Lopez Lopez v. Garriga

• Citation: 718 F. Supp. 1066
• Decision Date: 21 August 1989
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 88-0636 (JP).
• Parties: Celso E. LÓPEZ LÓPEZ, Plaintiff, v. R.D. GARRIGA, I. Rivera; individually and in their official capacities as agents of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service; Allan C. Nelson, in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service; James H. Walker in his official capacity as District Director of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service for the District of Puerto Rico; Police officer Santiago Cruz, individually and in his official capacity as an officer of the Puerto Rico Police; Police officer Orozco, individually and in his official capacity as an officer of the Puerto Rico Police, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

718 F. Supp. 1066

Celso E. LÓPEZ LÓPEZ, Plaintiff, v. R.D. GARRIGA, I. Rivera; individually and in their official capacities as agents of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service; Allan C. Nelson, in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service; James H. Walker in his official capacity as District Director of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service for the District of Puerto Rico; Police officer Santiago Cruz, individually and in his official capacity as an officer of the Puerto Rico Police; Police officer Orozco, individually and in his official capacity as an officer of the Puerto Rico Police, Defendants.

Civ. No. 88-0636 (JP).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

August 21, 1989.

Charles S. Hey Maestre, Bayamón, P.R., for plaintiff.

Sylvia Carreño Coll, Federal Litigation Div., Dept. of Justice, San Juan, P.R., and Eduardo E. Toro Font, Asst. U.S. Atty., Hato Rey, P.R., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

PIERAS, District Judge.

The case is now before the Court for ruling on the plaintiff's motions under Fed. Rule Civ.Pro. 50 and for the framing of an injunction. At trial, the jury rendered a verdict for all defendants on the plaintiff's damages claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). The defendants' pre-trial and mid-trial motions for summary judgment based on qualified immunity were denied based on the insufficiency of the factual record at that time. The issue of qualified immunity was not presented to the jury. The plaintiff contends that he is entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial because the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict for the defendants.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Plaintiff Celso López López brought this action to redress alleged violations of his fourth-and fifth-amendment rights by two agents of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and by a Puerto Rico police officer at the immigration checkpoint at the Luis Muñoz Marin airport in San Juan. In examining the plaintiff's motion, the Court considers the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether the evidence could lead reasonable people to one conclusion, i.e., that the verdict should be for the plaintiff. Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 607 (1st Cir.1985).

A. Federal Agents Garriga and Rivera

The plaintiff claims that the evidence presented to the jury did not, as a matter of law, establish that agents Garriga and Rivera had sufficient reason to question and detain him. The jury was instructed that the actions of the agents were proper if those agents had "reasonable, objective suspicion that the plaintiff was an illegal alien."¹ This statement of the law derives from settled fourth-amendment law,² including INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984), which concerned questioning of factory workers by INS agents.

The Court in Delgado held that the workers' encounters with the INS agents in their factories were consensual, and therefore not "seizures," despite the INS practice of stationing armed agents at the exits of the buildings. In addition, the Court noted that—

police questioning, by itself, is unlikely to result in a Fourth Amendment violation. While most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response. Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231-234, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2049-2051, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Unless the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded, one cannot say that the questioning resulted in a detention under the Fourth Amendment. But if the person refuses to answer and the police take additional steps—such as those taken in Brown—to obtain an answer, then the Fourth Amendment imposes some minimal level of objective justification to validate the detention or seizure. (Citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980), and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879-1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).)

Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216, 104 S.Ct. at 1763.

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects most law enforcement officers from personal liability for damages in all but the most egregious cases of unconstitutional actions. This Court denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment, which were based on qualified immunity, because the factual record was not sufficiently developed. The Court also denied qualified immunity at the close of the plaintiff's evidence, after the testimony only of Celso López and INS Assistant District Director Robert Bowles, and at the close of the defendants' case.

The jury's determination on the merits of the case mooted the issue of qualified immunity. Because the Court now upholds the jury's verdict, it need not reconsider the legal questions raised by the defendants' qualified-immunity motion. The Court notes, however, that even if it had found the verdict to be unsupported by the evidence, it would have granted qualified immunity to the federal defendants because the plaintiff offered no objective evidence that the defendants knowingly violated the law. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).

With respect to the merits of López' claim, and after careful review of the proceedings, the Court finds ample evidence to support the jury's verdict that agents Garriga and Rivera had a sufficiently reasonable suspicion to detain López for questioning. Defendant Rivera testified that INS agents are skilled in spotting illegal aliens on the basis of trends and profiles. He particularly noted that extreme behavior, either in avoiding or cooperating with the inspection, causes agents to become quite suspicious.

Defendant Rivera saw López approach the INS checkpoint quickly in a slouch, avoiding eye contact, and passing by a group of other travelers in line for inspection, apparently intending to "swish right through." Defendant Garriga stated that he was alarmed by López' rapid movement, his Groucho Marx-type slouch, and his movement through the orderly line of passengers. Garriga thought that López could be an illegal alien, that he might have a hearing or mental impairment, or that he could be a hijacker. Garriga sought to determine if López was going to the mainland U.S. and, if so, what his citizenship might be.

Garriga left the checkpoint, followed López, and continued asking questions which López ignored. When López began turning left to proceed to his departure gate, Garriga blocked his path. When López attempted to step around Garriga, Garriga blocked his path again. This encounter caused enough commotion to alert the attention of Puerto Rico Police Officer Santiago Cruz, who joined the fracas and escorted López to the inspection area by the elbow.

A short time later, López decided to leave the inspection area. When defendant Rivera attempted to halt this escape, López sat on the floor. Police Officers Santiago Cruz and Orozco carried him back to the inspection area. An INS supervisor who knew Celso López soon arrived, and López was released from his detention.

There is no question that López never consented to questioning and that he was detained. The question for the jury was the reasonableness of the detention, or seizure, in light of its justification. The jury had every opportunity to weigh the nature of the detention—which was relatively short—against the suspicions described by the INS agents, and it determined the defendants' actions to have been reasonable and justified.

The evidence presented, as outlined above, was not of the nature and weight that it should compel reasonable people to but the one conclusion that the plaintiff entreats. Considering the behavior López exhibited in avoiding the inspection, as well as the careful response of the agents in seeking to confirm their suspicions of illegal alienage, the Court finds that the jury was justified in finding no violation of López' rights by agents Garriga and Rivera. The Court therefore DENIES the motions for judgment notwithstanding a verdict and for a new trial.

B. Officer Santiago Cruz

The jury's verdict with respect to Officer Santiago Cruz is likewise supported by the evidence presented. The evidence showed that Santiago was on general duty at the airport, not assigned to assist the INS inspection in any way. He was attending to a problem at the security checkpoint when a security guard called his attention to the commotion between López and Garriga. Santiago approached, and responding to Garriga's request for help, he led López to the INS checkpoint area. Later, he helped move López back to the checkpoint, as described above.

The jury had sufficient evidence to reach the conclusions that Officer Santiago acted solely under his authority to keep the peace at the airport and that his actions toward López were consistent with this purpose and reasonable under the circumstances. The plaintiff's claim that Santiago acted solely to enforce federal immigration law finds no support whatsoever in the evidence. The Court therefore DENIES the plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial.

II. Equitable Relief

Plaintiff Celso López has requested equitable relief in the form of a declaration and an injunction to prevent future violations of his fourth- and fifth-amendment rights.

The plaintiff requests a declaration that the current checkpoint system is unlawful and unconstitutional insofar as it entails inspection of U.S. citizens travelling from San Juan to other points on the island; that the inspection given...