Lopez v. LeMaster
| Decision Date | 19 December 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 27,012.,27,012. |
| Citation | 61 P.3d 185,133 N.M. 59,2003 NMSC 3 |
| Parties | Gilbert LOPEZ, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Tim LeMASTER, Warden, Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Jacqueline R. Medina, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.
Phyllis H. Subin, Chief Public Defender, Jennie Lusk, Assistant Public Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.
{1} The State appeals directly to this Court from an order of the district court granting Petitioner's writ of habeas corpus challenging the loss of good-time credits following a disciplinary hearing. See Rule 5-802(H)(1) NMRA 2002 (); Rule 12-102(A)(3) NMRA 2002 (). The district court found that Petitioner's due process rights had been violated by the manner in which the Department of Corrections ("the Department") conducted the disciplinary hearing. To remedy the violation, the district court ordered the Department to restore Petitioner's good-time credits and to strike the record of the disciplinary hearing from his file. The court refused to permit the Department to pursue the same issues in another disciplinary hearing. On appeal, the State concedes that Petitioner's due process rights were violated and does not appeal from that portion of the district court's ruling. Rather, the State appeals from the remedy ordered by the district court, arguing that the only proper remedy was for the district court to remand the case to the Department for a new hearing. This appeal provides an opportunity to address issues of first impression arising from the expansion of the availability of the writ since our statutory scheme was adopted. We affirm.
{2} On February 14, 1999, Corrections Officer Clarence Sena observed Petitioner and fellow inmate Edward Ibuado struggling with a broom through the food port of Ibuado's cell. He also observed Petitioner attempt to throw a portion of the broken broom at Ibuado through the food port. After Petitioner lost control of the broom, he moved away from the cell, and Ibuado threw the broom out of the cell. Officer Sena prepared a misconduct report based on this incident, charging Petitioner with assault or battery with a weapon on another person unless in justifiable defense, and physical fighting with another inmate unless in justifiable defense. Officer Sena took the statements of two other correctional officers who witnessed the event, Officer John Nawara and Sgt. Joey Montoya, and attached those statements to his misconduct report.
{3} Another corrections officer, Sgt. Charles Carlson, conducted a disciplinary investigation. According to his report, he interviewed Petitioner, who gave no statement but listed Gilbert Saavedra as his witness. Sgt. Carlson interviewed Saavedra, who told him that the guards panicked and that nothing had happened. Sgt. Carlson also interviewed Ibuado, who denied the charges. Based on these interviews and his review of the officers' statements submitted to him, Sgt. Carlson recommended that the fighting charge be elevated to a major level offense.
{4} The Department held a disciplinary hearing on February 22, 1999, at which time Petitioner was represented by inmate Samuel Chavez. Petitioner tried to call two inmate witnesses—Saavedra and Ibuado. The hearing officer declined to allow the inmates to testify because he thought that their testimony would be duplicative and cumulative. Based on the written report, the hearing officer concluded that Petitioner was guilty of the major offense of assault or battery, but dismissed the fighting charge. The Warden approved the decision, which was upheld on an internal administrative appeal. The hearing officer recommended 30 days of disciplinary segregation and forfeiture of all of Petitioner's good-time credits. The classification committee, however, forfeited 1 year, 11 months, and 7 days of his good-time credits, leaving him with 30 days of credits on his record.
{5} Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court on May 6, 1999, alleging, among other things, that he was denied the opportunity to call witnesses in violation of prison policy and his right to due process. The district court appointed the public defender's office to represent Petitioner, and on October 26, 1999, filed an order directing the State to respond to the petition. An evidentiary hearing was scheduled for January 9, 2001.
{6} Petitioner filed his witness list on December 12, 2000. The State, on December 20, 2000, filed a motion in limine to exclude the witnesses. In that motion, and at the subsequent telephonic hearing, the State argued that the fact that Petitioner listed inmate witnesses indicated that he was "attempting to encourage the court to conduct a judicial review of the facts adduced against him during the revocation process." The State argued that the hearing should be limited to determining whether the Department complied with the limited due process rights available to an inmate. The district court agreed that it should not relitigate the facts, but disagreed that the witnesses should be excluded:
I think I do need to hear what those people would have testified, not for the purpose of substituting my opinion for that of the hearing officer, but to determine whether or not the hearing officer was correct in ruling that these witnesses were not required to appear because their testimony was cumulative. If I find that their testimony was not cumulative, then the officer's decision to not allow the witnesses could be found to be arbitrary and in violation of policy, so I don't ... think that I am required to just take the officer's opinion that it was cumulative and not listen to what they actually would have said.
On that basis, the district court denied the motion.
{7} The evidentiary hearing was held on January 9, 2001. After hearing the testimony of the two inmate witnesses, as well as the investigating officer, the hearing officer, and Petitioner, the district court concluded that the hearing officer had violated Petitioner's due process rights and prison policy by not allowing him to call his witnesses:
I have a real problem with the hearing officer not allowing the two witnesses to testify. I think that that is a violation of the policies which require that the Department provide a fair disciplinary proceeding based on due process, and the reason I have these serious concerns is that the hearing officer made some conclusions that I think are not supported by what at least is in front of me at this point. We've got no live witnesses testifying at this hearing. That concerns me right off the top because I think a lot of the questions that the hearing officer might have had could have been at least clarified by at least having the three guards testify. The three guards' statements are all different and I have some concerns about that.
{8} The district court indicated that it was inclined to reverse the finding of a major incident, order that the good-time credits be restored, and further order that the major report be stricken from Petitioner's record. The court then gave the parties an opportunity to respond. The State wanted the court to clarify whether it was finding that there was no evidence to support the charge. The court responded:
No.... If [the investigative report] was all the evidence that was there, that would have been substantial, sufficient to support a finding. But what I'm saying is all he needed to do was call these two additional witnesses and he could have still come down with the same conclusion, but I think sometimes Corrections gets quick and they get sloppy, and they cut corners. I've just seen that too many times, and I am getting concerned about it. Prisoners are almost never allowed to call inmate witnesses ... under that same category of cumulative, and that concerns me, because I'm seeing too many of those and maybe Corrections needs to know that, at least from my point of view, that's improper.
Toward the close of the hearing the State argued that the proper remedy upon a finding of a due process violation was to remand the matter to the Department for a new disciplinary hearing. The court expressed concern that the matter would come to the court again, and that the guards and witnesses might no longer be available. The court gave the parties five days to brief the issue. Each party filed a written response.
{9} The parties next appeared for a telephonic hearing on April 24, 2001, to resolve the form of the final order. The State had submitted an order that gave the Department the option of holding another disciplinary hearing that would comport with due process. The district court clarified its position:
I am not allowing them to have another hearing. They had their shot, [and] they denied him a fair hearing. I found that they denied him a fair hearing, [and] they are precluded from having another hearing.... I allowed you all to give me argument as to whether it should be remanded for a new hearing or whether the remedy was just forfeiture, period. And I am convinced under the law that the remedy is forfeiture, not remand, so that part of the order is incorrect.... I'm not allowing them to go back and then allow him to call witnesses, in other words to have another hearing. They had their opportunity to provide him with a fair hearing. I think the writ and the whole historical perspective of these writs is to provide people with relief. To allow them to go back and just then allow witnesses and make the same finding is not what this court is going to allow.
The district court then encouraged the parties to provide it with the order quickly because Petitioner was being prejudiced by the delay.
{10} Under two separate headings, the State argues first that it was...
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