Lopera v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc.
| Decision Date | 28 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 21-10355-NMG |
| Citation | 578 F.Supp.3d 130 |
| Parties | Laura E. LOPERA, Plaintiff, v. COMPASS GROUP USA, INC., et al., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Eric R. LeBlanc, Michaela C. May, Bennett & Belfort PC, Cambridge, MA, for Plaintiff.
Siobhan M. Sweeney, Alice A. Kokodis, Ellen E. Lemire, Littler Mendelson P.C., Boston, MA, for Defendants Compass Group USA, Inc., Marie Montfleury.
Siobhan M. Sweeney, Littler Mendelson P.C., Boston, MA, for Defendant Flik International Corporation.
Ellen E. Lemire, Siobhan M. Sweeney, Littler Mendelson P.C., Boston, MA, for Defendant Morrison Management Specialists, Inc.
This action arises out of the termination of Laura Lopera ("Lopera" or "the plaintiff") from her employment as Patient Services Manager at Compass Group USA, Inc. ("Compass"). That company provides food services to entities such as hospitals and schools.1 Lopera alleges, inter alia, that the defendants interfered with her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. ("the FMLA") and, after she exercised those rights, terminated her in retaliation. In addition, she claims that Compass failed to compensate her for overtime, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207 ("the FLSA"), and the Massachusetts Wage Act, M.G.L. c. 149, § 148 ("the Wage Act"). Compass denies all of plaintiff's substantive claims.
Pending before the Court is the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to counts IV and V ("the FMLA claims"), count VII ("the FLSA claim") and part of count VIII, ("the Wage Act claim"). For the reasons set forth below, that motion will be allowed, in part, and denied, in part.
The facts of this case are not, for the most part, in dispute. Laura Lopera was first hired by Compass in 2009. In 2017, she applied for and was accepted into Compass's management training program, and in early 2018, defendants hired her to work as a Patient Services Manager for their client, the Boston Medical Center Corp. ("BMC"), a hospital in Boston, Massachusetts. In that role, Lopera was paid bi-weekly just over $2,000. Her responsibilities included supervision of the preparation and delivery of meals to BMC patients who, at any given time, numbered approximately 200. The Patient Services Manager position was time consuming and frequently required Lopera to work more than 40 hours per week. During the relevant period, her usual weekly schedule consisted of three shifts of 13 to 14 hours and a half shift of approximately 7 hours.
On July 17, 2018, Lopera felt unwell and left work to see her doctor. She subsequently called out of work for her scheduled shifts on July 18 and 20, 2018, due to vertigo. She returned to work three days later but, upon the recommendation of her doctor, she worked no more than 12 hours per day.
On July 31, 2018, Lopera again left work early due to a medical issue. Earlier that day, she had met with Marie Monfleury, another Patient Services Manager and co-defendant and Katrina Parsons, Associate Director of Patient Food Services and Lopera's supervisor, concerning a temporary employee's inappropriate behavior several days earlier.2 Lopera was given a "counseling report" that detailed what her superiors, Parsons and Mia Amado, Director of the Food and Nutrition Department at BMC, believed were shortcomings in plaintiff's management of that situation.
The parties dispute the tenor of the July 31 meeting. Parsons and Monfleury contend that Lopera yelled at them and acted inappropriately. Amado, who did not attend the meeting, says that Lopera later came to her office while she was on a call and yelled at her, too. Lopera denies yelling or behaving inappropriately during any interaction with Parsons, Monfleury or Amado.
Lopera returned to work without restriction on August 6, 2018. On that day, Amado and Charles Green, another Associate Director of Patient Food Services, met with Lopera to deliver the same counseling report that had been the subject of the contested July 31 meeting, as well as a personal improvement plan ("the PIP") drafted by Parsons. Lopera's behavior in the August 6, 2018, meeting is also disputed. Amado contends that Lopera used profanity repeatedly and stated that she would not feed patients if she was short staffed, while Lopera denies that she said anything of the sort. The parties do not dispute, however, that Lopera refused to sign the counseling report.
On August 8, 2018, Lopera met with Parsons and Jamie Robidoux, a Regional Director. Again, the parties disagree about what occurred. Defendants aver that Lopera admitted to Robidoux that she had said she would not serve patients if short staffed. Lopera maintains that she never said that she would not serve patients. Undisputed is the fact that after the meeting, Robidoux removed Lopera from the BMC account. Lopera was placed on paid administrative leave for 30 days and offered an opportunity to search for jobs in other divisions of the defendant companies. After the 30-day leave period expired and Lopera had not secured another position, her employment was terminated.
On January 10, 2020, Lopera filed a complaint in Massachusetts Superior Court for Suffolk County, naming Compass, Morrison, Monfleury, and Flik International Corporation, another wholly-owned Compass subsidiary, as defendants. They removed the action to this Court in February, 2020, and after discovery, Compass and Morrison moved for summary judgment, in part. Lopera opposes that motion.
The role of summary judgment is "to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990) ). The burden is on the moving party to show, through the pleadings, discovery and affidavits, "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law ...." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists where the evidence with respect to the material fact in dispute "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.
If the moving party satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine, triable issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The Court must view the entire record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and make all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. O'Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 907 (1st Cir. 1993). Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the record in the non-moving party's favor, the Court determines that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
The FMLA affords employees certain substantive rights, including the right to 12 weeks of leave for serious personal or family health conditions during any 12-month period. 28 U.S.C. § 2612, see Carrero-Ojeda v. Autoridad de Energia Electrica, 755 F.3d 711, 718 (1st Cir. 2014). In addition to enumerating those rights, the statute describes two ways in which they may be violated: 1) through an employer's interference with an employee's protected conduct and 2) in retaliation for it. See Favreau v. Liberty Mut., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 3d 150 (D. Mass. 2020). While there is not always a "clear demarcation" between interference and retaliation, here Lopera alleges that Compass violated the FMLA in both ways. Colburn v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Div., 429 F.3d 325, 330 (1st Cir. 2005).
With respect to a claim of interference in violation of the FMLA, a plaintiff must first show that her employer denied her FMLA benefits to which she was entitled. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), see Carrero-Ojeda, 755 F.3d at 722 n.8. If an employee can show that a benefit was denied, she must then demonstrate that the denial resulted in prejudice. See Favreau, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 166 (citing Dube v. J.P. Morgan Investor Servs., 201 Fed. App'x 786, 788 (1st Cir. 2006) ). An employee is prejudiced if, for example, she did not receive all of the leave to which she was statutorily entitled, see Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 88, 122 S.Ct. 1155, 152 L.Ed.2d 167 (2002), or if she would have structured her leave differently had she received timely notice of her rights under the FMLA, see Dube, 201 Fed. App'x at 788.
To state a retaliation claim under the FMLA where direct evidence of retaliation is lacking, a plaintiff must first make a prima facie showing that 1) she availed herself of a right protected by the FMLA, 2) she was adversely affected by a decision of her employer, and 3) there is a causal connection between her protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 161 (1st Cir. 1998) (). The burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action. Id. Finally, the plaintiff is tasked with demonstrating that there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find that the stated reason is a pretext for retaliation. Id.
Lopera alleges three instances of purported interference with the exercise of her rights under the FMLA, the defendants’ failure: 1) to notify...
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