Lopes v. Phillips

• Decision Date: 12 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 93-656-A,93-656-A
• Citation: 680 A.2d 65
• Parties: Manuel A. LOPES v. Desiree K. PHILLIPS et al. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 65

680 A.2d 65

Manuel A. LOPES v. Desiree K. PHILLIPS et al.

No. 93-656-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 12, 1996.

Edward J. Mulligan, Carolyn E. Mulligan, Lincoln, for Plaintiff.

Michael E. Civittolo, Providence, for Defendant.

OPINION

BOURCIER, Justice.

This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Superior Court following grant of summary judgment in favor of one of the two named defendants in a civil negligence case.

The appellant here, and plaintiff below, is Manuel A. Lopes (Lopes). On March 6, 1990, Lopes, a Massachusetts resident, was the operator of a motor vehicle that was parked on Pomona Avenue in Providence and was struck by another vehicle while so parked. The operator of the other vehicle was Desiree K. Phillips (Phillips), who had rented the vehicle she was operating from Agency Rent-A-Car (Agency), a Delaware corporation doing business in Seekonk, Massachusetts. The record before us reveals that Phillips, a Rhode Island resident, had both signed the vehicle rental contract and had taken possession of the rental car at Agency's Seekonk, Massachusetts, office. The collision involving the two vehicles, unlike the litigation that followed, was somewhat prosaic.

Shortly before midnight, Phillips, while driving the rental car near the intersection of Academy and Pomona Avenues in Providence, attempted to make a right turn from Academy onto Pomona. The car slid on the icy roadway and struck the left side of the parked car occupied by Lopes. Lopes was the only person in the car, which was owned by his former wife, also of Massachusetts. Lopes was injured, taken to the emergency room at Rhode Island Hospital for treatment and was later released. He later complained of back pain and during the ensuing months received medical care and underwent some rehabilitative medical treatment.

As a result of his alleged personal injuries, Lopes in September 1991 instituted a civil negligence action in the Superior Court, naming Phillips and Agency as defendants. Phillips did not answer the complaint and was defaulted in October 1992. Agency, the remaining defendant in the case, following discovery, filed a motion for summary judgment in September 1993. That motion was heard and granted. The hearing justice ruled that Agency was not jointly and severally liable for the alleged negligence of the co-defendant Phillips. Final judgment in favor of Agency entered on December 1, 1993. The plaintiff's appeal was thereafter duly filed.

I Summary Judgment

Summary judgment foreclosing and determining a party's interest and/or liability in pending litigation short of trial is understandably an abrupt manner of disposing of a pending legal action, utilization of which we have referred to as being drastic, McPhillips v. Zayre Corp., 582 A.2d 747 (R.I.1990), and because so, should be applied cautiously by the hearing justice. Hydro-Manufacturing, Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 640 A.2d 950 (R.I.1994); Golderese v. Suburban Land Co., 590 A.2d 395 (R.I.1991); Rustigian v. Celona, 478 A.2d 187 (R.I.1984).

This Court reviews the propriety of an order granting summary judgment employing the same standard as that utilized by the hearing justice when initially passing upon the motion. Hydro-Manufacturing, Inc., 640 A.2d at 954. That standard, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, requires us to review and evaluate the case pleadings, affidavits, admissions, answers to interrogatories, and other case file materials in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and to determine therefrom whether there is any genuine issue of disputed material fact, and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hydro-Manufacturing, Inc., 640 A.2d at 954; LaFazia v. Howe, 575 A.2d 182, 184 (R.I.1990); Grissom v. Pawtucket Trust Co., 559 A.2d 1065, 1066 (R.I.1989); Ludwig v. Kowal, 419 A.2d 297, 301 (R.I.1980). If no material issue of contested fact is found, summary judgment is appropriate. Richard v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 604 A.2d 1260, 1261 (R.I.1992). If a material issue of contested fact is discernible from the case pleadings and other case filings, that contested issue cannot be disposed of by summary judgment but must be left for the factfinder to resolve, and the motion should be denied. Saltzman v. Atlantic Realty Co., 434 A.2d 1343 (R.I.1981); Palazzo v. Big G Supermarkets, Inc., 110 R.I. 242, 292 A.2d 235 (1972).

