Longino v. Martinez

Decision Date11 August 2022
Docket Number22-cv-22010-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes
PartiesSAMUEL LONGINO, Plaintiff, v. CARLOS J. MARTINEZ, Public Defender, and PENNY KIM, Assistant Public Defender, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

SAMUEL LONGINO, Plaintiff,
v.

CARLOS J. MARTINEZ, Public Defender, and PENNY KIM, Assistant Public Defender, Defendants.

No. 22-cv-22010-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes

United States District Court, S.D. Florida

August 11, 2022


Samuel Longino, Pro Se

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND & GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

BETH BLOOM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and Incorporated Memorandum of Law, ECF No. [6] (“Motion to Dismiss”), and Plaintiff's Motion to Remand Plaintiff's Complaint, ECF No. [13] (“Motion to Remand”). Plaintiff's Complaint was originally filed in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida, Case No. 22-02111-CA01, ECF No. [1-2] (“Complaint”), but Defendants filed a Notice of Removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446, ECF No. [1] (“Notice”). Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [15], and Defendants have filed a Response to the Motion to Remand, ECF No. [16]. After reviewing the record and the relevant pleadings, the Motion to Remand is granted in part and denied in part consistent with this Order, and the Motion to Dismiss is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Samuel Longino (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Longino”) is presently housed at the Florida Civil Commitment Center in Arcadia, Florida. ECF No. [1-2] at ¶ 1. Plaintiff has been involuntarily

1

committed to the custody of the Florida Department of Children and Families, pursuant to Florida's Jimmy Ryce Act, since at least 2006. See ECF No. [1-4] at 16; see generally Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act (“Jimmy Ryce Act”), Fla. Stat. §§ 394.910-932. A “probable cause hearing” was scheduled for January 27, 2017, where a state court judge determined if “there [was] probable cause to believe that [Plaintiff's] condition has so changed that it is safe for the person to be at large and that the person will not engage in acts of sexual violence if discharged.” Fla. Stat. § 394.918(3); ECF No. [1-2] at ¶ 4. Mr. Longino was represented by Assistant Public Defender Penny Kim (“Ms. Kim”) during this probable cause hearing-Carlos J. Martinez (“Mr. Martinez”), the elected Public Defender of Miami-Dade County, supervised Ms. Kim and the other Assistant Public Defenders at the time of this hearing. ECF No. [1-2] at ¶¶ 23.

At the hearing, Ms. Kim presented the reports of two licensed psychologists: Dr. Dean Cauley and Dr. Chris Carr. ECF No. [1-2] at ¶ 6; see also ECF No. [1-4] at 16-38 (“Cauley Report”); ECF No. [1-4] at 39-59 (“Carr Report”). Both doctors opined that Plaintiff “no longer met the criteria for involuntary civil commitment, that it was safe for him to be at large in the community, [and] that he would not engage in acts of sexual violence.” ECF No. [1-2] at ¶ 7. The Assistant State Attorney, in turn, relied on a report authored by Dr. Shelia Rapa opining that Plaintiff should remain civilly committed. Id. at ¶ 9; see also ECF No. [1-4] at 60-66 (“Rapa Report”). During the probable cause hearing, Ms. Kim “neglected to have [Drs. Cauley and Carr] present during the hearing so that they could offer expert testimony” and did not object to the “use of the report that had been written by Doctor Rapa.” ECF No. [1-2] at ¶¶ 8, 10-12. The state court judge ultimately found that Plaintiff did not establish probable cause under the Jimmy Ryce Act and ordered that Plaintiff continue to be civilly committed. Id. at ¶ 13.

