Lopes v. JetSetDC, LLC
Decision Date | 08 October 2014 |
Docket Number | Case No. 13–cv–1550 RCL |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Parties | Anthony Lopes, Plaintiff, v. JetSetDC, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
Spencer Michael Hecht, Hecht & Associates, Silver Spring, MD, for Plaintiff.
Charles C. Iweanoge, The Iweanoges' Firm, PC, Washington, DC, Matthew August Lefande, Matthew August Lefande, Law Offices of Matthew August Lefande, Arlington, VA, Anthony Graham, Sr., Smith Graham & Crump LLC, Largo, MD, for Defendants.
Before the Court are a number of subject matter jurisdiction-related motions. Included are the defendants David McLeod and Inner Circle, LLC's second motion to dismiss [40] (“McLeod motion to dismiss”) and the defendants JetSetDC, LLC, Corey Moxey, and Mark Spain's (collectively, “JetSetDC defendants”) second motion to dismiss [41] (“JetSetDC motion to dismiss”), the plaintiff's opposition [43], and the defendants McLeod and Inner Circle's reply [44] thereto; the defendants McLeod and Inner Circle's motion to stay the Court's discovery Order regarding the ownership of Lotus Lounge DC [42] (“McLeod motion to stay”) and the plaintiff's opposition [45] thereto; and the plaintiff's motions for additional discovery [51] relating to McLeod's domicile and to shorten the time for McLeod to respond to the discovery motion [52]. Upon consideration of the parties' briefings on these various motions, the applicable law, and the entire record herein, the Court will GRANT the McLeod motion to dismiss [40], GRANT the JetSetDC motion to dismiss [41], GRANT the McLeod motion to stay [42] nunc pro tunc, and DENY the plaintiff's motions for additional discovery [51] and to shorten the time to respond [52] nunc pro tunc .
Given that the background of this case has been provided in prior Memorandum Opinions issued in this case, e.g. Lopes v. JetSetDC, LLC, 994 F.Supp.2d 126, 129–130 (D.D.C.2014), ECF No. 36, the Court will only recite those alleged facts that are most relevant to the jurisdictional questions at hand. According to the complaint, plaintiff Anthony Lopes “is the owner/operator of an [automated teller machine (‘ATM’) ] business, and one of his own ATMs is located within [the] Lotus Lounge” nightclub in Washington, D.C. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 13, ECF No. 39. While visiting Lotus Lounge to service its ATM on or about December 27, 2012, the plaintiff alleges that defendant Jameka Ivy, who was working as a hostess at Lotus Lounge, verbally abused and physically attacked him, causing injuries. Id. ¶¶ 14–16.
The plaintiff, a citizen of Virginia, id. ¶ 1, brings suit in this federal Court against Ivy, Lotus Lounge, and five other purported defendants: Inner Circle, McLeod, JetSetDC, Moxey, and Spain. The complaint alleges that Inner Circle “owns and operates, or is trading as Lotus Lounge,” id. ¶ 7, and that McLeod “is an owner and operator of Lotus Lounge and/or Inner Circle,”id. ¶ 8. The plaintiff asserts that McLeod is a citizen of Maryland. Id . The complaint then pleads that JetSetDC “has a business relationship with Lotus Lounge[ ][and] Inner Circle, [ ] and is thoroughly involved in the management, staffing, and events at Lotus Lounge.” Id. ¶ 9. The plaintiff further alleges that Moxey and Spain “are the owners and operators of JetSet, and are alter egos of this corporation.” Id. ¶ 4. The plaintiff claims that Moxey is a citizen of Washington, D.C., and that Spain is a citizen of Maryland. Id. ¶¶ 5, 6. Finally, the complaint alleges that that defendant Ivy was employed by Id. ¶ 10.1 Unlike his contention that Inner Circle and JetSetDC are LLCs, the plaintiff does not plead a specific entity type for Lotus Lounge. See id. ¶ 3.
