Lopez v. Merced County, Cal.

• Decision Date: 26 January 2007
• Docket Number: No. 1:06-cv-01526 OWW DLB.,1:06-cv-01526 OWW DLB.
• Parties: Felix M. LOPEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MERCED COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

473 F.Supp.2d 1072

Felix M. LOPEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MERCED COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:06-cv-01526 OWW DLB.

United States District Court, E.D. California.

January 26, 2007.

Brian J. Sutherland, Pro Hac Vice, Brian J. Sutherland, Attorney at Law, Everett, WA, Joaquin Guadalupe Avila, Law Office of Joaquin G. Avila, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Marguerite Mary Leoni, Nielsen, Merksamer, Parrinello, Mueller & Naylor, LLP, Mill Valley, CA, James Nathan Fincher, Thomas E. Ebersole, Berliner Cohen, Terry L. Allen, Allen Polgar Proietti and Fagalde, Merced, CA, Eugene Tanaka, Best Best & Krieger LLP, Walnut Creek, CA, Joseph Wells Ellinwood, Abbott and Kindermann LLP, Sacramento, CA, Mark J. Mulkerin, Stephen A. McEwen, Burke, Wiliams & Sorensen LLP, Irvine, CA, Paul Ryan Minasian, Minasian Spruance Meith Soares and Sexton, Oroville, CA, Craig Merrill Mortensen, Bacigalupi, Neufeld & Rowley, Fresno, CA, Roger K. Masuda, Griffith & Masuda, Turlock, CA, for Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE: PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

I. INTRODUCTION

This case comes before a three-judge court, under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA"). 42 U.S.C. § 1973c ("Section 5"). Plaintiffs challenge numerous annexations, detachments, consolidations and/or formations to cities and special districts in the County of Merced, California, adopted since November 1, 1972. On November 21, 2006, Circuit Judge Jay S. Bybee and District Judges Oliver W. Wanger and Anthony W. Ishii, appointed to the three-judge panel by the Chief Judge of the Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284, heard Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 19), seeking to enjoin the certification of the November 7, 2006 election results in certain defendant jurisdictions.

Due to the proximity of the scheduled city council meetings at which the November 7, 2006 results were to be certified and newly-elected municipal officers sworn-in, the Court announced an oral statement of decision which denied the motion for preliminary injunction. The parties were invited to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. (See Does. 67 & 76.) Having reviewed these, and all the pleadings and supplementary materials, and having heard oral argument, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated entitlement to injunctive relief. These Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law memorialize our oral decision on November 21, 2006.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are citizens of the United States and are registered voters residing in the City of Los Banos in Merced County, California who allege they are Hispanic, Spanish-speaking, and have been unlawfully denied voting rights, in part based on their race and language. (Compl. at ¶ 3.) Defendants are the County of Merced and numerous governmental units within the County, including: the Local Area Formation Commission of Merced County (LAFCO), which is an administrative agency responsible for reviewing and approving requests to annex or change the boundaries of governmental units within the County, see Cal. Gov.Code § 56375; the cities of Atwater, Dos Palos, Gustine, Livingston, and Los Banos, all of which are municipalities organized pursuant to California law; and seventeen water and resource conservation special districts within Merced County. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-6.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have violated § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Under § 5, a covered state or political subdivision must secure approval or "preclearance" before enacting or seeking to administer "any voting " qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect" on the date coverage began. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. A covered jurisdiction can secure preclearance from either the United States Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Colombia. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.1. In either an administrative proceeding before the United States Attorney General or a judicial proceeding seeking a declaratory judgment before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the covered jurisdiction must demonstrate that the proposed change affecting voting does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or membership in a language minority group. Id. If the covered jurisdiction cannot meet its burden, the United States Attorney General will deny preclearance or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia will not grant a declaratory judgment approving a change affecting voting. In the absence of either type of preclearance, the voting change cannot be implemented or enforced in any election. 28 C.F.R. § 51.10.

