Lopez v. City of Belen
| Decision Date | 25 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV 19-0855 RB/JHR,CIV 19-0855 RB/JHR |
| Parties | Ana LOPEZ, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Luis Lopez, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF BELEN, Scott Conner, and Leona Vigil, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
James A. Montalbano, Shane C. Youtz, Stephen Curtice, Youtz & Valdez, PC, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff.
Paula Grace Maynes, Miller Stratvert PA Santa Fe, NM, for Defendants.
Luis Lopez was a sergeant with the Belen Police Department (BPD) and the president of AFSCME Local 601 (the Union). Displeased with the performance of BPD Deputy Chief Robert Miller, Lopez initiated a "vote of no confidence" that 9 of the 13 Union members signed. Lopez sent a letter outlining the Union's issues with Miller and reporting the vote to BPD Chief of Police Scott Conner, City Manager Leona Vigil, the Belen Mayor and City Council, and the local newspaper. Vigil hired an outside firm to investigate the allegations against Miller, which concluded that they were largely unfounded. Lopez was terminated from his position with the BPD and appealed his termination to the Belen Labor Management Relations Board. The Board, considering witness testimony and the same investigative report that the City relied on to fire Lopez, concluded that the City unlawfully terminated Lopez for union-related activities.
Shortly before the Board issued its decision, Lopez tragically committed suicide. The City appealed the Board's decision, and the state court has reversed it, but the matter is not yet final. Ana Lopez, Lopez's mother and the personal representative of his estate, filed a lawsuit in state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages arising from the alleged violation of Lopez's rights under the First Amendment to free speech and to associate with a union. Defendants removed the lawsuit to this Court and now move for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds on the claims against Vigil and Conner and for summary judgment on the claim against the City. For the reasons discussed herein, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion.
"Summary judgment is proper if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Halley v. Huckaby , 902 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting McCoy v. Meyers , 887 F.3d 1034, 1044 (10th Cir. 2018) ). "The movant bears the initial burden of ‘show[ing] that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.’ " Tanner v. San Juan Cty. Sheriff's Office , 864 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1106 (D.N.M. 2012) (quoting Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc. , 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir. 1991) ) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). "Once the movant meets this burden, rule 56 requires the non-moving party to designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). A party cannot "avoid summary judgment by repeating conclusory opinions, allegations unsupported by specific facts, or speculation." Id. (quotation and citations omitted). Instead, the non-moving party must come forward with "sufficient evidence on which the factfinder could reasonably find" in her favor. Id. (citations omitted). Evidence that is "merely colorable," Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, or consists only of "[u]nsubstantiated allegations[,]" McCoy , 887 F.3d at 1044, is insufficient.
The Court reviews summary judgment motions based on a qualified immunity defense somewhat differently. See Halley , 902 F.3d at 1144. "When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established." Id. (quoting Koch v. City of Del City , 660 F.3d 1228, 1238 (10th Cir. 2011) ). "A constitutional right is clearly established if it is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’ " Id. (quoting Mullenix v. Luna , 577 U.S. 7, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) ). "A Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point or the weight of authority from other courts can clearly establish a right." Id. (citation omitted). "Generally, ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate’ to clearly establish a right." Id. (quoting Redmond v. Crowther , 882 F.3d 927, 935 (10th Cir. 2018) ). "The question is not whether a ‘broad general proposition’ was clearly established, but ‘whether the violative nature of particular conduct [was] clearly established.’ " Id. (quoting Redmond , 882 F.3d at 935 ) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"If, and only if, the plaintiff meets this two-part test does a defendant then bear the traditional burden of the movant for summary judgment ...." Id. (quoting Koch , 660 F.3d at 1238 ). And while the "Court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party, ‘a plaintiff's version of the facts must find support in the record.’ " Koch , 660 F.3d at 1238 (quoting Thomson v. Salt Lake Cty. , 584 F.3d 1304, 1312 (10th Cir. 2009) ). If the plaintiff's "version of the facts is ‘blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it,’ then [the Court] ‘should not adopt that version of the facts.’ " Halley , 902 F.3d at 1144 (quoting Thomson , 584 F.3d at 1312 ).
