Lopera v. Town of Coventry

Citation652 F.Supp.2d 203
Decision Date09 September 2009
Docket NumberC.A. No. 08-123 S.
PartiesJuan LOPERA, Marlon Giraldo, Mauricio Espinal, Hector Cardona Steven Giraldo, William Ruiz, Pedro Hernandez, Luis E. Ardila-Lazaro by and through his parents and next friends, Luis Ardila and Hziel Ardila, Brian Ocampo by and through his parent and next friend, Alba Jaramillo, Stephen Patino by and through his parent and next friend, Lilian Giraldo, Joulder Salazar by and through his parents and next friends Youlder Salazar and Martha Duran, Milton Ricuarte, Jr. by and through his parents and next friends, Milton Ricuarte, Sr. and Elizabeth Rivera, Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF COVENTRY by and through its Treasurer, Warren West, Kevin P. Harris in his individual capacity and in his capacity as a police officer for the Town of Coventry, Kevin Kennedy in his individual capacity and in his capacity as a police officer for the Town of Coventry, David Nelson in his individual capacity and in his capacity as a police officer for the Town of Coventry, Stephen A. Michailides in his individual capacity and in his capacity as a police officer for the Town of Coventry, Ronald E. DaSilva individually and in his capacity as Chief of Police for the Town of Coventry, and Brian J. O'Rourke individually and in his official capacity as the former Chief of Police for the Town of Coventry, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

Stephen M. Robinson, Law Offices of Stephen M. Robinson, Esq., Vicki J. Bejma, Robinson & Clapham, Providence, RI, for Plaintiffs.

Karen K. Corcoran, Marc DeSisto, DeSisto Law, Providence, RI, for Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

WILLIAM E. SMITH, District Judge.

In this action, Plaintiffs, now former members of the Central Falls High School boys soccer team, claim their civil rights were violated when they were subjected to a humiliating search in front of a crowd of unruly spectators by the Defendant police officers.

While dismayed and disappointed by the officers' lack of professional judgment and the appalling conduct of the crowd, the Court is compelled to conclude that the police officers' conduct is covered by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Moreover, Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy their burden with respect to their claims of discrimination and municipal and supervisory liability. So, for the reasons explained in detail below, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

I. Factual Background1

On September 28, 2006, the Central Falls High School boys soccer team played an away game against Coventry High School. The Central Falls team arrived by bus. Before the game began, five or six Central Falls players used the bathrooms located inside the Coventry boys locker room. While inside, one of the Central Falls players noticed a security guard keeping an eye on them.

The game was played and resulted in a tie. After the game, Coach Marchand (the Central Falls coach) sent his team to the bus and followed behind them. Before Coach Marchand reached the bus, approximately twenty players from the Coventry football team stopped him, and in profanity-laced terms accused the Central Falls players of stealing electronic devices (iPods and cell phones) from the Coventry locker room.

Coach Marchand told the football players that he would get to the bottom of the allegation and had them follow him to the team bus. The Central Falls players already were on the bus waiting to leave. Coach Marchand entered the bus and told his players: "everybody needs to put their game bag, varsity bag and their book bags ... on their laps." The coach and his assistant coach then searched each bag for the alleged stolen items. If one of his players had an iPod or cell phone, Coach Marchand asked for proof of ownership. In his deposition, he characterized the search as a good one—"I think we did a Columbo search, you know, CSI." The entire search took twenty to twenty-five minutes and none of the missing items were found.

When Coach Marchand exited the bus, the original group of twenty football players had grown to about fifty or sixty students and adults. The Coventry Athletic Director was also waiting. According to Coach Marchand, at this point the crowd was extremely vocal, shouting derogatory and racist remarks at his team and threatening not to disperse until the missing items were found.

