Lopez-Velazquez v. De Alcala

• Decision Date: 19 July 2021
• Docket Number: Case No. 118,161
• Citation: 513 P.3d 546
• Parties: Maria LOPEZ-VELAZQUEZ, individually and on behalf of Aurora Velazquez, a minor, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Alejandra Guittierrez DE ALCALA, Defendant/Appellee, and Olivas Fernando, and Jose Valladares, Defendants.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma

513 P.3d 546

Maria LOPEZ-VELAZQUEZ, individually and on behalf of Aurora Velazquez, a minor, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.Alejandra Guittierrez DE ALCALA, Defendant/Appellee,andOlivas Fernando, and Jose Valladares, Defendants.

Case No. 118,161

Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 2.

FILED JULY 19, 2021

Mandate Issued: June 2, 2022

Eric N. Edwards, ERIC N. EDWARDS, PC, Enid, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant

Christopher C. King, Bradley E. Bowlby, STARR, BEGIN & KING, PLLC, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee

OPINION BY JANE P. WISEMAN, PRESIDING JUDGE:

¶1 Plaintiff Maria Lopez-Velazquez, individually and on behalf of Aurora Velazquez, a minor, appeals from the trial court's judgment memorializing a jury verdict in favor of Defendant Alejandra Guittierrez De Alcala. After review of the record and the parties' arguments, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

¶2 This case arises from an automobile collision in Enid, Oklahoma, in July 2015. Lopez-Velazquez and her daughter, Aurora Velazquez, were passengers in a car driven by De Alcala that collided with a car driven by Defendant Jose Valladares. The case was tried to a jury on Lopez-Velazquez's negligence claim against De Alcala.¹ Lopez-Velazquez states on appeal that all claims against Valladares were settled before trial.²

¶3 It is undisputed that, after exiting Highway 412 heading west onto an off-ramp, Valladares failed to stop at a stop sign located where the off-ramp ends at the intersection of South 30th Street and East Oklahoma Avenue. Rather than stopping, he continued at high speed driving west across the four lanes of South 30th Street through the intersection.³ De Alcala was driving her car south in the outside curb lane of South 30th Street. Before Valladares' car cleared the intersection, De Alcala's vehicle struck it, with the front left portion of De Alcala's vehicle colliding at impact with the right rear passenger door of Valladares' vehicle.

¶4 Valladares was traveling at a high rate of speed, and evidence was introduced at trial that he was traveling at highway speeds down the off-ramp and through the stop sign at as much as 70 miles an hour.⁴ No evidence was introduced that his vehicle was going significantly slower. De Alcala was traveling at or slightly below the posted speed limit of 35 miles an hour.

¶5 Lopez-Velazquez argues that De Alcala was negligent in failing to act sooner to avoid the collision. Counsel for Lopez-Velazquez stated in his closing argument to the jury that while Valladares "bears responsibility too, ... [De Alcala] bears an equal amount of responsibility in this case[.]" Lopez-Velazquez testified at trial, for example, that she yelled as many as four times to warn De Alcala about the other car entering the roadway, but De Alcala nevertheless proceeded forward without braking, striking Valladares' car in the rear. This testimony was corroborated by the testimony of Lopez-Velazquez's daughter, who was eight years-old at the time of the accident. On the other hand, Lopez-Velazquez's testimony was contradicted at trial by De Alcala's testimony, as well as by the testimony of her daughter, who was nineteen at the time of the accident and also a passenger.

¶6 The jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of De Alcala, after which counsel for Lopez-Velazquez moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the basis that no reasonable juror could determine De Alcala was not negligent and that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.

¶7 Counsel for Lopez-Velazquez also moved for a mistrial on the basis that certain testimony elicited from the officer investigating the accident—in particular, his testimony that he cited Valladares for, among other things,⁵ inattentive driving, and did not cite De Alcala—was tantamount to the expression of an "opinion as to fault and causation" by the officer. Lopez-Velazquez's counsel asserted that the officer's opinion as to the cause of the accident was inadmissible and constituted prejudicial error.

¶8 Counsel for Lopez-Velazquez also moved for a mistrial on the basis of De Alcala's counsel's description to the jury of Valladares as "an illegal immigrant" and that Valladares was on a "joyride" with a "drunk passenger."

¶9 The trial court denied the motions, stating that, regarding the motion for judgment NOV, "Quite honestly, [I] would have been surprised" if the jury had gone "the other way" based on the evidence presented. Regarding the motion for mistrial based on the officer's testimony, the trial court denied the motion, and further denied the motion for mistrial as to the objected-to statements by De Alcala's counsel, opining, "I do not believe that [the statements in question] impacted the jury to the extent that it affected their verdict in this matter."

