Longuepee v. GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECH., No. A04A1803.

Decision Date05 October 2004
Docket NumberNo. A04A1803.
Citation605 S.E.2d 455,269 Ga. App. 884
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals


Tisinger, Tisinger, Vance & Greer, Thomas E. Greer, Kenneth B. Crawford, for appellants.

Eve A. Appelbaum, Paul A. Henefeld, for appellee.

ANDREWS, Presiding Judge.

While Susan Longuepee was walking to work from an employer-owned parking facility where she parked her car for ingress to work, she was struck by a vehicle owned and operated by her employer, the Georgia Institute of Technology. She and her husband sued Georgia Tech under the Georgia Tort Claims Act for personal injury and loss of consortium. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Georgia Tech ruling that the accidental injury was compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA), OCGA § 34-9-1 et seq., and that the exclusive remedy was a claim under the WCA. For the following reasons, we agree and affirm.

Where an employee has suffered an accidental injury compensable under the WCA, "[the WCA] shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee ... on account of such injury, loss of service, or death." OCGA § 34-9-11(a). The WCA provides compensation to an employee injured in an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. OCGA § 34-9-1(4). Thus, if Longuepee's accidental injury was compensable under the WCA because it arose out of and in the course of her employment, her exclusive remedy was under the WCA and the trial court correctly dismissed her tort claim for personal injury and her husband's derivative tort claim for loss of consortium. Henderson v. Hercules, Inc., 253 Ga. 685, 324 S.E.2d 453 (1985).

The record shows that Longuepee's injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. Longuepee was employed by Georgia Tech at the School of Biology located on the Tech campus. In connection with her employment, Georgia Tech provided Longuepee with space to park her car in a parking facility owned and controlled by Tech and located on the Tech campus about three blocks from the building where she worked. On the morning of the accident, Longuepee parked her car in the parking facility at about 7:15 a.m. and started to walk from the parking area to her work place where she was scheduled to start work at 7:30 a.m. During the walk to work, Longuepee was struck by a Georgia Tech owned and operated vehicle as she attempted to cross a public street which traversed her route.

The general rule is that an accidental injury which occurs while an employee is traveling to or from work does not arise out of or in the course of employment, and therefore the injury is not compensable under the WCA. Tate v. Bruno's, Inc., etc., 200 Ga.App. 395, 396, 408 S.E.2d 456 (1991). However, a so-called "parking lot" exception to the general rule applies where, during ingress to or egress from work, an employee is injured going to or from a parking facility owned, controlled, or maintained by the employer. Harrison v. Winn Dixie Stores, 247 Ga.App. 6, 7-8, 542 S.E.2d 142 (2000); Tate, 200 Ga.App. at 396-397, 408 S.E.2d 456. Under these circumstances, the injury is deemed to be compensable under the WCA as arising out of and in the course of the employment. Id. The rationale for this exception is that such an employer-furnished parking facility is part of the employer's premises, and that the period of employment includes a reasonable period of time necessary for the employee to travel directly to the place of work from the parking facility. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales v. Desselle, 176 Ga.App. 174, 175, 335 S.E.2d 458 (1985); Tate, 200 Ga.App. at 397, 408 S.E.2d 456. For the exception to apply, the parking facility need not be directly adjacent to the employee's place of work, nor does it matter that, in this case, Longuepee was injured on a public street rather...

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5 cases
  • Frett v. State Farm Emp. Workers' Comp.
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • June 16, 2020
    ...leave her immediate working area was a necessary incident to the [worker's] employment."). See also Longuepee v. Georgia Institute of Technology, 269 Ga. App. 884, 885, 605 S.E.2d 455 (2004). Incidental activities also include the employee reasonably attending to routine personal needs, suc......
  • Bonner-Hill v. Southland Waste Sys. of Ga., Inc.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 18, 2014
    ...(Citation omitted.) Med. Center v. Hernandez, 319 Ga.App. 335, 336(1), 734 S.E.2d 557 (2012).9 Longuepee v. Ga. Institute of Technology, 269 Ga.App. 884, 885, 605 S.E.2d 455 (2004). See also Fed. Ins. Co. v. Coram, 95 Ga.App. 622, 624, 98 S.E.2d 214 (1957) (“while an employee is traveling t......
  • Davaut v. Univ. of S.C.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • October 26, 2016
    ...is relevant is that USC allowed her to and, once she did, the necessity of crossing the Street arose. Cf. Longuepee v. Ga. Inst. of Tech. , 269 Ga.App. 884, 605 S.E.2d 455, 457 (2004) (holding that the employee's exercise of discretion in how she traveled from the employer-owned parking lot......
  • Collie Concessions, Inc. v. Bruce
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • March 30, 2005
    ...omitted.) Id. at 624, 98 S.E.2d 214. 11. See Tate, supra at 397(1), 408 S.E.2d 456. 12. Supra. 13. Longuepee v. Ga. Institute of Technology, 269 Ga.App. 884, 605 S.E.2d 455 (2004); Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales v. Desselle, 176 Ga.App. 174, 175, 335 S.E.2d 458 (1985) (physical precedent onl......
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