As Coach Marchand began to discuss the situation with the Coventry Athletic Director, the four Defendant police officers arrived on scene. The officers entered the parking lot with sirens wailing and "boxed-in" the bus with their police cruisers. Coach Marchand and the Athletic Director then brought the officers up to speed on the situation. Coach Marchand informed the officers that the crowd suspected his team of stealing (or in the coach's own words: that his players were the "prime suspects.") A discussion ensued and at some point, after a "pregnant pause" in the conversation, the topic of whether the officers could do their own search came up. The parties agree it was at this point Coach Marchand consented to another search of his players. (In his deposition, however, Coach Marchand explained that he only consented because he felt compelled to do so under the circumstances.)

After obtaining Coach Marchand's consent, the officers ordered the Central Falls players to exit the bus with their belongings and stand with their backs against the bus. Up to this point, the police officers made little to no effort to quell or disperse the crowd, even as the crowd verbally assailed the players shouting racist epithets and accusations of theft.2

The search of the players began with the officers ordering each player to step forward one at a time with his bag. The officers then sorted through the contents of each bag on the hood of a police cruiser. If one of the officers discovered an iPod or cell phone, he held it up for the crowd to see—purportedly to allow the "victims" a chance to identify the stolen property. Some of the boys were asked to stretch their waist band and lift their shirt so the officers could make sure they were not hiding anything, and a few of the boys were subjected to pat down searches. The entire search by the police, all of which took place in front of the angry mob, lasted approximately one hour and none of the missing items were found.

Undeterred, the mob persisted in its boorish behavior, even after the search ended. Concerned that the mob would take matters into its own hands, the officers in classic too little, too late fashion decided for safety reasons to escort the bus out of town.

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue exists if a "reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party," and a fact is material if it has the "potential to affect the outcome of the suit." Velazquez-Garcia v. Horizon Lines of Puerto Rico, Inc., 473 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir.2007). The Court views all facts and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Torrech-Hernandez v. Gen. Elec. Co., 519 F.3d 41, 46 (1st Cir.2008).

When the defense of qualified immunity is raised on summary judgment, as it is in this case, the Court begins by "identifying the version of events that best comports with the summary judgment standard and then [asks] whether, given that set of facts, a reasonable officer should have known that his actions were unlawful." Morelli v. Webster, 552 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir.2009).

III. Discussion

Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges six causes of action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. Counts I-III allege that the officers violated the boys' Due Process,3 Equal Protection, and Fourth Amendment rights.4 The remaining causes of action allege violations of R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28.1, Invasion of Privacy (Count IV); § 31-21.2-3 Racial Profiling (Count V); and § 9-1-35 Ethnic Intimidation (Count VI). Although not alleged in separate counts, Plaintiffs' Complaint also presents claims against the Town and the Defendant police chiefs for a failure to train and supervise the officers.5 See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

A. Qualified Immunity

Plaintiffs allege the officers violated their Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches. On this claim, the officers have asserted the defense of qualified immunity, which "protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). Qualified immunity shields officials who perform their duties reasonably from liability and "applies regardless of whether the government official's error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact." Id. at 815, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).

Determining whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity is a two-step inquiry. Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 269 (1st Cir.2009). Under this test, "[a] court must decide: (1) whether the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) if so, whether the right was `clearly established' at the time of the defendant's alleged violation." Id. (citing Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 815-16). The clearly established prong has two aspects: (1) the clarity of the law at the time of the alleged civil rights violation and (2) whether given the...

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    • August 18, 2021
    ...law that establishes widespread acceptance of a federal constitutional right, state law is not enough. See Lopera v. Town of Coventry , 652 F. Supp. 2d 203, 216 (D.R.I. 2009) (explaining that state law cannot "determine whether federal law was clearly established"); see also Davis v. Schere......
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    ...a reasonable defendant would have understood that his conduct violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights." Lopera v. Town of Coventry , 652 F. Supp. 2d 203, 211 (D.R.I. 2009), aff'd , 640 F.3d 388 (1st Cir. 2011). The general right of an employee to speak on matters of public concern wi......
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