Lopez v. City of Glendora
| Decision Date | 01 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:17-cv-06843-ODW (RAO) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | KRYSTAL LOPEZ, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF GLENDORA; LISA ROSALES; WILLIAM RAYMOND KODADEK; MATTHEW WENDLING; and DOES 1-10, Defendants. |
Plaintiff, Krystal Lopez, alleges various claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and supplemental state law claims following a traffic stop. Plaintiff alleges that she was unlawfully detained and searched and that Defendants used excessive force to detain and silence her First Amendment Rights. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' violations of her rights were done pursuant to the City of Glendora's policy or custom.
Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion). (ECF No. 34.) Defendants, City of Glendora; Lisa Rosales; William Raymond Kodadek; and Matthew Wendling (collectively, "Defendants"), move for summary judgment on the basis that their conduct was not unlawful and, even if it was, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The parties agreed to dismiss Defendant Matthew Wendling as to all claims and to dismiss the entire fourth claim for conspiracy to violate civil rights. (Mot. 7.) Defendants move for summary judgment on all remaining claims.
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants' Motion. (ECF No. 34.)1
On November 16, 2016, at approximately 1:40 p.m., Plaintiff was a passenger in a red Ford Escape ("SUV") traveling in Glendora, California. (See Defs'. Statement of Uncontroverted Facts ("DSUF") 8, 19, ECF No. 34-1.) Around the same time, the Glendora Police Department received a call from a concerned citizen that two vehicles, a white Honda and a red Ford, each with two African-American occupants, appeared to be canvassing the area. (Decl. of Olu K. Orange ("Orange Decl.") Ex. B ("Dispatch Call") 0:40-1:00, ECF No. 36.) The call described the African-Americans as looking like "they were from South Central" and that "they don't look as if they were from the area." (Id.)
Defendant Kodadek, while on patrol, spotted the red SUV and followed it. (DSUF 19.) Defendant Kodadek ran a record check of the SUV and the registration tags came back expired. (See id. 20.) Defendant Kodadek then initiated a traffic stop. (Id.) The traffic stop was captured on a dash cam video of a second patrol car, although parts of the incident occurred off-camera. (Orange Decl. Ex. A ("DashCam").)2 Defendant Kodadek exited his patrol vehicle and walked up to the driver's side of the SUV. (DSUF 23.) The driver of the SUV was Antwon Shamburger, an African-American male. (Id.) Following a conversation between Defendant Kodadek and Mr. Shamburger, Mr. Shamburger was asked to exit the vehicle. (Id. 24-26.) Defendant Kodadek asked if he could search Mr. Shamburger, and Mr. Shamburger stated that he could. (Id. 28.) Defendant Kodadek did not find any illegal contraband or weapons on Mr. Shamburger. (Id.) Mr. Shamburger informed Defendant Kodadek that he was on probation for robbery, and Defendant Kodadek then instructed Mr. Shamburger to have a seat on the curb. (Id. 29-30.) Defendant Kodadek observed that Mr. Shamburger was wearing red shoes, and as a result, suspected that Mr. Shamburger and Plaintiff were part of the Bloods gang casing the area for a residential burglary. (Id. 32.)
Defendant Kodadek then approached the passenger side of the vehicle and asked Plaintiff to exit the SUV. (Dash Cam 1:25-1:30.) Plaintiff complied. (Id.) Defendant Kodadek asked Plaintiff to turn around, place her hands on top of her head, and interlock her fingers. (Id. 1:35-1:43.) Plaintiff complied as instructed, but also told Defendant Kodadek, (Id. 1:44-1:52.) Defendant Kodadek informed Plaintiff to not move, to not do anything stupid, and for Plaintiff to separate her feet. (Id. 1:51-1:55.) Plaintiff refused to separate her feet, and instead, told Defendant Kodadek to call a female officer. (Id. 1:52-1:55.) Defendant Kodadek then forced Plaintiff away from the SUV (and outside the range of the dash cam video). (See id. 1:57-2:05.) Defendant Kodadek stated that he placed Plaintiff in a wrist lock and placed her body against the brick wall along the southside of the sidewalk. (Decl. of WilliamRaymond Kodadek ("Kodadek Decl.") ¶ 14, ECF No. 34-3.) While away from the dash cam, Defendant Kodadek repeatedly told Plaintiff to separate her feet, and Plaintiff repeatedly told Defendant Kodadek to let go of her arm. (Dash Cam 1:59-2:17.) Defendant Kodadek stated that, to maintain control, he forced Plaintiff to the ground, placed his right arm across her neck and shoulders, and placed handcuffs on her. (Kodadek Decl. ¶¶ 14-15; Dash Cam 2:18-3:03.) Plaintiff responded by asking, (Dash Cam 2:25-2:54.)
