellees–Defendants.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

992 N.E.2d 221

Matthew LONGEST, Deceased, by Robert LONGEST, Administrator of the Estate and Parent of Matthew Longest, and Robert Longest, Jr., Administrator of the Estate of Maribel Longest, Deceased and Parent of Matthew Longest, Appellants–Plaintiffs,

v.Lisa M. SLEDGE, a minor, and Roger Brown and Donna Sledge, a/k/a Donna Sledge Brown, Appellees–Defendants.

No. 47A05–1211–CT–594.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

July 17, 2013.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 19, 2013.

Mary Beth Ramey, Ramey & Hailey, Indianapolis, IN, Nicholas F. Baker, The Hastings Law Firm, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellants.

William H. Kelley, Darla S. Brown, Kelley, Belcher & Brown, Bloomington, IN, Attorneys for Appellees.

OPINION

FRIEDLANDER, Judge.

Robert Longest Sr. and Maribel Longest (collectively, the Longests) filed a wrongful death action following the death of their son, Matthew Longest, and named Lisa Sledge, Donna Sledge Brown, and Robert Brown as defendants.¹ The Longests appeal from a final judgment following the trial court's entry of partial summary judgment in favor of defendants on the Longests' claims under the Child Wrongful Death Statute ² (CWDS) and the General Wrongful Death Statute ³ (GWDS). The Longests raise the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment for the defendants on the Longests' CWDS claim based on its conclusion that Matthew was not a child for the purposes of the CWDS because he was not enrolled in a vocational school or program?

2. Did the trial court err in granting partial summary judgment for the defendants on the Longests' GWDS claim based on its conclusion that the Longests were not Matthew's dependents for the purposes of the GWDS?

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in limiting its award of attorney fees?

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

In 1998, twenty-one-year-old Matthew was living with his parents and participating in an informal, non-union apprenticeship to become a journeyman mason under his father's supervision. Matthew had begun learning the masonry trade from his father while still in high school, and after leaving high school in 1995, became his father's full-time apprentice. In December 1997, Robert Sr., who had previously been self-employed for a number of years as a journeyman mason, took a job with Wilhelm Construction Company as a mason. At that time, Matthew also began working for Wilhelm as a hod carrier.⁴ Wilhelm offered a union apprenticeship program, but Matthew did not enroll. Instead, Matthew continued his informal apprenticeship with Robert Sr. while they worked together at Wilhelm.

On April 21, 1998, Robert Sr. was driving Matthew home after a day at work when they were involved in a head-on collision with a vehicle driven by then-sixteen-year-old Lisa Sledge. Matthew did not survive the accident, and Robert Sr. was seriously injured.

On October 4, 1999, the Longests filed an action against the defendants asserting four claims: Count I, the estate's wrongful death claim under the GWDS; Count II, the Longests' wrongful death claim under the CWDS; Count III, Robert Sr.'s personal injury claim; and Count IV, Maribel's loss of consortium claim.⁵ On April 12, 2001, the defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment arguing that recovery under the GWDS was limited to medical, funeral, and administration expenses and attorney fees because the Longests were not Matthew's “dependent next of kin.” Appellant's Appendix at 21. The Longests filed a response in which they argued that they were entitled to recovery under the CWDS or, alternatively, the GWDS. The defendants replied in support of their motion for summary judgment and argued that Matthew was not a child for the purposes of the CWDS because Matthew's apprenticeship with his father did not constitute enrollment in a vocational school or program, and that Matthew's contributions to the Longest household were insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether his parents were dependent upon him.

The trial court heard argument and took the matter under advisement before granting partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants on September 25, 2001. In its order, the trial court concluded that the Longests were not entitled to recover under the CWDS because Matthew was not enrolled in a vocational school or program at the time of his death, and that recovery under the GWDS was limited to medical and funeral expenses by the estate because the Longests were not Matthew's dependent next of kin. The trial court granted the Longests' request to certify its partial summary judgment order for interlocutory appeal, but this court declined to accept jurisdiction.