Before summarizing the facts at issue in this lawsuit, the Court must resolve a dispute regarding collateral estoppel. In response to his termination, Mr. Lopez filed a Prohibited Practice Complaint against the City of Belen. (See Doc. 18-3.) The Board held hearings on his complaint and issued a ruling in Lopez's favor. (See Doc. 18-1.) The City appealed to the 13th Judicial District Court, Valencia County, New Mexico. (See Doc. 18-9.) The state court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on June 11, 2020, and a Final Order on June 19, 2020, but the time to appeal has not yet run.1 See City of Belen v. Lopez , No. D-1314-CV-2019-00923, Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law (13th Jud. Dist., Valencia Cty., N.M. June 11, 2020); Final Order (June 19, 2020).
In her response, Ms. Lopez contends that "claim preclusion should prevent Defendants from asserting" certain facts and that "the findings of the Labor Board ... defeat the instant motion for summary judgment." (Doc. 18 at 3.) The Court disagrees. "[C]ollateral estoppel promotes judicial economy and protects parties from endless relitigation." Deflon v. Sawyers , 139 N.M. 637, 137 P.3d 577, 582 (N.M. 2006) (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore , 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979) ). The party asserting collateral estoppel must prove four elements. See Reeves v. Wimberly , 107 N.M. 231, 755 P.2d 75, 79 Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted). First, "the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must be the same party or be in privity with the party to the original action;" second, "the subject matter or the cause of action in the two suits must be different;" third, "the ultimate facts or issues must have been actually litigated;" and fourth, "the issue must have been necessarily determined." State v. Bishop , 113 N.M. 732, 832 P.2d 793, 795 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing Reeves , 755 P.2d at 77 (internal citations omitted)).
Ms. Lopez does not discuss the elements of collateral estoppel. (See Doc. 18.) She does, however, eventually acknowledge that the Board's findings may only "be entitled to preclusive effect" if "the determination is upheld on review ...." (Id. at 13 (citation omitted).) "[C]ollateral estoppel appl[ies] only to final judgments." C& H Const. & Paving Co. v. Citizens Bank , 93 N.M. 150, 597 P.2d 1190, 1200–01 (Ct. App. 1979) (citations omitted). Ms. Lopez further asserts that even though the action is not final, the Board's "findings are sufficient to defeat" the motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 18 at 13.) Ms. Lopez does not cite any authority to support this contention. (See id. ) To rely on those findings would be to give them preclusive effect, which the Court may not do. Because the state action is not final, collateral estoppel does not apply here. The Court will not give preclusive effect to the Board's findings.
Further, Ms. Lopez repeatedly objects to Defendants’ statement of material facts on the basis that the facts are refuted by the Board's findings. (See, e.g. , Doc. 18 at 5–7.) To the extent that Ms. Lopez objects solely on the basis that facts are disputed by Board findings, her objections are overruled.
Lopez was a sergeant with the BPD and president of the Union in 2017. (Compl. ¶¶ 8–9.) On May 10, 2017, Lopez, in his capacity as president of the Union, sent a letter to Conner, Vigil, the City Council and mayor, and the local newspaper. (Id. ¶¶ 4–5, 10; Doc. 16-B-2.) The letter informed City leaders that "[b]y an overwhelming majority," Union members had "voted no confidence on Miller and his subversive management style." (Doc. 16-B-2 at 23.3 ) The letter outlined eight distinct issues the Union had with Miller. (See id. at 23–24.) It specified that it was not the Union's "intent to reflect negatively on Chief Conner's leadership" and stated that Union members believed "the only path forward which maintains and protects public safety and the integrity of" the BPD was for "City Leaders to immediately demand the resignation of Deputy Chief Miller." (Id. at 24.) The...
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