Longstreth v. Gensel, Nos. 71465

• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan
• Writing for the Court: CAVANAGH; WILLIAMS; RILEY; BOYLE; RYAN
• Citation: 423 Mich. 675,377 N.W.2d 804
• Decision Date: 27 November 1985
• Docket Number: 71503,Nos. 71465
• Parties: James H. LONGSTRETH, as Personal Representative for the Estate of Jamie H. Longstreth, Deceased, and James H. Longstreth, Individually, and Carol Longstreth, Individually, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Edward GENSEL, Mrs. Edward Gensel, Samuel Langston and Myrna Langston, Defendants-Appellants, and Dennis Fitzgibbon, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Bryan Fitzgibbon, Deceased, Gary L. Jackson and Francis L. Jackson, Individually, and d/b/a Our Bar, Defendants. 423 Mich. 675, 377 N.W.2d 804, 54 U.S.L.W. 2309

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377 N.W.2d 804 James H. LONGSTRETH, as Personal Representative for the
Estate of Jamie H. Longstreth, Deceased, and James
H. Longstreth, Individually, and Carol
Longstreth, Individually,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
Edward GENSEL, Mrs. Edward Gensel, Samuel Langston and Myrna
Langston, Defendants-Appellants,
and
Dennis Fitzgibbon, as Personal Representative of the Estate
of Bryan Fitzgibbon, Deceased, Gary L. Jackson and
Francis L. Jackson, Individually, and
d/b/a Our Bar, Defendants. Nos. 71465, 71503.
423 Mich. 675, 377 N.W.2d 804, 54 U.S.L.W. 2309 Supreme Court of Michigan. Argued April 3, 1984.
Decided Nov. 27, 1985.

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[423 MICH 677] Stanley O. Zimostrad, Bay City, for defendant, Estate of Bryan Fitzgibbon, Deceased.

James W. Tarter, Bay City, for defendants Jackson, Individually and d/b/a Our Bar.

Terence J. O'Neill, Saginaw, for defendants-appellants Langston.

LeFevre, Swartz & Wilson by Martin B. Wilson, John J. Swartz, Saginaw, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Collison, Chasnis & Dogger, P.C. by Jeffrey C. Collison, Charles C. Collison, Saginaw, for defendants-appellants Gensel.

O'Neill, Ackerman, Wallace, Doyle & Jones P.C. by Terence J. O'Neill, Timothy L. Tacket, Saginaw, for defendants-appellants Langston.

CAVANAGH, Justice.

The issue presented is whether [423 MICH 678] plaintiffs can maintain a cause of action based on violation of M.C.L. Sec. 436.33; M.S.A. Sec. 18.1004, which prohibits a person from knowingly selling or furnishing alcoholic liquor to a person under twenty-one years of age, against persons who are social hosts.

I

The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of a failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. GCR 1963, 117.2(1). A motion brought under this subrule tests the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs' complaint. The motion should be granted only if the claims are so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery. Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 323-324, 343 N.W.2d 164 (1984), reh. den. 419 Mich. 1201 (1984), cert. den. --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 123, 83 L.Ed.2d 65 (1984). Accordingly, for the purposes of this appeal, we

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accept as true all well-pled allegations contained in plaintiffs' complaint. A

On July 7, 1979, plaintiffs' nineteen-year-old son, Jamie Longstreth, attended a private wedding reception hosted by the Gensels and the Langstons. While at the reception, Jamie consumed an unspecified amount of alcoholic beverage. In the early morning hours of July 8, 1979, Jamie was killed in an automobile accident.

Plaintiffs initially alleged that the defendants breached a duty not to give, provide, or furnish alcoholic beverages to anyone under the age of twenty-one. Plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants were negligent in furnishing alcohol to Jamie and that this negligence was the proximate [423 MICH 679] cause of his death. Longstreth v. Fitzgibbon, 125 Mich.App. 261, 265, 335 N.W.2d 677 (1983). ¹

In response to defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs argued that M.C.L. Sec. 436.33; M.S.A. Sec. 18.1004 imposed a duty not to furnish alcoholic beverage to a person under twenty-one years of age. The trial court noted that the common law did not recognize a cause of action against social hosts. It then ruled that the statute only applied to licensees under the Michigan Liquor Control Act, M.C.L. Sec. 436.1 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 18.971 et seq., and entered summary judgment for the Gensels and Langstons.

B

The Court of Appeals disagreed:

"Our review of the current statute, M.C.L. Sec. 436.33; M.S.A. Sec. 18.1004, which prohibits the selling or furnishing of alcoholic beverages to a minor, leads us to conclude that its application is not limited to Liquor Control Act licensees; rather, it is applicable to all persons who violate its terms. We believe that the Legislature did not intend to eliminate the misdemeanor offense attendant to the furnishing of alcoholic beverages to minors by persons other than licensees under the Liquor Control Act.