On June 4, 2004, the Longests filed a motion asking the trial court to set aside its partial summary judgment order, which the trial court denied on July 21, 2004. Thereafter, on September 15, 2008, the Longests filed a motion asking the trial court to “certify the issue of Matthew Longest['s] legal status for Interlocutory Appeal to the Indiana Court of Appeals.” Appellant's Appendix at 122. The trial court granted the order, but this court again declined to accept jurisdiction.

On May 23, 2012, a bench trial was held regarding liability and damages, at which the Longests again asked the court to reconsider its prior partial summary judgment order. On October 22, 2012, the trial court entered its final order. In the order, the trial court denied the Longests' request to set aside the partial summary judgment order, concluding that the Longests “ha[d] not shown any additional evidence to persuade the court the decision was incorrect.” Appellant's Appendix at 132. The trial court found in favor of the Longests on the issue of liability and entered an order on damages and attorney fees. The trial court concluded that the damages recoverable were limited to funeral and burial expenses, costs and expenses of administration of the estate, and attorney fees related to the administration of the estate. The Longests now appeal.

1.

The Longests first argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgmentin favor of the defendants on the Longests' CWDS claim. When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this court stands in the shoes of the trial court and applies the same standards in deciding whether to affirm or reverse the ruling. Ritchhart v. Indianapolis Pub. Sch., 812 N.E.2d 189 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. Thus, on appeal, we must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Dreaded, Inc. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 904 N.E.2d 1267 (Ind.2009). This standard requires us to construe all factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence of an issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Dreaded, Inc. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 904 N.E.2d 1267.

The CWDS allows a parent to maintain an action against a person whose wrongful act or omission causes the injury or death of a child. I.C. § 34–1–1–8. The remedies available in such an action include damages for the loss of the child's services, love, and companionship, as well as medical, burial, and administrative expenses, including attorney fees. Id. At issue in this appeal is whether Matthew was a child for the purposes of the CWDS at the time of his death. The version of the CWDS in effect at the time of Matthew's death provided the following definition:

(a) As used in this section, “child” means an unmarried individual without dependents who is:

(1) less than twenty (20) years of age; or

(2) less than twenty-three (23) years of age and is enrolled in an institution of higher education or in a vocational school or program.

Id. This court has noted that the statutes creating actions for wrongful death are in derogation of common law, and must therefore be strictly construed. Deaconess Hosp., Inc. v. Gruber, 791 N.E.2d 841 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). Nevertheless, this court has been willing to interpret the language of the CWDS pertaining to enrollment in an institution of higher education or a vocational school or program “as liberally as it can and still remain within the clear meaning of the statute.” Ledbetter v. Ball Memorial Hosp., 724 N.E.2d 1113, 1118 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (citing Sweet v. Art Pape Transfer, Inc., 721 N.E.2d 311 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. dismissed ), trans. denied.

The trial court granted summary judgment against the Longests based on its conclusion that Matthew was not enrolled in an institution of higher education or a vocational school or program at the time of his death. On appeal, the Longests argue that Matthew's informal apprenticeship under his father's supervision constituted enrollment in a vocational program. In support of this contention, the Longests direct our attention to the designated affidavits of Robert Sr. and Edward Bickel, a former field representative for the local unit of the International Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers. In these affidavits, both Bickel and Robert Sr. attested that in order to become a mason, a person must complete an apprenticeship with a person or persons who practice the trade. They testified further that there are two types of apprenticeships. First, there are “[l]ess formalized (and usually nonunion) apprenticeship programs consisting exclusively of extensive-on-the-job training by a skilled mason.” Appellant's Appendix at 61, 79. Both Robert Sr. and Bickel attested that there is no formal enrollment for this type of apprenticeship. Second, there are “[f]ormalized apprenticeship programs organized by the union, which include classroom instruction in addition to on the job training.” Id. at 61, 79. According to Bickel and Robert Sr., “[a] person who completes either type of apprenticeship program and attains a high...