Longfellow v. Presidente Miguel Aleman

• Decision Date: 02 January 1974
• Citation: 36 Cal.App.3d 508,111 Cal.Rptr. 643
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Roy P. LONGFELLOW, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The PRESIDENTE MIGUEL ALEMAN et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 31347.

Page 643

111 Cal.Rptr. 643

36 Cal.App.3d 508

Roy P. LONGFELLOW, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The PRESIDENTE MIGUEL ALEMAN et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 31347.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

Jan. 2, 1974.

Boccardo, Blum, Lull, Niland, Teerlink & Bell by Stanley A. Ibler, Jr., San Jose, for plaintiff and appellant.

Angell, Adams & Holmes, San Francisco, for defendants and respondents.

CHRISTIAN, Associate Justice.

Appellant Roy P. Longfellow brought this action to recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained while working aboard a ship of Mexican registry, the Presidente Miguel Aleman. The complaint set out two causes of action: a negligence claim, and a claim under the admiralty doctrine of unseaworthiness. Named as defendants were the vessel, her owner Petroleos Mexicanos, and Willamette Iron & Steel Company, the prime contractor which had engaged appellant's employer to assist in repairing the ship. The case was tried without a jury, on the sole issue of liability. The court rendered judgment for the defendants, determining that the admiralty cause of action failed because the ship was not in navigation and that both causes of action were barred by laches.

On June 5, 1961, the Miguel Aleman entered the Willamette dry dock in Richmond to undergo a major overhaul. She remained in dry dock until July 3, 1961, when she was towed to a pier owned by Willamette. Repairs were continued while the ship, afloat on navigable waters, was tied up at the pier.

Appellant was employed as a foreman by a subcontractor engaged in overhauling the ship's main engines. On the night of August 3, 1961, appellant suffered injuries when he fell after hitting his head on a steam pipe as he entered an area on the ship which he testified was not adequately lighted. On August 5 the vessel left the pier and sailed for Mexico. The complaint was filed on July 28, 1964.

Before turning to the issues raised by the parties, we must dispose of a jurisdictional problem. The ship Miguel Aleman was sued In rem, but jurisdiction to deal with property in an action In rem depends upon a seizure of the property. (Lee v. Silva (1925), 197 Cal. 364, 368--369, 240 P. 1015.) The record does not show that the vessel was made subject to the court's jurisdiction by seizure, such as by an attachment. Moreover, with the exception of actions to forfeit maritime property used in violation of state law (Moore v. Purse Seine Net (1941), 18 Cal.2d 835, 118 P.2d 1, aff'd, sub nom., C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore (1943), 318 U.S. 133, 63 S.Ct. 499, 87 L.Ed. 663), maritime In rem actions must be brought in a federal forum. Because the court has no jurisdiction over the ship, the Miguel Aleman must be dismissed as a defendant.

Appellant complains of the trial court's failure to make a factual finding on the issue of prejudice to respondents caused by appellant's delay in commencing the suit. Respondents argue that the one-year limitation of Code of Civil Procedure section 340 should be applied instead of the doctrine of laches, and that prejudice therefore need not be shown. They also claim that prejudice is conclusively shown by the evidence.

Admiralty jurisdiction in tort cases depends on the locality of the tort; maritime law governs actions involving torts that occur on navigable water. (The Plymouth (3 Wall. 1865), 70 U.S. 20, 18 L.Ed. 125.) Some cases suggest, as an additional requirement for admiralty jurisdiction, some nexus between the tort and maritime commerce. (E.g., McGuire v. City of New York (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1961), 192 F.Supp. 866. But see Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. (3d Cir. 1963), 316 F.2d 758 (locality is sole test).) Appellant was injured on a ship afloat in navigable waters; thus the location test is met. Any nexus requirement is met by appellant's participation in the work of repairing a vessel at the time of an accident. (See West v. United States (1959), 361 U.S. 118, 80 S.Ct. 189, 4 L.Ed.2d 161; Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek (1914), 234 U.S. 52, 61, 34 S.Ct. 733, 58 L.Ed. 1028, 1212.) Therefore, appellant's causes of action unquestionably arise under admiralty jurisdiction.

Federal judicial power extends to all cases of admiralty jurisdiction. (U.S.Const., art. III, § 2, cl. 1.) Providing for the exercise of this power, Congress has given the federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction to decide '(a)ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.' (28 U.S.C.A., § 1333, subd. (1).) This famous 'saving to suitors' clause has been held to allow a state court to provide traditional common law remedies for maritime causes of action brought in a state forum. (Madruga v. Superior Court (1954), 346 U.S. 556, 560--561, 74 S.Ct. 298, 98 L.Ed. 290, 295--296.) But such an exercise of jurisdiction does not convert the state forum into an admiralty court. (Cf. Blevens v. Sfetqu (1968), 259 Cal.App.2d 527, 531, 66 Cal.Rptr. 486.)