Plaintiffs allege that, since November of 1972, Defendants have adopted, approved and implemented over 200 annexations and other boundary changes within the County of Merced which unlawfully impair their voting rights. (Compl. at ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs further allege that no Defendant has obtained either administrative or judicial preclearance for these changes as required by § 5, but that they have nonetheless implemented and continue to implement the changes. (Id. at ¶¶ 38-39.) Plaintiffs contend that these violations of § 5 justify preliminary injunctive relief to restrain the Defendants from any continued implementation of the voting changes unless and until they are precleared under § 5. (Id. at ¶¶ 44-45.)

Along with their Complaint, Plaintiffs initially filed, but did not set for hearing, a motion for temporary restraining order ("TRO"). (Dots. 1-2, filed Oct. 27, 2006.) The district court then scheduled a hearing on the TRO for November 3, 2006. (Doc. 9, filed Nov. 2, 2006.) At that hearing, certain facts were agreed to by the parties, namely that only the Defendant municipalities of Atwater, Dos Palos, Gustine, Livingston, and Los Banos were to hold elections on November 7, not other Defendants, and that all of the challenged annexations and boundary changes in those jurisdictions had been previously submitted to the Attorney General for expedited review. (Doc. 18 at 3-4; see also Doc. 13-3, Decl. of Christopher E. Skinnell at ¶¶ 5-8.)

During the TRO hearing, the parties entered into a stipulation that elections would be held on November 7, 2006, but that no Defendant municipality would finalize or certify the results of its election until either preclearance was obtained for the voting changes or the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction at a hearing to be held subsequently. (See Doc. 18 at 3-4.) The Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefing on the issues identified, and set the hearing on Plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction for November 21, 2006 before the three-judge panel. (See id. at 4-5.) The parties elected not to present testimony at that hearing on the preliminary injunction.

Plaintiffs timely submitted supplemental authorities in support of their motion, and Defendants filed oppositions. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the certification of the November 7, 2006 election results by Defendants. Plaintiffs did not seek to enjoin the casting of ballots by the voters, or other conduct of the November 7, 2006 elections.

Defendants opposed the motion on the grounds that Plaintiffs (1) lacked standing, and were guilty of (2) laches and (3) unclean hands. Defendants also contended the Defendant cities are not subject to the preclearance requirement of § 5, and that the balance of hardships favored denial of the preliminary injunction.

With respect to standing, assuming, arguendo, that the Defendant Cities are covered jurisdictions under § 5, Defendants cited Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 89 S.Ct. 817, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969), for the proposition that a § 5 suit alleging failure to comply with the preclearance requirement may only be brought against a city, by a resident and registered voter of that city. Plaintiffs rejoined that residency in the County of Merced satisfied the standing requirement.

Defendants advanced the equitable defenses of laches and unclean hands, based on Plaintiffs' knowledge, at least as early as August 24, 2006, that their claims existed and their failure to timely notify each entity to provide reasonable opportunity for obtaining preclearances. Defendants also argued that Plaintiffs' delay of two full months to file this action, just eleven days before the election they sought to enjoin the certification of, without contacting any of the Defendants to provide notice of the alleged violations, coupled with taking no action to set the matter for a hearing on their injunctive relief request until six days before the election, caused Defendants prejudice.

Plaintiffs argued, relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, that the filing date was delayed because they required sufficient time to properly analyze facts and applicable law and to compile the documentation necessary to their claims before filing the complaint. They professed no duty to inform Defendants of the need for preclearance, and that no earlier hearing on injunctive relief was required because they sought only to stop certification of election results, not the elections.

Relying on United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Alabama, 435 U.S. 110, 98 S.Ct. 965, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978), Plaintiffs disputed Defendants' contention that Defendants are not subject to the § 5 preclearance requirement. Plaintiffs maintained that, having alleged a violation of § 5, they were entitled to injunctive relief as a matter of law, without the necessity of making any showing under the traditional test for issuance of a preliminary injunction. To support this position, Plaintiffs cited Lopez v. Monterey County, 519 U.S. 9, 117 S.Ct. 340, 136 L.Ed.2d 273 (1996) ("Lopez I"), and United States v. Louisiana, 952 F.Supp. 1151 (W...