Lopato v. Hayman
| Decision Date | 19 November 1920 |
| Docket Number | No. 5300.,5300. |
| Citation | 111 A. 529 |
| Parties | LOPATO v. HAYMAN. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Elmer J. Rathbun, Judge.
Action by Harris Lopato against Louis Haymau. Verdict for defendant, and on denial of new trial plaintiff brings exceptions. Exceptions overruled, and case remitted, with direction.
Edward C. Stiness, and Daniel H. Morrissey, both of Providence, Samuel Brenner, of Boston, Mass., for plaintiff.
McGovern & Slattery, of Providence, for defendant.
This is an action of assumpsit brought upon a promissory note, by the payee against the maker.
After a trial in the superior court the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff duly filed a motion for a new trial, alleging as reasons therefor the usual grounds. After a hearing upon this motion it was denied by the trial justice, and the plaintiff then duly prosecuted his bill of exceptions to this court.
The plaintiff proved his case by producing the note, and then the defendant introduced testimony tending to prove that the note was given without consideration, and also that it was delivered conditionally and for a special purpose only. Against the plaintiffs objection the defendant was permitted to introduce testimony showing that in 1915 he became engaged to marry the daughter of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff then said that he would make a wedding present to his daughter of $500; that plaintiff and defendant then went to a bank in Boston, and there the plaintiff transferred to a new account, opened in the name of his daughter and the defendant, $500; that about two weeks afterwards the defendant told the plaintiff that he was about to withdraw the $500 from the bank, and the plaintiff objected to this, because something might happen which would prevent the defendant from marrying plaintiff's daughter, and said that he wanted some security for the money and the defendant replied that he would give plaintiff a note as security. The plaintiff agreed to this proposal, and the defendant signed and delivered the note in suit. At the same time the defendant withdrew the money in the bank, which was the joint account of the daughter and himself, and surrendered the book, and shortly afterwards he married the plaintiff's daughter. The day after the wedding the defendant asked the plaintiff for the note, and the plaintiff replied that he had torn it up. Defendant further testified that he did not receive any money from the plaintiff on the day the note was signed, and that he never received any money, excepting the $500 as above stated. The plaintiff testified that he paid the defendant $500 at the time that the defendant signed and delivered the note, and denied that he made any present of $500 to his daughter and defendant, and he also denied that the day after the wedding the defendant asked him for the note.
The plaintiff objects to the admission of defendant's testimony on the ground that parol evidence cannot be received to contradict, alter, or vary a written obligation. The defendant's testimony was admissible under the provisions of section 22, chapter 200, General Laws of 1909, relating to negotiable instruments, which provides, among other things, that—
"Between immediate parties" "the delivery may be shown to have been conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the property in the instrument."
Said section 22 has been construed to be sufficiently broad to permit a defendant (the maker of a note) to show as against the plaintiff (the payee) lack of consideration for the note, and also to show that it was not intended by the parties that the property in the note was to be transferred by its delivery to the plaintiff (the payee). Lee v. Benjamin, 40 R. I. 567, 102 Atl. 713....
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...79 R.I. 98, 84 A.2d 425; or to establish that there was no consideration for a note and that its delivery was conditional, Lopato v. Hayman, 43 R.I. 271, 111 A. 529; or to show a different consideration from that stated in a release, Wood v. Moriarty, 15 R.I. 518, 9 A. 427, or to show the o......
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...Hospital Trust Co., 111 R.I. 415, 303 A.2d 121 (1973); DiBattista v. Butera, 104 R.I. 465, 244 A.2d 857 (1968) and Lopato v. Hayman, 43 R.I. 271, 111 A. 529 (1920). It is defendant's contention that these cases provide an exception to the parol-evidence rule allowing a party to offer eviden......
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...79 R.I. 98, 84 A.2d 425; or to establish that there was no consideration for a note and that its delivery was conditional, Lopato v. Hayman, 43 R.I. 271, 111 A. 529; or to show a different consideration from that stated in a release, Wood v. Moriarty, 15 R.I. 518, 9 A. 427; or to show the o......