When adjudicating a maritime claim, a state court must preserve all substantial admiralty rights of the litigants by applying general maritime law. (Intagliata v. Shipowners & Mer. etc. Co. (1945), 26 Cal.2d 365, 371, 159 P.2d 1.) Federal courts sitting in admiralty jurisdiction determine the timeliness of the commencement of an action by applying the doctrine of laches, unless a federal statutory time limit applies. (Fematt v. City of Los Angeles, Cal. (D.C.S.D.Cal.1961), 196 F.Supp. 89, 93.) It remains to be determined whether a state court must likewise apply the doctrine of laches, as opposed to the state's statute of limitations. In McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. (1958), 357 U.S. 221, 78 S.Ct. 1201, 2 L.Ed.2d 1272, the United States Supreme Court held 'that where an action for unseaworthiness is combined with an action under the Jones Act a (state or federal) court cannot apply to the former a shorter period of limitations than Congress has prescribed for the latter.' (Id., 357 U.S. p. 224, 78 S.Ct. at 1203, 2 L.Ed.2d at p. 1276.) The court reached this conclusion in order to protect the rights given to seamen by the Jones Act. But the court did not answer 'the broad question of whether a state court is free to apply its own statute of limitation to an admiralty right of action for which no special limitation is prescribed, or whether it is bound to determine the timeliness of such actions by the admiralty doctrine of laches.' (Ibid.) The courts of several states have reached divergent results (see Note 91 A.L.R.2d 1417, 1423).

If the question were fresh in California, a strong argument could be made for applying the statute of limitations. Federal law does not Require a state to make room for admiralty claims in its courts. When a state chooses to make its courts available for the vindication of admiralty rights, the procedural rules governing state litigation are generally applied. It might be thought that the state's statute of limitation, which simply fixes the time within which the state forum is held open to a given class of litigation, affects 'the Remedy only, not the substantive right or obligation.' (2 Witkin, California Procedure (2d ed. 1970) Actions, § 224, p. 1082.) On that understanding the action would be governed by the statute. But the issue is not new in California. In Curbelo v. Matson Navigation Co. (1961), 194 Cal.App.2d 305, 308, 14 Cal.Rptr. 913, it was held that the admiralty doctrine of laches, not the California statute of limitations, was applicable to an action for personal injuries sustained aboard a vessel in navigable waters. We consider it appropriate to follow the Curbelo holding rather than possibly create a conflict in the California authorities by reexamining the question.

Having determined that the trial court acted correctly in applying the maritime doctrine of laches, we must inquire whether the court erred in looking by analogy to the one-year provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision 3, rather than to the three-year limitation which governs actions brought under the Jones Act (46 U.S.C., § 688; 45 U.S.C., § 56). Appellant concedes that it was proper 'to consider a pertinent statute of limitations, by way of analogy, in evaluating whether there has been a sufficient delay to warrant invocation of the doctrine of laches.' (See Kane v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (3d Cir. 1951), 189 F.2d 303.) The three-year limitation provided for in the Jones Act is not the appropriate statute to look to in the present case. Reference is to be had to the appropriate State statute of limitations, whereas the Jones Act is a federal statute. Moreover, the circumstances in which the Jones Act apply--suits by seamen against their employers--are not analogous to the circumstances in this case. (See, e.g., Dawson v. Fernley & Eger (D.C.E.D.Va.1961), 196 F.Supp. 816, 820.) Appellant is not a seaman and he is not suing his employer.

Appellant contends that the one-year limitation of Code of Civil Procedure section 340 is not to be referred to since an action based on unseaworthiness does not depend upon negligence. (Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki (1946), 328 U.S. 85, 93--94, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099, 1105--1106.) But section 340, subdivision 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to personal injury suits founded on theories other than negligence. (Rubino v. Utah Construction Co. (1954), 123 Cal.App.2d 18, 26, 266 P.2d 163.) The doctrine of unseaworthiness has been characterized as an implied warranty of the ship's condition by the shipowner. (See Roper v. United States (1961), 368 U.S. 20, 24, 82 S.Ct. 5, 7 L.Ed.2d 1, 4.) California's one-year statute applies to actions to recover for injuries sustained as a result of a breach of warranty. (Rubino v. Utah Construction Co., Supra; see generally Paton v. American President Lines, Ltd. (D.C.N.D.Cal.1963), 236 F.Supp. 350; Carslund v. United States (D.C.N.D.Cal.1950), ...