Lopez v. Cnty. of L. A.

• Decision Date: 25 June 2015
• Docket Number: CASE NO. CV 15-01745 MMM (MANx)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: REBECCA LOPEZ and JOSE LOPEZ as individuals and successors in interest to decedent GABRIEL LOPEZ, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, LOS ANGELES SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, SAN FERNANDO POLICE DEPARTMENT and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, Defendants.

REBECCA LOPEZ and JOSE LOPEZ as individuals and successorsin interest to decedent GABRIEL LOPEZ, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, LOS ANGELES SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT,CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, SAN FERNANDO POLICE DEPARTMENTand DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, Defendants.

CASE NO. CV 15-01745 MMM (MANx)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

June 25, 2015

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS; DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE AS MOOT

Plaintiffs Rebecca and Jose Lopez filed this action on October 24, 2014, individually and as successors in interest to their son, Gabriel Lopez. They named as defendants the County of Los Angeles ("the County"), Los Angeles Sheriff's Department ("LASD"), City of San Fernando ("San Fernando"), and San Fernando Police Department ("SFPD").¹

On March 30, 2015, San Fernando and SFPD filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims,² as wellas a motion to strike their prayer for punitive damages.³ On April 17, 2015, the County and LASD filed a motion to dismiss,⁴ which they amended the same day.⁵ Plaintiffs oppose both motions.⁶ Pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 7-15, the court finds defendants' motions appropriate for decision without oral argument; the hearing calendared for June 29, 2015, is therefore vacated, and the matter taken off calendar.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On August 12, 2014, Gabriel Lopez was the victim of a fatal officer-involved shooting in San Fernando, California.⁷ As Lopez was leaving his residence, police officers purportedly fired multiple gunshots at him.⁸ Lopez did not survive.⁹

Plaintiffs assert that Lopez did not pose any reasonable threat of violence to the officers because he did not make any "aggressive movements," "furtive gestures," or "physical movements" from which a reasonable officer could have believed that he posed a risk of death or serious bodily injury to any individual.¹⁰ Accordingly, the complaint asserts that the officers, and defendants, who failed properly to train and supervise the officers, exhibited deliberate indifference to Lopez's FourthAmendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process, privacy, and freedom from unreasonable government interference with Lopez's family.¹¹ Plaintiffs contend the officers' use of force was "deadly, excessive, unnecessary, and unlawful."¹²

On September 5 and October 14, 2014, plaintiffs assert that they filed claims for damages with the County as required by the Government Claims Act, California Government Code § 910, et seq.¹³ The County rejected the claims on November 12, 2014.¹⁴ On September 5, 2014, plaintiffs filed a claim for damages with the City of Los Angeles; that claim was rejected on September 10, 2014.¹⁵ On September 17, 2014, plaintiffs filed a claim for damages with the City of San Fernando; this claim was rejected on February 15, 2015.¹⁶

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard Governing Motions to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only where there is either a "lack of a cognizable legal theory," or "the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). The court must accept all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint as true, and construe them and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996); Mier v. Owens, 57 F.3d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1995).

The court need not, however, accept as true unreasonable inferences or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 540 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) ("While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do"). Thus, a plaintiff's complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' . . . A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ("Factual allegations must be enough to raise the right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)" (citations omitted)); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[F]or a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory 'factual content,' and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief," citing Iqbal and Twombly).

B. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss

Defendants contend that all of plaintiffs' claims fail because they are not plausibly alleged under Rule 8, Twombly, and Iqbal. The court addresses each claim in turn.

1. Plaintiffs' Wrongful Death Claim

(a) Whether Defendants Are Entitled to Governmental Immunity

California Government Code § 815, et seq., provides immunity to public entities in California. Nuveen Mun. High Income Opportunity Fund v. City of Alameda, Cal., 730 F.3d 1111, 1124 (9th Cir. 2013). Under the Act, a public entity is not "liable for its conduct or omission to the same extent as a private person or entity." Arres v. City of Fresno, No. CV F 10 1628 LJO SMS, 2011 WL 284971, *23 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2011) (citing Zelig v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1128 (2002)). Rather, it is liable "as provided by statute." Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist., 19 Cal.4th 925, 932 (1998) (citing CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 815(a) (emphasis added)).

"[B]ecause under the [Government] Claims Act all governmental tort liability is based on statute,the general rule that statutory causes of action must be pleaded with particularity is applicable." Lopez v. So. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 40 Cal.3d 780, 795 (1985); Arres, 2011 WL 284971 at *23. Thus, "to state a cause of action against a public entity, every fact material to the existence of its statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity." Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 60 Cal.App.3d 814, 819 (1960). Moreover, "the plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show his cause of action lies outside the breadth of any applicable statutory immunity." Keyes v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 128 Cal.App.3d 882, 885 (1982).

Plaintiffs' complaint does not allege the statutory provision pursuant to which the defendants, each of which is a government entity, can be sued for wrongful death. The theory of liability alleged in the complaint is somewhat unclear; while the complaint pleads that the defendant municipal entities directly caused Gabriel's death by shooting him, that is implausible.¹⁷ Thus, it would appear plaintiffs wish to hold defendants vicariously liable. This is proper under California law. See CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 815.2(a) ("A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative"); Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) ("California . . . has rejected the Monell rule and imposes liability on counties under the doctrine of respondeat superior for acts of county employees; it grants immunity to counties only where the public employee would also be immune").

Plaintiffs, however, have failed to allege any specific statutory basis for either direct or vicarious liability in their complaint. Because they have failed to do so, their wrongful death claim must be dismissed. See Lang v. County of Sonoma, No. C12 0983 TEH, 2012 WL 4674527, *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2012) ("But he has failed to properly plead either vicarious liability claims under Government Code section 815.2 or any statutory basis for direct municipal liability claims. Accordingly, the CourtDISMISSES both the negligence and IIED claims against the municipal entities without prejudice to Plaintiff's proper re-pleading of such claims"); Arres, 2011 WL 284971 at *24 ("The complaint pleads no statutory basis to impose wrongful death-negligence liability on the City. Plaintiffs seek to impose liability on the City beyond that alleged or permitted by the Claims Act to further warrant dismissal of the wrongful death-negligence claim against the City"). This claim is therefore deficient and must be dismissed.

(2) Whether the Claim is Plausibly Alleged

Even were the wrongful death claim not deficient because it fails to identify the statutory basis for liability under the Government Claims Act, it would have to be dismissed because it fails plausibly to plead a claim for wrongful death.¹⁸ The complaint does not provide a coherent explanation of thebasis for defendants' liability. It alleges that "defendants" used excessive and unreasonable force against Gabriel, which caused his death, and that "defendants" did so while acting within the course of their employment with the County of Los Angeles, LASD, the City of San Fernando, and SFPD. Given that defendants are themselves these entities, and that they are municipal actors that cannot possibly have used excessive force, the claim lacks facial plausibility. For the same reason, it neither provides "fair notice" of the nature of the claim nor the "grounds" on which the claim rests.

Consequently, plaintiffs have failed to state a wrongful death claim under Rule 8, Twombly,...