Lopez Rosario v. Police Dept.

• Decision Date: 11 December 2000
• Docket Number: No. Civ. 00-1806 JP.,Civ. 00-1806 JP.
• Citation: 126 F.Supp.2d 167
• Parties: Delfina LOPEZ ROSARIO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Page 167

126 F.Supp.2d 167

Delfina LOPEZ ROSARIO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.

No. Civ. 00-1806 JP.

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

December 11, 2000.

Ivonne González-Morales, Old San Juan, PR, for plaintiffs.

José R. Cintrón-Rodríguez, Department of Justice of P.R., Federal Litigation Division, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

PIERAS, Senior District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(1) & (6) filed by Co-defendants the Puerto Rico Police Department, the Security Commission, the Central Office of Labor Advice and Human Resources Administration (OCALARH), and Police Superintendent Pedro Toledo in his official capacity (docket No. 3), Plaintiffs' Opposition thereto (docket No. 7), and the Motion to Dismiss Under FRCP 12(b)(6) filed by Co-defendants Pedro Toledo and Maribel Hernández, in their personal capacities (docket No. 10), to which Plaintiffs filed no opposition.

This is an action brought by sixty-five (65) civilian employees of the Puerto Rico Police Department and the Security Commission. Defendants in this action are the Puerto Rico Police Department, the Security Commission of Puerto Rico, the Central Office of Labor Advice and Human Resources Administration (OCALARH), Police Superintendent Pedro Toledo in his official and personal capacities, and Maribel Hernández, Director of OCALARH, in her personal capacity. Plaintiffs seek money damages, declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219; the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985; and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs also invoke the Court's pendent jurisdiction to assert claims under Puerto Rico law. Defendants move for dismissal of the case under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that Plaintiffs' claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Equal Pay Act (EPA) are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and that Plaintiffs have otherwise failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiffs claim to occupy diverse positions within the Police Department and Security Commission, including Administrative Assistant I-III, Clerk I-IV, Executive Office I & IV, Executive Secretary, Fingerprint Technician I-IV, Office Clerk I-IV, Personnel Technician I-IV, and Statistics Assistant. Geographically, all but one of the Plaintiffs are alleged to work in Hato Rey, Puerto Rico. One Plaintiff is alleged to work in Aguadilla. The schedule attached to the Complaint indicates that forty-two (42) of the Plaintiffs are female, and twenty-three (23) are male.

The Complaint asserts that Plaintiffs have performed work for which they have not been adequately compensated in accordance with Puerto Rico and Federal laws. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants (1) prepared and implemented a new, lower pay scale prior to the FLSA effective date vis-à-vis States and municipalities, as part of a scheme to reduce the economic impact of the FLSA; (2) have maintained a discriminatory compensation system by failing and refusing to pay Plaintiffs salaries consistent with the evaluated worth of the duties they perform; (3) have failed and refused to pay Plaintiffs' previously-earned seniority, legislative and/or merit wage increases, bonuses, and other benefits which had accrued to them and eliminated Plaintiffs' right to such wage increases, bonuses and benefits; (4) have failed and refused to adjust Plaintiffs' schedules to reduce the number of overtime hours worked; and (5) have failed to adjust the Police Department and Security Commission civilian pay scale upwards in light of increases in the minimum wage.

Plaintiffs claim to be covered by the FLSA and further claim that their employers, the Police Department and Security Commission, are political subdivisions of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and public agencies within the meaning of the FLSA. Co-defendant OCALARH is alleged to be responsible for supervising the administration of the Defendant employers' compensation schedules, and as such should be considered an "employer" within the meaning of the FLSA. Plaintiffs contend that Co-defendant Hernández, as Director of OCALARH, was responsible for issuing the applicable norms pursuant to which the compensation schedules were approved and maintained by the Defendant employers, and in that capacity continued a pattern or practice of wage discrimination by failing to promulgate, amend, or repeal regulations as necessary to implement minimum wage legislation and to guarantee that employees of the Police Department and Security Commission were being adequately compensated.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

In adjudicating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must accept as true "all well-pleaded factual averments and indulg[e] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996) (citations omitted). "[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41 (1st Cir.1991). Although there is a low threshold for stating a claim, the pleading requirement is "not entirely a toothless tiger." Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc., 103 F.3d 186, 190 (1st Cir.1996) (quoting The Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir.1989)). A complaint must set forth "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable theory." Romero-Barcelo v. Hernandez-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 28 n. 2 (1st Cir.1996) (quoting Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir.1988)). For the purposes of this motion, therefore, all factual allegations in the Complaint will be accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Fair Labor Standards Act

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' FLSA claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages brought in federal court against any unconsenting State, unless Congress unequivocally expresses its intent to abrogate a State's sovereign immunity pursuant to a valid exercise of congressional power. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 67, 106 S.Ct. 423, 425-26, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985). Puerto Rico is treated as a State for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See Jusino Mercado v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 214 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir.2000); Ortiz-Feliciano v. Toledo-Davila, 175 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir.1999). Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to suits against State officers sued in their official capacity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Department of the Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 350, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945).

In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), the U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress possesses the authority to abrogate a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to its enforcement power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but not under the Commerce Clause. Thereafter, the First Circuit found that private suits initiated against a State under the FLSA were foreclosed by the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Seminole Tribe. See Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37 (1st Cir.1997); cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999) (holding that Constitution bars individuals actions against a State to enforce FLSA when brought in a State's courts over its objection). And recently, the Circuit clarified in that notwithstanding Congress's plenary powers over territories and possessions, the government of Puerto Rico, like the fifty States, is immune from a federal damages action brought by its employees under the FLSA. See Jusino Mercado, 214 F.3d at 36.

Plaintiffs do not dispute that Co-defendants the Puerto Rico Police Department, the Security Commission, and OCALARH are government agencies, instrumentalities, or "arms of the state." As such, they are protected against individual FLSA suits for money damages by Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Mills, 118 F.3d at 55; see also Reyes v. Supervisor of Drug Enforcement Admin., 834 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 (1st Cir.1987); Vega Castro, 43 F.Supp.2d at 190-91; Suarez Cestero v. Pagan Rosa, 996 F.Supp. 133, 142-43 (D.Puerto Rico 1998). The FLSA claim for damages against Pedro Toledo in his official capacity, brought under section 1983, is similarly precluded by the Eleventh Amendment. See Reyes, 834 F.2d at 1097-98. To the extent that Plaintiffs contend that they may obtain monetary relief against Co-defendants Toledo and Hernández in their individual capacities because they were acting outside the scope of their duties by refusing to actualize pay scales and to pay overtime wages, this argument does not circumvent the Eleventh Amendment bar. The conduct complained of "is not personal, and money damages for wages due would be paid out of the state treasury regardless of whether the officials were acting in accord with statutory duties." Hale v. State of Ariz., 993 F.2d 1387, 1399 (9th Cir.1993) (en banc) (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 653, 677, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 1362, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974)).

Plaintiffs argue that notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment bar to suits for money damages, they are entitled to pursue their FLSA claims for prospective injunctive relief and declaratory judgment against Toledo in his official capacity pursuant to Ex parte Young.¹ In suits against state...