Lopez v. Laney, A174827

CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
Writing for the CourtTOOKEY, P. J.
Citation322 Or.App. 778
PartiesTYLER LOPEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Garrett LANEY, Superintendent, Oregon State Correctional Institution, Defendant-Respondent.
Docket NumberA174827
Decision Date23 November 2022

322 Or.App. 778

TYLER LOPEZ, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.

Garrett LANEY, Superintendent, Oregon State Correctional Institution, Defendant-Respondent.

A174827

Court of Appeals of Oregon

November 23, 2022


This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

Submitted October 26, 2022

Umatilla County Circuit Court 19CV35204; A174827 J. Burdette Pratt, Senior Judge.

Raymond Tindell fled the brief for appellant.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Joanna Hershey, Assistant Attorney General, fled the brief for respondent.

Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and Kamins, Judge.

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[322 Or.App. 779] TOOKEY, P. J.

Petitioner appeals a judgment denying his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he raises four assignments of error, contending that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief, because (1) his trial counsel failed to ensure his guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; (2) his trial counsel failed to present mitigating evidence; (3) his trial counsel failed to move to suppress certain statements that petitioner made to police; and (4) his sentence of 513 months' prison is unconstitutionally disproportionate. We affirm.

"We review the post-conviction court's denial of relief for legal error," and "we are bound by the post-conviction court's findings of historical fact if those findings are supported by the evidence in the record." Cartrette v. Nooth, 284 Or.App. 834, 840, 395 P.3d 627 (2017).

Petitioner's first through third assignments of error involve claims that his trial counsel was "inadequate" under Article I, sections 9, 10, 11, 13, and 20 of the Oregon Constitution and "ineffective" under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. A petitioner claiming inadequate assistance of counsel under the Oregon Constitution has the burden "to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts demonstrating that [1] trial counsel failed to exercise reasonable professional skill and judgment and that [2] petitioner suffered prejudice as a result." Trujillo v. Maass, 312 Or. 431, 435, 822 P.2d 703 (1991). The standard under the United States Constitution for assessing whether counsel was constitutionally ineffective is "functionally equivalent." Montez v. Czerniak, 355 Or. 1, 6-8, 322 P.3d 487 (2014); see also McDonnell v. Premo, 309 Or.App. 173, 185, 483 P.3d 640 (2021), rev den, 369 Or. 507 (2022) ("[T]he state and federal tests for establishing prejudice are functionally similar.").

In his first assignment of error, petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief, because his trial counsel was inadequate and ineffective for failing to adequately communicate with him, such that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The evidence at the post-conviction hearing-including

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[322 Or.App. 780] petitioner's plea agreement, the trial transcript, and trial counsel's deposition testimony-supports the postconviction court's findings that petitioner was satisfied with trial counsel's work on his case; that petitioner had read and understood his plea agreement; that he and trial counsel had discussed the plea agreement "in great detail" and "conferred extensively" about his case and his options; and that petitioner knew what he was doing when he pleaded guilty. Additionally, that evidence reflects that, prior to accepting petitioner's guilty plea, the trial court assured itself that petitioner understood the plea agreement, the rights he was waiving, and the consequences of pleading guilty. Therefore, the post-conviction court did not err in denying relief on that claim. See Wilson v. Armenakis, 144 Or.App. 587, 589, 928 P.2d 354 (1996), rev den, 324 Or. 560 (1997) (rejecting postconviction petitioner's claim that his plea was not knowing and voluntary, where post-conviction court found that the "petitioner executed a plea petition that set out the rights that he was waiving," that "trial counsel read the petition to petitioner before he entered his guilty plea," and that, "before accepting the plea, the trial court assured itself that petitioner's plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent").

In his second assignment of error, petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief, because...

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