Lopez-Aguilar v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't

• Decision Date: 09 May 2019
• Docket Number: No. 18-1050,18-1050
• Parties: Antonio LOPEZ-AGUILAR, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARION COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal of: State of Indiana, Proposed Intervenor.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

924 F.3d 375

Antonio LOPEZ-AGUILAR, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. MARION COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants-Appellees.Appeal of: State of Indiana, Proposed Intervenor.

No. 18-1050

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued September 7, 2018

Decided May 9, 2019

Gavin M. Rose, Attorney, ACLU OF INDIANA, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Thomas M. Fisher, Attorney, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Indianapolis IN, for Proposed Intervenor Appellant.

Donald Eugene Morgan, Attorney, OFFICE OF THE CORPORATION COUNSEL, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants-Appellees.

Mark Steven Venezia, Attorney, IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW INSTITUTE, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW INSTITUTE.

Kyle D. Hawkins, Attorney, OFFICE OF THE TEXAS SOLICITOR GENERAL, Austin, TX, for Amicus Curiae STATE OF TEXAS.

Erez Reuveni, Scott Grant Stewart, Attorney, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Civil Division, Washington, DC, Bob Wood, Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Indianapolis, IN, for Amicus Curiae UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Before Flaum, Ripple, and Barrett, Circuit Judges.

Ripple, Circuit Judge.

Antonio Lopez-Aguilar brought this action against the Marion County Sheriff’s Department ("the Sheriff’s Department"), Sheriff John R. Layton, in both his official capacity and his individual capacity, and a sergeant of the Sheriff’s Department, in his individual capacity (together, "the defendants"). His complaint set forth one claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that when the defendants detained him for transfer into the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), they violated his Fourth Amendment rights.¹ Mr. Lopez-Aguilar also brought supplemental claims, based on Indiana law, for false arrest and false imprisonment. His complaint sought damages and a declaration that the defendants had violated his rights by detaining him. He did not seek injunctive relief.

The parties later proposed, and the district court subsequently entered, a Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction ("the Stipulated Judgment"), which granted declaratory and prospective injunctive relief but dismissed with prejudice Mr. Lopez-Aguilar’s damages claims. Following the entry of final judgment, but within the time for appeal, the State of Indiana ("the State" or "Indiana") moved to intervene for the purpose of appealing the district court’s order entering the Stipulated Judgment. The district court denied Indiana’s motion to intervene. The State now appeals that denial.

Indiana has standing for the purpose of bringing this appeal. The State’s motion to intervene was timely, and it also fulfilled the necessary conditions for intervention of right. Finally, the State has demonstrated that the district court was without jurisdiction to enter prospective injunctive relief. Therefore, for the reasons set forth more fully below, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.BACKGROUND

A.

On September 18, 2014, Mr. Lopez-Aguilar came to the Marion County Courthouse in Indianapolis to attend a hearing on a criminal misdemeanor complaint charging him with driving without a license. When he arrived, officers of the Sheriff’s Department informed him and his attorney that an ICE officer had come to the courthouse earlier that day looking for him.² He alleges that a Sergeant Davis took him into custody. Later that day, Mr. Lopez-Aguilar appeared before the traffic court and resolved his misdemeanor charge. That disposition did not include a sentence of incarceration. Sergeant Davis nevertheless again took Mr. Lopez-Aguilar into custody, informing him that he would be held until the Sheriff’s Department could transfer him to ICE’s custody. Mr. Lopez-Aguilar consequently remained at the Marion County jail overnight; the next day, county officers transferred him to ICE. Neither federal nor state authorities charged Mr. Lopez-Aguilar with a crime, and he did not appear before a judicial officer. ICE subsequently released him on his own recognizance. An unspecified type of "immigration case" against Mr. Lopez-Aguilar was pending when he later filed this action.³

B.