After placing handcuffs on Plaintiff, Defendant Kodadek then picked Plaintiff off the ground and walked her to the back of his patrol vehicle. (Id. 3:10-3:26.) Defendant Kodadek again asked Plaintiff to separate her feet. (Id. 3:28-3:29.) Plaintiff responded, "Put me in the car, you're not going to touch me." (Id. 3:32-3:35.) Defendant Kodadek responded by slamming Plaintiff onto the patrol vehicle and again requesting Plaintiff to separate her feet. (Id. 3:40-3:45.) Defendant Kodadek then conducted a waistband pat down search of Plaintiff by moving his hand from the left side of Plaintiff's waist to the right. (Id. 3:48-3:50.) Plaintiff responded by kicking her right leg backwards towards Defendant Kodadek, striking his groin. (Id. 3:50-3:51.) Defendant Kodadek then punched Plaintiff on the right side of her ribs and then pushed her to the ground. (Id. 3:51-3:54.) While Plaintiff was laying on the ground on her side, Defendant Kodadek placed his body on top of Plaintiff's right side and then placed his right knee on Plaintiff's stomach. (Id. 3:54-4:12.)
Plaintiff was arrested for resisting/obstructing a peace officer and battery on a peace officer. (DSUF 70.) She was transported to Foothill Presbyterian Hospital for medical clearance, then taken to the police station. (Id. 71.) She was booked and released on a citation. (Id. 74.)
Plaintiff subsequently filed a lawsuit with ten claims for relief: (1) violation of § 1983 pursuant to the First Amendment; (2) violation of § 1983 pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) violation of § 1983 pursuant to the Fourth Amendment;(4) violation of §§ 1983 and 1988 for conspiracy to violate civil rights; (5) Monell claim pursuant to § 1983; (6) violation of § 1983 pursuant to Larez and Canton for failure to train and supervise; (7) assault; (8) battery; (9) negligence; and (10) violation of California Civil Code section 52.1. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.)
Before reaching the merits of Defendants' Motion, the Court addresses two preliminary matters: (1) Plaintiff's request for judicial notice; and (2) Defendants' objection to Plaintiff's expert reports.
In support of her Opposition, Plaintiff requests that the Court take notice of three sections of the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training ("POST") learning materials. (Req. for Judicial Notice 1, ECF No. 40.) Defendants do not oppose or otherwise object to Plaintiff's request.
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 allows a court to take judicial notice of a fact that "is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).
However, the Court declines to take notice of the documents requested because they are not necessary to the resolution of the Motion and because they are incomplete copies of the publication. See Newman v. San Joaquin Delta Community College Dist., 814 F. Supp. 2d 967, 972 n.2 (E.D. Cal. 2011) ().
Defendants object to the expert reports of Andrea Bernhard and Roger Clark because they were not timely disclosed pursuant to the Court's Order. (Evidentiary Objections 2, ECF No. 45-1.) Plaintiff served the expert reports on December 12, 2018, via U.S. mail. .)However, initial disclosures were due on October 29, 2018, and rebuttal disclosures were due on November 19, 2018, pursuant to the Court's Scheduling and Case Management Order. (ECF No. 28; see also Order to Continue Trial and Related Dates, ECF No. 32.) These dates were set after the parties stipulated to extend the time for expert discovery cut-off and other related dates. (ECF No. 31.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A) authorizes courts to modify the disclosure of expert testimony requirements by order or local rule. The Court did just that in its Scheduling and Case Management Order. Rule 37(c)(1) automatically excludes any evidence not properly disclosed under Rule 26(a). Yeti by Molly v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001). However, exclusion under Rule 37(c)(1) is not appropriate if the failure to disclose was substantially justified or harmless. Id.
Here, Plaintiff does not provide substantial justification for her failure to follow the explicit Order of the Court. However, Defendants have not identified any harm that they have suffered. Accordingly, the Court will consider the expert reports for the purposes of this Motion. This does not preclude Defendants from bringing a motion in limine to exclude the experts' testimony at trial on the basis of timeliness or other grounds.
Additionally, the Court does not rely on most of...
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