Lontkowski v. Ignarski
| Decision Date | 03 March 1959 |
| Citation | 6 Wis.2d 561,95 N.W.2d 230 |
| Parties | Bernard LONTKOWSKI, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Ralph Lontkowski, Appellant, v. Joseph IGNARSKI et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Lontkowski & Lontkowski, Kaftan, Kaftan & Kaftan, Green Bay, for appellant.
Everson, Ryan, Whitney & O'Melia, Green Bay, for respondents.
The ultimate question presented by this appeal is whether the exclusion provision of the Dairyland policy, quoted in the statement of facts, operated to exclude coverage of Donald's automobile at the time of the accident.
Appellant contends that the question was settled in favor of coverage by the jury's verdict, approved by the court, that Donald did not furnish his automobile for regular use to Joseph. The argument is that the expression 'furnished for regular use' applies to all of the situations described in the exclusion, and that unless the automobile has been furnished for regular use to the named insured, coverage of the named insured is not excluded.
This interpretation of the exclusion provision misconceives its meaning as set forth in express and unequivocal terms. The exclusion applies to three situations, each of which is different than and separate from the others, to-wit: (1) ownership of the automobile by the named insured or a member of his household; (2) hiring of the automobile by same, and (3) furnishing of the car for regular use to same.
Structurally the sentence might be set up thus:
or
'(3) furnished for regular use to the named insured or a member of his household.'
The disjunctive 'or', which we have italicized, shows that regular use is not a necessary element of all three excluded situations but only of the third one. Appellant's interpretation virtually disregards that word and also the words 'owned by.' Other things being equal, a construction which gives effect to every word is preferable to one which does not. Dore v. Glenn Rock Mineral Spring Co., 1911, 147 Wis. 158, 161, 132 N.W. 906.
The foregoing interpretation of the policy provision is in accord with the views expressed in several reported cases. Campbell v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 4 Cir., 1954, 211 F.2d 732; Aler v. Travelers Indem. Co., D.C.Md.1950, 92 F.Supp. 620; Leteff v. Maryland Casualty Co., La.App.1957, 91 So.2d 123. To the contrary is a 2 to 1 decision in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Pray, 6 Cir., 1953, 204 F.2d 821. On the general subject see Annotation, 173 A.L.R. 901.
It remains to be determined whether the automobile which Joseph Ignarski was driving at the time of the accident was excluded from coverage because it was an 'automobile owned by * * * the named insured or a member of his household.' It was not owned by the named insured, Joseph Ignarski, but by his brother, Donald. Was Donald a member of Joseph's household? The trial court answered this question in the affirmative.
'Household' is defined by Webster as 'those who dwell under the same roof and constitute a family.' That definition corresponds with the common and approved usage of the term and is supported by judicial authority. 'Persons who dwell together as a family constitute a household.' Arthur v. Morgan, 1884, 112 U.S. 495, 499, 5 S.Ct. 241, 243, 28 L.Ed. 825.
On the evidence in the present record the trial court could properly find that the young men, Donald and Joseph, were dwelling with their parents as a family under one roof, and hence were members of the same household. The facts that each brother was a little more than 21 years old, had a job and paid something for room and board, either in money or work, did not require a finding that they were not living in the house as members of the same family. That a 'household' may include persons other than parents and minor children is shown by the words of the policy, 'a member of his household other than a private chauffeur or domestic servant.'
Since the brothers were members of the same household, the trial court did not err in finding that...
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