2

Following the hearing, Ms. Kim informed Plaintiff that she would appeal the state court judge's decision. Id. at ¶ 14. After nearly two years of waiting, Plaintiff wrote a letter to Ms. Kim inquiring about the status of his appeal. Id. at ¶ 15. Ms. Kim responded that “I did submit your case for appeal but I have not heard anything from the appellate attorney regarding your case.” Id. at ¶ 16; see also ECF No. [1-4] at 67. For the next two years, Plaintiff would continue to contact Ms. Kim about the status of his appeal, but Ms. Kim would purportedly tell him that “[t]hose things take time. Besides, the appellate attorney is very busy. Surely you understand that.” ECF No. [12] at ¶ 16. In June 2021, Plaintiff became frustrated and concerned that Ms. Kim was not being honest, so he sent a letter to the Clerk of the Court of Florida's Third District Court of Appeal (“Third DCA”) to inquire about the status of his appeal. Id. at ¶¶ 18-19. The Clerk responded to Plaintiff that “this office has not received any appeal in a case under your name.” Id. at ¶ 20; see also ECF No. [1-4] at 68. Plaintiff attempted to file a pro se petition for belated appeal and/or a writ of habeas corpus with the Third DCA, but the court denied his petition on November 2, 2021. ECF No. [1-2] at ¶¶ 21-22.

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in state circuit court against Ms. Kim and Mr. Martinez. The Complaint contains several allegations against both Defendants. First, Plaintiff claims that Ms. Kim misrepresented him, rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to appeal the state trial court's probable cause determination, and “continued to deceive the plaintiff, with willful intent and reckless disregard for his right to access to the courts [sic], by telling him over and over that she'd submitted his case for appeal.” Id. at ¶¶ 23-24. Next, Plaintiff argues that Defendants' “gross negligence” constituted cruel and unusual punishment by causing him to be “inflicted with great psychological pain, so much that he lost faith in the treatment process,” and that he began “sexually acting out with other residents.” Id. at ¶¶ 33-35. Finally, Plaintiff argues

3

that Ms. Kim violated his right to due process by (1) intentionally depriving Plaintiff of his right to be physically present at all but one of his biannual limited probable cause hearings under the Jimmy Ryce Act, and (2) intentionally depriving Plaintiff of his right to appeal the results of the January 27, 2017 hearing. Id. at ¶¶ 38-40.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Removal of State Proceedings

Removal is proper in “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). To establish original jurisdiction, a lawsuit must demonstrate the existence of either federal question jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or diversity jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Federal question jurisdiction arises “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 1331. Diversity jurisdiction, on the other hand, exists where the parties are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. Id. § 1332(a).

“A removing defendant bears the burden of proving proper federal jurisdiction.” Coffey v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 994 F.Supp.2d 1281, 1283 (S.D. Fla. 2014). Furthermore, “a federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.” United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002) (citing United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 291 (1947)). Accordingly, “[t]he district court may remand a case sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time.” Corp. Mgmt. Advisors, Inc. v. Artjen Complexus, Inc., 561 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)); see also Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't Civ. Serv. Comm'n v. Overstreet, 115 Fed.Appx. 813, 816-17 (6th Cir. 2004) (“A federal court may remand a case sua sponte where the allegations of the complaint which gave rise to the federal jurisdictional basis are insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court.” (citation

4

omitted)). As such, “once a federal court determines that it is without subject matter jurisdiction, the court is powerless to continue.” Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999). “Any ‘doubt about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.'” Family Meat, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 1:19-cv-20154, 2019 WL 8160417, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 29, 2019) (quoting Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 411).

B. Motion to Dismiss Standard

A pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)'s pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”). Additionally, a complaint may not rest on “‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. If the allegations satisfy the elements of the claims asserted, a defendant's motion to dismiss must be denied. Id. at 556.

When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court, as a general rule, must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and evaluate all plausible inferences derived from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012); Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Everglades Restoration Alliance, 304 F.3d 1076, 1084 (11th Cir. 2002); AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity Fin. Grp., LLC, 608 F.Supp.2d 1349, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (“On a motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the

5

non-moving party, and all facts alleged by the non-moving party are accepted as true.”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A court considering a Rule 12(b) motion is generally limited...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT