Longley v. McGeoch
| Decision Date | 23 February 1911 |
| Citation | 80 A. 843,115 Md. 182 |
| Parties | LONGLEY et al. v. McGEOCH et al. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit of Baltimore City; Alfred S. Niles, Judge.
Bill for an injunction by Harry N. McGeoch and others, made parties plaintiff by order of court, against William M Longley, with an amended bill making the William M. Longley Quarry Company a codefendant. From a decree making perpetual a preliminary injunction, and adjudging both defendants guilty of contempt in violating the preliminary injunction and imposing a penalty therefor, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
Argued before BOYD, C.J., BRISCOE, PEARCE, SCHMUCKER, and URNER, JJ.
William A. Wheatley, for appellants.
Alfred J. Carr, for appellees.
This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of Baltimore city making perpetual an injunction previously granted by that court, and also adjudging both defendants to be guilty of contempt in violating the terms of the preliminary injunction outstanding, and ordering that the defendant corporation forfeit and pay a fine of $100 as a penalty for having violated said injunction. The three plaintiffs are residents of a suburban settlement in Baltimore county called Rognel Heights, just beyond the western limits of Baltimore city, and are owners of real estate located there. The defendant Wm. M. Longley is a resident of Baltimore city and is president of the other defendant the W. M. Longley Quarry Company, a body corporate, with its principal office in Baltimore city. Wm. M. Longley is the owner of a tract of land adjacent to the property of the plaintiffs, upon which is a quarry of stone which is operated by the W. M. Longley Quarry Company. The amended bill of complaint alleges that this quarry is distant about 900 feet from the dwelling of the complainant Harry N. McGeoch, and from the dwelling of the complainant Lewis Bihy, and about 600 feet from the waterworks of the complainant Wm. T. Pfeiffer; that there are a considerable number of other dwellings on said Heights occupied by the families of the owners or tenants; that prior to February 15, 1909, Wm. M. Longley was operating said quarry under the name of the W. M. Longley Quarry Company blasting and exploding by dynamite large quantities of stone for sale for various uses, and that frequent complaints had been made to him of the consequence of such blasting, and that he had been notified that, unless he desisted from blasting in such a way as to throw rocks and stones upon complainants' premises, proceedings would be taken to enjoin him, but he nevertheless continued to blast and to throw rocks and stones upon complainants' property, injuring the same, and endangering the lives of them and their families; that on February 15, 1909, said Longley leased said quarry to said quarry company, which has ever since continued blasting in the same manner and with the same results almost every day in the week except Sunday, and frequently at intervals during the whole day, rendering it necessary at times for those in the neighborhood to seek some secure and protected place when the blastings are about to occur; that injury has been done to the property of complainants and others at the Heights, and workmen there engaged in work have been compelled to quit their labor to avoid personal injury; that sometimes, bothbefore and after February 15, 1909, there was an attempt to give notice a few moments in advance of a blast, but such notice could not reach the residents of the Heights in time to enable them to protect themselves, even if the defendants could justify its blasting by such notice; that the complainants and their families cannot safely enjoy their lawns and premises, or the avenues on the Heights, on account of such blasting, which is a constant menace to life and limb, and an injury to their property rights for which there is no adequate remedy except in equity.
The prayer of the bill is for themselves and all others interested therein, and who may be made parties to the proceeding, for a perpetual injunction against each of the defendants prohibiting them and their servants from casting rocks and stones upon the premises of complainants and others similarly situated, and from so conducting said quarry as to interfere with the free use of the avenues and roads through said Heights by the complainants and any others entitled to use them, and for a preliminary injunction in the meantime, for the same purpose, and also for general relief. A preliminary injunction was issued June 11, 1909, prohibiting said defendants or their servants or agents "from throwing or casting any stone, boulder, or rock upon the portions of the property of Rognel Heights, located in Baltimore county, which the complainants and others similarly situated are entitled to use and occupy, and from the use of what is known as mud blasting, or from in any manner menacing or endangering the safety of the complainants and all other persons residing in Rognel Heights, and from carrying on the operations of said quarry so as to interfere with the free use and passage by the complainants and all other persons on said Heights of the avenues and roads leading through said Heights until the further order of said court in the premises."