¶10 Lopez-Velazquez appeals from the trial court's judgment memorializing the jury's verdict in favor of De Alcala.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11 "Rulings concerning the admission of evidence are measured against the abuse of discretion standard." Holm-Waddle v. William D. Hawley, M.D., Inc. , 1998 OK 53, ¶ 5, 967 P.2d 1180. "An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no rational basis in evidence for the ruling." Spencer v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. , 2007 OK 76,¶13, 171 P.3d 890 (emphasis omitted). This Court has reiterated this principle:

The admission and exclusion of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Jordan v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 1979 OK 10, ¶ 12, 590 P.2d 193, 196. We will not reverse evidentiary decisions of the trial court absent an abuse of discretion which results in prejudice to the proponent. Mills v. Grotheer , 1998 OK 33, ¶ 3, 957 P.2d 540, 541.

King v. King , 2009 OK CIV APP 49, ¶ 21, 212 P.3d 1232.

"Before any claimed error concerning the admission or exclusion of evidence will be deemed reversible error, an affirmative showing of prejudicial error must be made." Kahre v. Kahre , 1995 OK 133, ¶ 45, 916 P.2d 1355 ; see also 12 O.S. 2011 § 2104(A) ("Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of a party is affected ....").

Wright v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs of Carter Cnty. , 2020 OK CIV APP 46, ¶ 21, 475 P.3d 409.

ANALYSIS

I. Admissibility of the Officer's Testimony

¶12 As grounds for reversal, Lopez-Velazquez argues that the investigating officer's testimony regarding liability for the collision and the citations he issued to Valladares and did not issue to De Alcala was inadmissible. Counsel for Lopez-Velazquez properly objected to this testimony by a motion in limine and again at the time the officer testified, and by a subsequent motion for mistrial, but the trial court disagreed with the argument that the testimony was inadmissible under Gabus v. Harvey , 1984 OK 4, 678 P.2d 253, and allowed the officer to testify both as to fault in causing the accident and as to which party he cited for traffic violations.

¶13 The officer in fact testified on direct examination that he was there in court specifically to testify as to whose fault caused the accident. After allowing the testimony, the trial court pursuant to a request by Lopez-Velazquez's counsel then cautioned the jury that "[t]his officer is not here to tell you who caused the accident or who is responsible for the accident. So you're to disregard any statement about who is the cause or responsible person. That's up to you." But no correction was offered in regard to the evidence as to the officer's citations to one party and not to the other. In overruling Lopez-Velazquez's objection to the officer's testimony as to citations issued, the trial court stated before the jury, "[Officer Maddex] can answer as to whether he issued any citations. We're not going to resolve any issue about the citation itself." A short while later, the court reiterates, "[Officer Maddex] can issue citations, but we're not going to get into what was the result of those citations."

¶14 De Alcala maintains on appeal that the officer's testimony in this regard is admissible to show Valladares' negligence per se :

Counsel for Defendant De Alcala merely asked Officer Maddex what citations the latter gave. This is an important distinction from an opinion as to fault, under oath, by an officer sworn in as an expert (as in Gabus ). Traffic citations are a matter of common knowledge and experience; jurors understand that a citation is a claim, not a final finding of guilt. Jurors also understand, as all drivers do, that a citation given, or not given, is not necessarily dispositive of fault or causation, or lack thereof.

De Alcala argues that although Lopez-Velazquez cited Walker v. Forrester , 1988 OK 102, 764 P.2d 1337, "and its progeny," she cited no case standing for the proposition that an investigating officer's testimony as to citations he did or did not issue at the collision scene is inadmissible. De Alcala attempts to distinguish Walker , saying: "In Walker , the Court ruled that evidence that a defendant had paid —not simply been issued—a traffic citation was inadmissible without proof that the defendant had knowingly entered a plea of guilty to same. Here, Officer Maddex never testified that Defendant Valladares paid the ticket." (Citation omitted.) We are unpersuaded by this distinction. This argument simply reinforces the policy behind prohibiting evidence of which party was cited for a traffic violation without evidence of a guilty plea.

¶15 The present case appears to be an example of an officer "effectively put[ting] the stamp of expertise upon an issue that the jury was fully competent to decide," which risked "permit[ting] the jury to substitute the opinion of the officer for the combined judgment of the jury." Gabus , 1984 OK 4, ¶ 25, 678 P.2d 253. In particular, allowing the officer to testify that he cited only Valladares (for several things, including inattentive driving) and did not cite De Alcala at all, as...