On February 26, 2014, the Court filed two Memorandum Opinions, ECF Nos. 36, 38, denying the defendants' respective motions to dismiss, ECF Nos. 16, 26, on the basis of the plaintiff's pleadings, and granted the plaintiff's motion for leave to file its Second Amended Complaint, see ECF No. 39. Regarding Lotus Lounge's status as a defendant, the Court noted that it would reserve judgment on the issue of “whether a trade name or alias is a proper party to a lawsuit under District of Columbia law.” 994 F.Supp.2d at 135. On March 12, defendants McLeod and Inner Circle filed a second motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on diversity grounds, claiming that evidence clearly demonstrates that McLeod was a citizen of Virginia at all times relevant to this case. ECF No. 40. That same day, the JetSetDC defendants filed a second motion to dismiss that simply “request[ed] to adopt [the McLeod motion to dismiss] since the said motion form [sic] the basis of [the JetSetDC] motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.” ECF No. 41. In April, the Court issued an Order, ECF No. 46, and subsequent Memorandum Opinion, ECF No. 47, granting the plaintiff “limited discovery on the issue of defendant David McLeod's state of domicile” and setting an evidentiary hearing. See 4 F.Supp.3d 238, 242, 2014 WL 1388836, at *3–4 (D.D.C.2014). The evidentiary hearing took place on July 11, 2014. At the hearing, both parties submitted exhibits and plaintiff's counsel cross-examined McLeod on his domicile claims.2
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that such jurisdiction exists. Khadr v. United States, 529 F.3d 1112, 1115 (D.C.Cir.2008). The Court must “assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and construe the complaint liberally, granting [the] plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Am. Na'l Ins. Co. v. F.D.I.C., 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C.Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But “[b]ecause subject-matter jurisdiction focuses on the [C]ourt's power to hear the claim ..., the [C]ourt must give the plaintiff's factual allegations closer scrutiny when resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion than would be required for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Youming Jin v. Ministry of State Sec., 475 F.Supp.2d 54, 60 (D.D.C.2007). Importantly, “it has been long accepted that the [Court] may make appropriate inquiry beyond the pleadings to satisfy itself on authority to entertain the case.” Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C.Cir.1987).
As the Court previously explained in its April Memorandum Opinion, “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between—(1) citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Novak v. Capital Mgmt. and Dev. Corp., 452 F.3d 902, 906 (D.C.Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The plaintiff pleads that McLeod is a citizen of Maryland, while McLeod contends that he, like the plaintiff, is a citizen of Virginia. Compare Second Am. Compl. ¶ 8, with McLeod motion to dismiss at 3. Prakash v. Am. Univ., 727 F.2d 1174, 1180 (D.C.Cir.1984) ; see also Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989). “In many instances, and perhaps in most, a party's intent will appear, at least in part, from facts established by documents” beyond the plaintiff's pleadings. Prakash, 727 F.2d at 1180.
In support of McLeod's purported Maryland domicile, the plaintiff sets forth two allegations: “McLeod currently has a valid Maryland driver's license and owns a home in Maryland.” Pl.'s Opp'n at 2, ECF No. 43; see also Evidentiary Hr'g, July 11, 2014, Pl.'s Exs. 3 ( ), 4 (McLeod's driver's license record from the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration, indicating a July 2014 expiration date). McLeod concedes both of these facts. See, e.g., Evidentiary Hr'g, Pl.'s Ex. 2 at 2–3 ( ). However, McLeod's Maryland driver's license and property are insufficient to overcome the contrary jurisdictional evidence presented by the defendant at the July 11 hearing and in a Notice of Filing, ECF No. 55, docketed thereafter.
First, the Court finds McLeod's explanation for both the Maryland driver's license and property to be reasonable. To support his contention that he possesses a Maryland driver's license—and, additionally, Maryland license plates—despite the fact that he lives in Virginia, McLeod presents an Initial Request for Information from the Office of Commissioner of Revenue for Arlington County, Virginia. Evidentiary Hr'g, Defs.' Ex. 3. The request, dated March 19, 2014, states that McLeod's vehicle “appears to be garaged (regularly parked) at 4220 CAMPBELL...
To continue reading
Request your trial- Rollins v. U.S. Dep't of State
-
Odutola v. Floyd
... ... there for an unspecified or indefinite period of time.” ... Lopes ... there for an unspecified or indefinite period of time.” ... Lopes v. JetSetDC ... ...
-
Brown v. Bergsgaard
... ... state residents to delay updating these documents, regardless ... of any intent to remain indefinitely. See Lopes v ... JetSetDC, LLC, 70 F.Supp.3d 555, 559 (D.D.C. 2014). The ... Court also notes Bergsgaard may be in violation of Arkansas ... ...