II Agency's Position on Summary Judgment

Agency in its summary judgment motion asserted that pursuant to our opinion in Fratus v. Amerco, 575 A.2d 989 (R.I.1990), it could not be held liable to plaintiff Lopes for any negligent action on the part of Phillips. In Fratus, we had answered in the negative, the following question certified to this Court by the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island pursuant to Rule 6 of our Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure:

"Whether Rhode Island law imposes joint and several liability on any owner of a rental vehicle not registered or rented in, but negligently operated by the bailee thereof, on the public highways of the State of Rhode Island." Fratus, 575 A.2d at 990.

In order to respond properly to that certified question, we were required in Fratus to interpret chapter 34 of title 31 of our General Laws, entitled "Responsibility of Owners of Rental Vehicles." That chapter mandates now, as it did then, that anyone intending to engage in the business of renting motor vehicles or trucks in this state without drivers must first notify the Registry of Motor Vehicles of that intention to rent and must also furnish proof of financial responsibility in certain prescribed amounts. G.L.1956 § 31-34-1. The statute further provides in pertinent part:

"Any owner of a for hire motor vehicle or truck who has given proof of financial responsibility under this chapter or who in violation of this chapter has failed to give proof of financial responsibility, shall be jointly and severally liable with any person operating the vehicle for any damages caused by the negligence of any person operating the vehicle by or with the permission of the owner." Section 31-34-4.

In Fratus we concluded that § 31-34-4 was not to "be applied extraterritorily to a Massachusetts bailment." Fratus, 575 A.2d at 992. Our reasoning was based, in part, upon a review of relevant regulations promulgated by the Rhode Island Department of Transportation (DOT), and we emphasized that "this court attributes great weight to an agency's construction of a regulatory statute when the statute's provisions are unclear." Id. at 991 (quoting Defenders of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Management, 553 A.2d 541, 543 (R.I.1989)). One of the regulations promulgated by the DOT, regulation 2.0, provided in pertinent part that "every party engaged in leasing of vehicles in this State shall first obtain a license from the Division of Motor Vehicles." Fratus, 575 A.2d at 992. The DOT regulation 6.1 read in pertinent part that "the owner of any motor vehicle offered for lease in this State by a motor vehicle lessor shall provide proof of financial responsibility to the Division of Motor Vehicles * * * ." Id.

We concluded that reference to the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions "clearly establish[es] that the duty to file proof of financial responsibility is limited to owners of vehicles that are registered in Rhode Island or that are required to be registered in Rhode Island." Fratus, 575 A.2d at 992. We further noted that because the failure of an owner of a leased vehicle to file proof of financial responsibility constituted a misdemeanor pursuant to § 31-34-6, "every owner of a leased vehicle who failed to file proof of financial responsibility in Rhode Island, regardless of the location or registration of that vehicle, would be guilty of a criminal offense in Rhode Island." Fratus, 575 A.2d at 992. This, we reasoned in Fratus, could lead to absurd results or, as we specifically stated, an "absurd conclusion." Id.

Putting aside for the moment the fact that the rental companies in both this case and in Fratus were situated in Massachusetts, the potential absurdity of our reaching a contrary result is readily apparent. If we were to hold that out-of-state companies, renting cars not registered in Rhode Island, were liable for the negligent acts of the individuals who had rented their vehicles in those foreign states, then it would have to follow, a priori, that a car rental company in Alaska would have to take the preventative measure of filing proof of financial responsibility with our State Registry of Motor Vehicles' department to protect itself in the eventuality that one day, one of its customers might drive from cold Nome, Alaska, to posh Newport, Rhode Island, and while here become involved in an accident. In that case, if the owner of the Alaskan rental company had not filed proof of financial responsibility in Rhode Island, then that owner would be vulnerable to criminal charges in our state. "As a general rule, criminal laws do not operate beyond the territorial limits of the state in which they are enacted." Fratus, 575 A.2d at 992 (citing Hardy v. Betz, 105 N.H. 169, 195 A.2d 582 (1963); In re Adoption of Lunger, 28 N.J.Super. 614, 101 A.2d 370 (1953)). We therefore reiterate our previously expressed belief in Fratus that "the Legislature never intended this statute to be applied outside this state." Fratus, 575 A.2d at 992.

The pertinent facts of the Fratus case and the case at bar are strikingly similar. In Fratus, the rental vehicle was rented in Worcester, Massachusetts. The rental company was located and incorporated in Massachusetts, and at the time of the accident title to the rental vehicle was held by a Michigan corporation, which is also the state in which the vehicle was registered. The allegedly negligent driver of the rental vehicle, a Massachusetts resident, struck the...