On September 15, 2016, Mr. Lopez-Aguilar initiated this litigation by filing a complaint against the Sheriff’s Department, Sheriff Layton, and Sergeant Davis. As noted earlier, he asserted a claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as state law claims for false arrest and false imprisonment. Following the exchange of discovery, the parties agreed to settle the case to "avoid the cost and uncertainty of continued litigation."⁴ Specifically, on July 10, 2017, Mr. Lopez-Aguilar and the defendants jointly proposed to the district court a Stipulated Judgment. Indiana news outlets reported this proposed Stipulated Judgment in the days following its filing. On July 13, 2017, the United States filed a request for time to submit a pleading addressing the parties’ proposed settlement. The district court granted that motion, and, on August 4, 2017, the United States filed a statement of interest objecting to the Stipulated Judgment. The news media also reported the Government’s opposition to the parties’ agreement.

In its statement, the United States noted that the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") authorized the Sheriff’s Department to cooperate with the enforcement of federal immigration laws. Further, the Government submitted, the Sheriff’s Department’s cooperation with ICE did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The United States disputed whether the defendants’ detention of Mr. Lopez-Aguilar amounted to an unlawful seizure. Even if there had been an unlawful seizure, continued the Government, the permanent injunction was improper because it imposed relief far beyond any actual injury to Mr. Lopez-Aguilar.

After considering the positions of the parties and the Government, the district court approved the Stipulated Judgment and then entered a final judgment declaring that:

[S]eizures by the defendants of any person based solely on detention requests from [ICE], in whatever form, or on removal orders from an immigration court, violate the Fourth Amendment, unless ICE supplies, or the defendants otherwise possess, probable cause to believe that the individual to be detained has committed a criminal offense; [and]

... [F]or the avoidance of doubt, an ICE request that defendants seize or hold an individual in custody based solely on a civil immigration violation does not justify a Fourth Amendment seizure ....⁵

Further, the district court permanently enjoined the defendants from "seizing or detaining any person based solely on detention requests from ICE, in whatever form, or on removal orders from an immigration court, unless ICE supplies a warrant signed by a judge or otherwise supplies probable cause that the individual to be detained has committed a criminal offense."⁶

The district court also issued an opinion to explain its approval of the Stipulated Judgment. The court first considered whether the Stipulated Judgment would require the Sheriff’s Department to violate Indiana law. A statutory provision prohibits a governmental body, such as the Sheriff’s Department, from implementing a policy that "prohibits or in any way restricts" law enforcement officers from taking certain actions "with regard to information of the citizenship or immigration status" of a person, such as "[c]ommunicating or cooperating with federal officials." Ind. Code § 5-2-18.2-3. The district court determined, however, that because the Stipulated Judgment only prohibited the Sheriff’s Department from "seizing" or "detaining" certain individuals, "not from communicating with or about them," the Stipulated Judgment posed no conflict.⁷ The district court then examined another provision that forbids a state governmental body from "limit[ing] or restrict[ing] the enforcement of federal immigration laws to less than the full extent permitted by federal law." Ind. Code § 5-2-18.2-4. The district court conceded difficulty in interpreting and applying this provision. It nevertheless determined that, if the provision simply prohibits a state governmental body from requiring or permitting anything less than cooperation with federal immigration enforcement to the full extent such cooperation is permitted by federal law, there is no conflict with the Stipulated Judgment. In the district court’s view, without an express agreement with the United States Attorney General or some other Congressionally-approved arrangement, state cooperation with federal immigration authorities did not contemplate state enforcement of removal orders or ICE detainers. The INA preempted any such requirement. Additionally, said the court, any such state enforcement absent probable cause would violate the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the district court found that the Stipulated Judgment did not require the Sheriff’s Department to violate Indiana law.⁸

The district court next considered whether the Stipulated Judgment complied with the strictures of Local No. 93, International Association of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland , 478 U.S. 501, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986). That case requires the district court to determine that a proposed consent decree "(1) spring[s] from and serve[s] to resolve a dispute within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction; (2) come[s] within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings; and (3) further[s] the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based." Komyatti v. Bayh , 96 F.3d 955, 960 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Local No. 93 , 478 U.S. at 525, 106 S.Ct. 3063 ) (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court concluded that the Stipulated Judgment satisfied these requirements because: (1) it would resolve Mr. Lopez-Aguilar’s § 1983 claim, which was within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, by terminating the litigation; (2) restricting the...