The original bill was filed by Harry N. McGeoch alone against Wm. M. Longley alone. To that bill a demurrer was interposed by the defendant on March 12, 1909, and while that was pending Wm. T. Pfeiffer and Lewis Bihy were by order of court made parties plaintiffs. The grounds of the demurrer were three in number: (1) That the quarry was wholly in Baltimore county, and therefore the circuit court of Baltimore city was without jurisdiction; (2) that the prayer for relief was vague and indefinite, and seeks the aid of a court of equity for persons unnamed and not parties to the cause; and (3) that the prayer for process was not in accordance with section 147 of article 16 of the Code, and therefore bad in substance. This demurrer was overruled May 12, 1909, and a preliminary injunction granted, which was afterwards, on June 4th, dissolved, it then becoming known that the quarry had been leased to the quarry company on February 15, 1909, and it was therefore a necessary party. Thereupon, with leave of court, the amended bill was filed on June 11th making the W. M. Longley Quarry Company a codefendant. It does not appear from the record that the demurrer to the original bill was renewed to the amended bill, and we should not therefore notice it but for the fact that the appellee in his brief has devoted several pages to its discussion, which suggests that it is possible the demurrer was again interposed, there being no docket entries embraced in the record, and we shall therefore briefly consider it as if renewed to the amended bill, in which the prayer for relief is unchanged, but the prayer for process contains the name and residence of Wm. M. Longley, and the name and place of the principal office of the defendant corporation.
(1) Injunction operates in personam. If the person is within the jurisdiction, it is not material that the subject-matter may be without the jurisdiction. This is the general rule. 22 Cyc. 906; Miller's Equity, § 570; Phelps, Juridical Equity, p. 307; Carroll v. Lee, 3 Gill & J. 504, 22 Am. Dec. 350; Dorsey v. Omo, 93 Md. 74, 48 A. 741; Phelps v. McDonald, 99 U.S. 298, 25 L.Ed. 473.
(2) The prayer for relief is definite and certain as to the plaintiffs named, and is not rendered vague and indefinite because it embraces such other residents of Rognel Heights as are alleged to suffer in like manner from the blasting complained of, and who may appear and be made parties to the proceedings. Such a prayer ought not to be condemned as bad practice.
(3) In the prayer for process in the amended bill the third ground of the demurrer was met and obviated by setting out the name and residence of each defendant, and, treating this demurrer as to the amended bill, it was clearly correctly overruled. Regarded merely as going to the original bill, it is not before us for review, and we are not called on to decide it now, though we may say the original bill, in its second paragraph, gave the name and address of the then sole defendant, and thus gave all the information that would have been given if repeated in the prayer for process. Webb v. Ridgely, 38 Md. 364.
Both defendants answered the amended bill at length, each denying that it ever conducted the blasting at the quarry in such manner as to cause rocks and stones to be thrown upon other premises than their own, or to endanger the lives of any of the residents of Rognel Heights, or to in any manner injure the complainants' property. A great mass of testimony was taken before Judge Niles in open court, who, after argument, filed an opinion in which he made no reference to the law of the case, but treated it as dependent wholly upon the facts, and made the injunction perpetual, and imposed the fine for contempt as before stated. The appellants' counsel apparently concurred in the view that there was little law in the case, since he devoted 31 of the 33 pages of his brief to a statement of the facts alleged in the pleadings, and to a recital and analysis of the evidence. The appellees' counsel, however, in his brief has cited very fully the authorities, and we shall make brief reference only to such as declare the well-recognized legal principles applicable to this case.
In Scott v. Bay, 3 Md. 444, it was held that, where blasting was such as to keep all persons on or about the premises in constant fear and jeopardy of their lives rendering a proper attention to business full of fear and danger, it would constitute a nuisance. In Hamilton v. Whitridge, 11 Md. 128, 69 Am. Dec. 184, it...
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