* * *

"Accordingly, we hold that a civil cause of action continues to exist for injuries or death caused by the furnishing of liquor to a minor by a social host or other persons not falling under the purview of the Liquor Control Act." Longstreth, supra, p. 266, 335 N.W.2d 677.

The Court of Appeals remanded the case with instructions to allow plaintiffs to amend their [423 MICH 680] complaint to state a cause of action in accordance with M.C.L. Sec. 436.33; M.S.A. Sec. 18.1004. Plaintiffs amended their complaint, ² and we granted defendants' application for leave to appeal. 418 Mich. 876 (1983).

II

We are asked once again to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the

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Legislature. We may determine legislative intent after considering the language and general scope of the act, in light of the general purpose it seeks to accomplish or the evil it seeks to remedy. White v. City of Ann Arbor, 406 Mich. 554, 562, 281 N.W.2d 283 (1979). We agree with the Court of Appeals that the provisions of Sec. 33 are not limited to licensees. The development of the act as a whole, and specifically Sec. 33, persuades us that the Legislature intended the act to have a broad scope. A

The historical development of the act supports our conclusion that the act was intended to govern the entire regulation of liquor within Michigan. During Prohibition, it was illegal, among other [423 MICH 681] things, to manufacture, sell, give away, or furnish intoxicating liquors to anyone. 1917 P.A. 338. However, the Prohibition Act was repealed by 1933 P.A. 64. The 1933 regular session act was then repealed by the present Liquor Control Act. 1933 (Ex.Sess.) P.A. 8. The present act was based on a referendum.

"At the November election in 1932, the people adopted a constitutional amendment (Const. 1908, art. 16, Sec. 11), which reads:

" 'The legislature may by law establish a liquor control commission, who, subject to statutory limitations, shall exercise complete control of the alcoholic beverage traffic within this State, including the retail sales thereof; and the legislature may also provide for an excise tax on such sales; Providing, however, that neither the legislature nor such commission may authorize the manufacture or sale of alcoholic beverages in any county in which the electors thereof, by a majority vote, shall prohibit the same.'

"Following the adoption of this amendment the legislature created 'a liquor control commission for the control of the alcoholic beverage traffic within this State,' and prescribed 'its powers, duties and limitations,' et cetera. Act No. 8, Pub. Acts 1933 (Ex.Sess.), as amended (Comp. Laws Supp.1940, Sec. 9209-16 et seq., Stat.Ann. Sec. 18.971 et seq.)." Black v. Liquor Control Comm, 323 Mich. 290, 293, 35 N.W.2d 269 (1948). (Emphasis supplied.)

On the basis of Const. 1908, art. 16, Sec. 11, the Legislature provided that alcohol could be sold to persons twenty-one years of age or older. However, the Age of Majority Act, passed in response to ratification of the Twenty-sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, granted certain rights and privileges to eighteen-year-olds. As a result, the legal drinking age was reduced, and alcoholic liquor could legally be sold to those persons eighteen years of age or older. 1972 P.A. 13.

[423 MICH 682] However, in 1978, the people of this state passed Proposal D, which returned the legal drinking age to twenty-one years. In doing so, the people retained the "complete control" language found in Const. 1908, art. 16, Sec. 11, as emphasized in Black, supra. Const. 1963, art. 4, Sec. 40 now provides:

"A person shall not sell or give any alcoholic beverage to any person who has not reached the age of 21 years. A person who has not reached the age of 21 years shall not possess any alcoholic beverage for the purpose of personal consumption. An alcoholic beverage is any beverage containing one-half of one percent or more alcohol by volume.

"Except as prohibited by this section, the legislature may by law establish a liquor control commission which, subject to statutory limitations, shall exercise complete control of the alcoholic beverage traffic within this state, including the retail sales thereof. The legislature may provide for an excise tax on such sales. Neither the legislature nor the commission may authorize the manufacture or sale of alcoholic beverages in any county in which a majority of the electors voting thereon shall prohibit the same." (Emphasis supplied.)

We believe that this recent constitutional amendment recognizes three very important principles. First, the raising of the

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drinking age indicates that the people of this state have made a public policy determination that persons under twenty-one years of age should not possess alcohol for the purpose of personal consumption. Second, other persons should be prohibited from selling or giving away alcohol to those under twenty-one years of age. These first two principles will be discussed below.

The third principle is more applicable to our present analysis. The amendment makes it clear that, from the very inception of the act to the [423 MICH 683] present, the people intended the Liquor Control Commission to exercise complete control of the alcoholic beverage traffic within this state, including (and by implication, not limited to) its retail sale. The title of the act has been given a broad interpretation to effectuate the will of the people. See Beacon Club v. Kalamazoo County Sheriff, 332 Mich. 412, 420, 52 N.W.2d 165 (1952). The act does more than merely regulate liquor traffic; it involves the public health, safety, and morals. Turner v. Schmidt Brewing Co., 278 Mich. 464, 469, 270 N.W. 750 (1936). Therefore, the act was not intended to apply only to licensees. It was intended to govern the entire regulation of liquor within...