Lopez v. Suggs
| Decision Date | 12 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Index No.708449/17,2018–08299 |
| Citation | 126 N.Y.S.3d 676 (Mem),186 A.D.3d 589 |
| Parties | Blanca LOPEZ, Appellant, v. William SUGGS, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Wingate, Russotti, Shapiro & Halperin, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Victor Goldblum of counsel), for appellant.
JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, J.P., JOSEPH J. MALTESE, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Timothy J. Dufficy, J.), entered June 20, 2018. The order denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissing the defendants' affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence of the plaintiff.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissing the defendants' affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence of the plaintiff is granted.
In 2017, the plaintiff commenced this action for damages, alleging that she sustained personal injuries in April 2016, when the vehicle in which she was a passenger was struck in the rear by a vehicle owned by the defendant William Suggs and operated by the defendant Melissa N. Suggs. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissing the defendants' affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence of the plaintiff. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The plaintiff appeals.
A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence with respect to the operator of the rearmost vehicle, requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a non-negligent explanation for the collision (see Edgerton v. City of New York, 160 A.D.3d 809, 810, 74 N.Y.S.3d 617 ; Cortese v. Pobejimov, 136 A.D.3d 635, 636, 24 N.Y.S.3d 405 ). Here, the plaintiff established her entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating, prima facie, that the defendants' vehicle rear-ended the vehicle in which she was a passenger, which was stopped for a red traffic light (see Edgerton v. City of New York, 160 A.D.3d at 810, 74 N.Y.S.3d 617 ; Cortese v. Pobejimov, 136 A.D.3d at 636, 24 N.Y.S.3d 405 ), and that she was an innocent passenger who did not contribute to the happening of the accident (see Balladares v. City of New York, 177 A.D.3d 942, 114 N.Y.S.3d 448 )...
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Sapienza v. Harrison
...affidavit. Moreover, the defendant's contention that the motion was premature is without merit (see CPLR 3212[f] ; Lopez v. Suggs, 186 A.D.3d 589, 590, 126 N.Y.S.3d 676 ). "A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead ......
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Coyle v. Martocello
...Martocello, and that he did not engage in any culpable conduct which contributed to the happening of the accident (Lopez v Suggs, 186 A.D.3d 589, 126 N.Y.S.2d 676 [2d Dept 2020]; Romain v City of NY, 111 A.D.3d 590, 112 N.Y.S.3d 162 [2d Dept 2019]). However, plaintiff has failed to submit a......
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Yonghong Xia v. Zhao Xian Zeng
...Zeng's vehicle in the rear, regardless of whether Zeng's vehicle was moving or stopped at the time of the collision (see Lopez v Suggs, 186 A.D.3d 589; Service v McCoy, 131 A.D.3d 1038). Further, the plaintiff established, prima facie, that he did not engage in any culpable conduct that con......
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Pesa v. Kolesnikov
...his entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law as he was an innocent passenger in the Pesa vehicle. See Lopez v. Suggs, 186 A.D.3d 589 (2d Dept. 2020). The right of an innocent passenger to summary judgment on the issue of liability is not restricted by potential issues of comparati......