Lopez v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 April 2022
• Docket Number: SC 20574
• Citation: 343 Conn. 31,272 A.3d 150
• Parties: Carmen LOPEZ v. WILLIAM RAVEIS REAL ESTATE, INC., et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

343 Conn. 31

272 A.3d 150

Carmen LOPEZ

v.WILLIAM RAVEIS REAL ESTATE, INC., et al.

SC 20574

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 14, 2021

Officially released April 19, 2022

Jeffrey Gentes, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Tracey Lane Russo, Orange, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).

Joseph P. Sargent, Fairfield, for the appellees (defendant Anthony Vaccaro et al.).

Robinson, C. J., and D'Auria, Mullins, Ecker and Keller, Js.

ROBINSON, C. J.

In this appeal, we consider the standard for determining whether a statement made in connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling violates General Statutes § 46a-64c (a) (3)¹ by indicating a "preference, limitation, or discrimination," or an "intention to make any such preference, limitation or discrimination," on the basis of an individual's "lawful source of income ...." The plaintiff, Carmen Lopez, appeals² from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants, William Raveis Real Estate, Inc. (Raveis), Sarah Henry, a licensed real estate salesperson, and Anthony Vaccaro and Eve Vaccaro,³ in this action alleging housing discrimination in violation of § 46a-64c (a). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court, in considering whether Henry violated § 46a-64c (a) (3) by making certain statements in the course of renting an apartment owned by the Vaccaros, improperly considered whether Henry had the subjective intent to discriminate on the basis of lawful source of income when she made those statements. The plaintiff specifically contends that she is entitled to judgment in her favor because (1) Henry's statements were facially discriminatory, rendering her subjective intent irrelevant as a matter of law, and (2) even if we were to conclude that Henry's statements were not facially discriminatory, the trial court nevertheless incorrectly determined that the statements, considered in context, did not convey an impermissible preference. We conclude that, although the trial court applied the proper legal standard in considering the plaintiff's claims under § 46a-64c (a) (3), its ultimate conclusion as to liability on the facts of this case was clearly erroneous with respect to Henry. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts, as found by the trial court, and procedural history. At all relevant times, the Vaccaros owned a two family home located at 5 Prince Street in Danbury. On January 28, 2017, Vaccaro entered into an exclusive right to lease listing contract with Raveis, through its authorized representative, Henry, to lease a rental apartment located in the two family home (rental apartment). Henry is a real estate salesperson who is affiliated with Raveis, a real estate broker, pursuant to an independent contractor agreement. Vaccaro informed Henry that he wanted to ensure a new tenancy was in place for the rental apartment by April 1, 2017. Henry listed the rental apartment on the multiple listing service database, and, on March 9, the plaintiff, through her real estate agent, Sarah Becker, submitted to Henry an application and offer to lease the rental apartment. Henry received the documents on March 11, and, despite the plaintiff's having left blank portions of the offer to lease,⁴ Henry forwarded the offer to Vaccaro on March 12. The next day, March 13, following a phone call with Vaccaro, Henry e-mailed Becker: "[A]ll set for April 1st. I will get the lease over to you. [It's] one month rent and one month security."

Later on March 13, Becker sent Henry blank paperwork for the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program (section 8) to accompany the plaintiff's application to lease the rental apartment. After Henry received the section 8 documents on March 15, the following conversation occurred:

At 8:29 a.m., Henry e-mailed Becker: "I wasn't aware that this was a [s ]ection 8 tenant . I have to speak with [Vaccaro] today. [He] is looking for a security deposit for this rental .... I will give you a call later today."

At 9:46 a.m., Becker e-mailed Henry: "To whom should [the] check be made out .... I can be there for [the] housing inspection if you like, but [I] will need access to [the] basement. It's oddly one of the best parts of [my] working with housing—free inspections. I had a state paid tenant in one of my buildings for [more than eight] years (not [section] 8 but similar), the direct deposit payments and yearly inspections were great really—that agency monitored the condition of the apartment, and they kept a paper trail and photos. No disagreements over who did what to a place, plus I knew I'd get paid [which made it] easier to sleep at night. Plus to get a voucher the state has already checked out the tenant financially and their background, so that is a huge benefit to a landlord as well. Win-win. [Vaccaro] hasn't had anyone with voucher assistance before? You can let him know that most of the rent will come from the tenant, and a part from the state via direct deposit, and other than that it's pretty normal. Let me know how I can help. ... Will need to get paperwork in ASAP so [we] can have [the] place inspected fast to meet [the] April 1 start date. Usually a place may fail the first time on a stuck/broken window or no [ground fault circuit interrupter (GFCI)] outlets, basic safety issues that should be in place for any tenant, and then passes on [the] second trip. If [the] windows function OK and [there are GFCI] outlets by [the] sinks, [it] should be in good shape, place looks nice."

