Lord v. Detroit Sav. Bank

• Decision Date: 23 March 1903
• Citation: 132 Mich. 510,93 N.W. 1063
• Parties: LORD v. DETROIT SAV. BANK et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

93 N.W. 1063

132 Mich. 510

LORD v. DETROIT SAV. BANK et al.

Supreme Court of Michigan

March 23, 1903

Error to Circuit Court, Wayne County; Joseph W. Donovan, Judge.

Action by Franklin L. Lord against the Detroit Savings Bank and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Charles T. Alexander, for appellees.

CARPENTER J.

Plaintiff brought an action to recover of the defendants damages for the conversion of a cupola and crane which were bricked up and built into a building by the owner of said building. Subsequently defendants acquired the ownership, through a purchase at the foreclosure of a purchasemoney mortgage executed by said owner. Some months after possession was so acquired, plaintiff, who had, while the foreclosure suit was pending, obtained a bill of sale of the cupola and crane, demanded possession of the same, and on defendants' refusal to comply with this demand instituted this suit. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendants, giving as one of his reasons therefor that the property in dispute was realty, and on the foreclosure of the mortgage became the property of the defendants. We think this decision was correct. The testimony of the plaintiff not only showed an attachment in a permanent manner by the owner of the realty, but it also showed that the value of the cupola and crane would be impaired by their removal, and that without them the building in which they were would not be in condition for immediate use. Under these circumstances, the cupola and crane became a part of the realty. Coleman v Stearns Mfg. Co., 38 Mich. 30; Lyle v. Palmer, 42 Mich. 314, 3 N.W. 921; O'Brien v. Kusterer, 27 Mich. 289; Wickes Bros. v. Hill, 115 Mich. 333, 73 N.W. 375.

Plaintiff contends that whether or not these fixtures became part of the realty depends upon the intent of the parties, and that the fact that they were transferred as personal property to the plaintiff is evidence of that intent. We do not think this sale afforded any such evidence. If this property is part of the realty, it became so at the time it was annexed thereto. A declaration on the part of its owner, not made at the time, but long afterwards, would clearly be inadmissible to prove the intent with which said annexation was made. Made, as it was in this case, after the foreclosure suit was commenced, it was a mere self-serving statement.

Plaintiff contends that the following evidnece...