Longoria v. Cnty. of Dall.

Decision Date13 March 2017
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 3:14-CV-3111-L
PartiesPAULA LONGORIA, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF DALLAS, TEXAS and RICHIE LADONE WIMBISH, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court are Defendant Dallas County's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 70), filed May 26, 2016; Defendant Richie Ladone Wimbish's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 61), filed April 19, 2016; and Defendant Dallas County's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 96), filed August 3, 2016. After careful consideration of the motions, briefs, pleadings, admissible summary judgment evidence, and applicable law, the court grants Defendant Richie Ladone Wimbish's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 61) and dismisses with prejudice Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") claim but will allow Plaintiff to amend her pleadings to assert a claim or claims based on assault or sexual assault against Richie Ladone Wimbish ("Wimbish"). Further, the court grants in part and denies in part Defendant Dallas County's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 70); grants in part and denies in part Defendant Dallas County's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 96), and dismisses with prejudice Plaintiff's section 1983 claim, to the extent based on theories of conditions of confinement, state-created danger, or municipal liability theories. Plaintiff's claim under section 1983 based on episodic acts or omissions remains for trial, as will any claim by Plaintiff, if asserted in an amended pleading, for assault or sexual assault against Wimbish.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On August 29, 2014, Plaintiff Paula Longoria ("Plaintiff" or "Longoria") filed this action against Defendants Dallas County ("Dallas County" or "the County") and Wimbish, who was employed by Dallas County as a detention service officer ("DSO") at the Dallas County Jail ("DCJ" or "Jail") when the events that form the basis of Longoria's claims in this case occurred. From August 18, 2012, to September 18, 2012, Longoria was incarcerated at the DCJ as a pretrial detainee. On one occasion in September 2012, while Longoria was incarcerated at the DCJ, Wimbish escorted her out of her cell to a mattress room in the infirmary area near the West Tower of the Jail where he had sex with her. Longoria and Wimbish dispute whether the sex was consensual. Longoria contends that, given her mental state, history of sexual abuse, and her status as a detainee in the Jail, she did not have the capacity to consent to Wimbish's sexual advances and misconduct.

In Plaintiff's Original Complaint ("Complaint"), Longoria asserts a cause of action under Texas law for IIED against Wimbish based on her contention that she was sexually assaulted by Wimbish in violation of section 39.04 of the Texas Penal Code. Longoria also asserts a claim against Dallas County, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for alleged violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, based on Wimbish's conduct. Longoria seeks actual and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, costs, prejudgment interest, and postjudgment interest.

On April 19, 2016, Wimbish moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's IIED claim. On May 26, 2016, Dallas County moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) on Plaintiff's claim under section 1983, which is based on various theories ofliability. On August 3, 2016, Dallas County moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim under section 1983 claim. In response to Wimbish's summary judgment motion and Dallas County's Rule 12(c) motion, Longoria requested to amend her pleadings, if necessary.

II. Dallas County's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Dallas County contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Rule 12(c) on Plaintiff's claim under section 1983.

A. Rule 12(c) Standard for Judgment on the Pleadings

Any party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed and when it would not delay the trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). "Rule 7(a) provides that the pleadings are closed upon the filing of a complaint and an answer (absent a court-ordered reply) . . . ." 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1367 at 213 (3d ed. 2004) (footnote omitted). If, however, "a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim is interposed, . . . the filing of a reply to a counterclaim, crossclaim answer, or third-party answer normally will mark the close of the pleadings." Id. (footnote omitted). A "defendant may not move under Rule 12(c) prior to filing an answer." Id. at 214.

A motion brought pursuant to Rule 12(c) "is designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts." Hebert Abstract Co. v. Touchstone Props., Ltd., 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). A court, when ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c), applies the same standard as that used for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 313 F.3d 305, 313 n.8 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

To defeat a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2008); Guidry v. American Pub. Life Ins. Co., 512 F.3d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 2007). A claim meets the plausibility test "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations omitted). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it must set forth "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). The "[f]actual allegations of [a complaint] must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. (quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted). When the allegations of the pleading do not allow the court to infer more than the mere possibility of wrongdoing, they fall short of showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Sonnier v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007); Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). In ruling on such a motion, the court cannot look beyond the pleadings. Id.; Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). The pleadings include the complaint and any documents attached to it. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000). Likewise,"'[d]ocuments that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to [the plaintiff's] claims.'" Id. (quoting Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993)). In this regard, a document that is part of the record but not referred to in a plaintiff's complaint and not attached to a motion to dismiss may not be considered by the court in ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion. Gines v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 699 F.3d 812, 820 & n.9 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Further, it is well-established and '"clearly proper in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion [that a court may] take judicial notice of matters of public record."' Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Norris v. Hearst Trust, 500 F.3d 454, 461 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994)).

The ultimate question in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether the complaint states a valid claim when it is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002). While well-pleaded facts of a complaint are to be accepted as true, legal conclusions are not "entitled to the assumption of truth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citation omitted). Further, a court is not to strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff and is not to accept conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions, or legal conclusions. R2 Invs. LDC v. Phillips, 401 F.3d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). The court does not evaluate the plaintiff's likelihood of success; instead, it only determines whether the plaintiff has pleaded a legally cognizable claim. United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 2004). Stated another way, when a court deals with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, its task is to test the sufficiency of the allegations contained in the pleadings to determine whether they are adequate enough to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Mann v. Adams Realty Co., 556 F.2d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 1977); Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 1395, 1401 (5thCir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 113 F.3d 1412 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc)....

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