At 10:41 a.m., Henry texted Becker: "Good morning I was not aware of the [s ]ection 8 when I spoke with you I'm not sure [Vaccaro ] would want to wait. I know it takes a couple of weeks for the process and he wants to [rent ] it by April 1st I will speak with him today and let you know thanks." (Emphasis added.)

At 12:31 p.m., Henry texted Becker: "I will speak with [Vaccaro] later today to make a decision about the rental."

At 1:36 p.m., Henry texted Becker: "You did not inform me of section 8 when I spoke with you about the offer . I have to present that to [Vaccaro ]. [I'm ] not sure if [he ] wants to [wait ] through the process. It is up to my client. We do not have a signed offer yet." (Emphasis added.)

At 1:50 p.m., Henry texted Becker: "[Vaccaro] has another offer he's also looking at we do not have an offer without a signed lease. You were not upfront with me with [s ]ection 8 and I didn't [present it ] to [Vaccaro ] that way as well. It's up to [Vaccaro ] what he would like to do with the offers as well as the waiting. I will get back to you tonight thank you." (Emphasis added.)

At 1:52 p.m., Becker texted Henry: "It is not necessary to identify [my] client as having a voucher to all places she applies to, I respect her privacy, only that income is sufficient."

At 2:23 p.m., Henry texted Becker: "Yes, it is necessary by law. It needs to be on the offer if paying from a [third ] party . [Vaccaro] will let me know tonight either way thanks." (Emphasis added.)

At 7:09 p.m., Henry texted Becker: "Hi, [Vaccaro] has decided to go with the other offer, [s]orry."

As reflected in the conversation, Henry received a second offer to lease on behalf of Everton Thompson and Saudia Dyer (Thompson and Dyer offer) on March 15, 2107, at 11:37 a.m. The Thompson and Dyer offer was accompanied by a completed rental application. It also proposed a lease term beginning on March 15, 2017, and ending on February 28, 2018, a lease price of $1500 per month, and a security deposit of $3000, and identified no contingencies. Vaccaro instructed Henry to accept the Thompson and Dyer offer and had a fully executed lease for the rental apartment by March 18.

The plaintiff subsequently brought this action for, inter alia, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the defendants violated § 46a-64c (a) by (1) denying her the opportunity to rent property on the basis of her lawful source of income,⁵ in violation of subdivision (1) of § 46a-64c (a), and (2) making a statement with respect to the rental of a dwelling that indicated a preference, limitation, or discrimination on the basis of lawful source of income, in violation of subdivision (3) of § 46a-64c (a). The case was tried to the court over four days. The trial court issued a memorandum of decision and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendants had discriminated against her on the basis of her lawful source of income in light of Henry's statements. Given its conclusion as to Henry's liability, the trial court also declined to reach the plaintiff's derivative claims against Raveis and the Vaccaros.

Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a motion for reargument and reconsideration on the grounds that the trial court either failed to analyze her § 46a-64c (a) (3) claims or improperly analyzed those claims under the mixed motive analysis applicable to § 46a-64c (a) (1) claims. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion and issued an addendum to its memorandum of decision, further explaining its judgment in favor of the defendants on the plaintiff's § 46a-64c (a) (3) claims. Specifically, the trial court stated in that addendum that it "must determine whether Henry's statements convey a preference against Lopez to an ordinary listener, hearing the statements in context." Applying that standard, the trial court ultimately concluded that Henry's statements did "not convey a rejection [of] or disfavor[ing] ... a section 8 tenancy" and, therefore, did not violate § 46a-64c (a) (3).⁶ This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff asks us to direct judgment in her favor, claiming that Henry's statements were facially discriminatory on the basis of her lawful source of income, in violation of § 46a-64c (a) (3), rendering it unnecessary to consider the context of those statements. The plaintiff further claims that the record supports a...