Lord v. Shaw
| Decision Date | 01 May 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 18367,18367 |
| Citation | 682 P.2d 853 |
| Parties | Carol Jean Shaw LORD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Harold Elijah SHAW, Defendant and Respondent. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Lowell Summerhays, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Jeff Thorne, Brigham City, for defendant and respondent.
In this divorce case, the decree divorcing the plaintiff, Mrs. Carol Lord (formerly Mrs. Carol Shaw), and the defendant, Mr. Harold Shaw, became final November 11, 1978. On December 18, 1981, a hearing was held in the district court to determine (1) whether Mrs. Lord's alimony of $125 per month had been properly terminated when she remarried; (2) whether Mr. Shaw was delinquent in child support payments; and (3) whether the plaintiff was entitled to additional child support due to changed circumstances. In addition, the proceeds from the sale of Mrs. Lord's house, in which Mr. Shaw had an equity, were to be distributed. Mrs. Lord appeals from rulings of the district court which were in favor of Mr. Shaw on each of the four points.
Mrs. Lord claims that her alimony should not have terminated upon her remarriage to her present husband. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, § 30-3-5(2) (Supp.1983) provides:
Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse shall automatically terminate upon the remarriage of that former spouse ....
Prior to the enactment of that provision in 1979, this Court applied a similar rule. In Austad v. Austad, 2 Utah 2d 49, 58, 269 P.2d 284, 290, 48 A.L.R.2d 256, 264 (1954), this Court stated:
[W]e conclude that ... there is implicit in the divorce decree the provision that the alimony continues only so long as the wife remains unmarried.
Accord Ferguson v. Ferguson, Utah, 564 P.2d 1380, 1383 (1977); Kent v. Kent, 28 Utah 2d 34, 497 P.2d 652 (1972). The divorce decree between the parties in the instant case states:
The defendant further agrees to pay the plaintiff the sum of $125 per month as and for alimony. This alimony is to run for a period of three years, beginning October 1, 1978.
Mrs. Lord contends that the alimony was to assist her with her education, which would take three years, and that Mr. Shaw was to pay her for three years regardless of her marital status. The divorce decree does not provide for an exception to the general rule that alimony terminates upon remarriage. Accordingly, the obligation to pay alimony terminated by operation of law upon Mrs. Lord's remarriage.
One of Mrs. Lord's and Mr. Shaw's children, Neil, moved in with Mr. Shaw in July 1980. As a result, Mr. Shaw paid no child support to Mrs. Lord for Neil from August 1980 through August 1981. Mrs. Lord claims that Mr. Shaw owes her $75 per month for Neil for that period of time. The trial court refused to order the requested reimbursement.
Before Neil moved in with his father, Mr. and Mrs. Lord had made arrangements to purchase a home large enough for their family, including Neil and five other children. Mrs. Lord claims that she was entitled to Neil's child support to help pay for this home. We are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to order child support for Neil for the disputed time period.
Parties are bound by a divorce decree and cannot unilaterally modify their obligations under the decree. Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 320, 517 P.2d 1010, 1013-14 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 7, 95 S.Ct. 1373, 43 L.Ed.2d 688 (1975). However, in Stanton, supra, at 1014, we stated:
[I]n matters concerning the custody and support of children, because of their highly equitable nature, it is appropriate for the trial court to take into consideration the entire circumstances in making any order of enforcement of the decree, by contempt or otherwise, having in mind his equitable powers, to make any adjustment he may think fair and justified.
In the instant case, the trial court heard the arguments of the parties, and determined that Mr. Shaw owed no child support to Mrs. Lord for Neil while Mr. Shaw was actually supporting Neil.
In divorce cases, absent an abuse of discretion we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. E.g., Turner v. Turner, Utah, 649 P.2d 6 (1982). This Court has refused to reverse the decision of the trial court in a divorce case when the evidence does not clearly show that the trial court erred or abused its discretion. Openshaw v. Openshaw, Utah, 639 P.2d 177 (1981). This Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1980). In this case, the trial court stated sufficient reasons for its decision, and we see no reason to overturn that decision.
A party seeking a modification of the divorce decree carries the burden of showing a substantial change in circumstances. Christensen v. Christensen, Utah, 628 P.2d 1297 (1981). Mrs. Lord claims that she has shown a sufficient change in circumstances since the original divorce decree to warrant an increase in child support for the three children residing with her. The change in circumstances cited by Mrs. Lord include: an increase in Mr. Shaw's income; an increase in the cost of living; an increase in the needs of the children now that they are older; and increased housing expenses. The following facts cut against Mrs. Lord: Mr. Shaw's remarriage and his responsibility to his step-children; the increased cost of living which also affects Mr. Shaw; Mrs. Lord's remarriage; the completion of Mrs. Lord's education; and Mr. Shaw's support of his three older children who are living with him. Based on these circumstances, the trial court held that a sufficient change in circumstances had not been shown to warrant a reassessment of the child support payments.
Parties to a divorce decree will undoubtedly experience economic and other changes following a divorce, but a modification in the decree is justified only when a party shows a substantial change in circumstances. In Christensen v. Christensen, supra, the Court found no substantial change in circumstances and declined to decrease child support payments even though the father had two additional children and alleged increased medical expenses. Similarly, in Openshaw v. Openshaw, supra, the Court found no substantial change even though the husband's income had increased, the cost of living had increased, and the children residing with the wife were older and required more financial support.
In the instant case, both parties have experienced changes that could increase and decrease their respective needs and incomes. The trial court did not find that the situation as a whole showed a...
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