Lorenc v. Hartford Hospital

• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: JENNINGS, Judge.
• Citation: Lorenc v. Hartford Hospital, 127 Conn. 194, 15 A.2d 313 (Conn. 1940)
• Decision Date: 16 July 1940
• Parties: LORENC v. HARTFORD HOSPITAL

15 A.2d 313

127 Conn. 194

LORENC v. HARTFORD HOSPITAL

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 16, 1940

As Amended on Denial of Rehearing, Oct. 4, 1940.

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Alfred C. Baldwin Judge.

Action by Jean Lorenc against the Hartford Hospital to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the breach of defendant's agreement, by its negligence and by the maintenance of a nuisance. There was a verdict for plaintiff, and from a decision of the court setting the verdict aside, plaintiff appeals.

Error and case remanded with direction to enter judgment on the verdict.

ELLS and BROWN, JJ., dissenting.

M. J. Blumenfeld and Abraham A. M. Schweitzer both of Hartford, for appellant.

Arthur L. Shipman, Jr., and Walfrid G. Lundborg, both of Hartford, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., AVERY, BROWN, JENNINGS, and ELLS, JJ.

JENNINGS Judge.

The plaintiff was injured while a patient in the defendant hospital. The trial court set aside a verdict in her favor upon the ground that it erred in its charge. She appeals from this ruling and both parties filed bills of exception.

The finding, in so far as relevant to the questions raised by the appeal, includes the following claims of proof by the plaintiff: The plaintiff entered the hospital as a maternity case. After the birth of her child (her first) she was moved to a ward. A student nurse negligently and carelessly massaged her back with carbolic acid, causing painful burns. The carbolic acid was kept in the same kind of container and in the same medicine closet as rubbing alcohol. Both were artificially colored the same rose shade in accordance with a rule of the pharmacy department. This practice was dangerous and negligent. The pharmacy department and its rules were governed, controlled and under the general supervision of the managing director of the hospital. He was incompetent to fulfill the duties and to perform the tasks required of him. The hospital examined into his qualifications and was negligent in selecting and retaining him. This negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries received by the plaintiff.

The hospital offered evidence and claimed to have proved that it was a charitable institution and that it exercised due care in employing its agents and servants and in the management of the hospital.

The trial court charged the jury that the question as to whether the hospital was a charitable institution was one of fact and that if it was such, the only basis on which the plaintiff could recover was under her allegation that it was negligent in the employment of its servants and agents. It also charged that if it was not a charitable institution, the plaintiff could recover for the negligence of the defendant, its servants and agents. The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff and, in response to an interrogatory submitted by the trial court, found that the hospital was not a charitable institution. The trial court set the verdict aside on the sole ground that he should have charged directly that the hospital was a charitable institution or at least have defined the term.

Two facts are disclosed by the verdict and answer to the interrogatory. The jury found that the hospital was not a charitable institution and found that it was liable. Whether the liability was based on the negligence of the hospital's agents and servants or on its negligence in employing them cannot be determined. That the trial court erred in not charging that the hospital was a charitable institution is not questioned on this record, and the validity of the doctrine that a charitable institution may be liable when it negligently employs incompetent servants and agents is not in dispute. Note, 14 A. L. R. 572, 599.

The plaintiff claims that even though error was committed in failing to charge that the hospital was a charitable institution, the general verdict on the main question of liability may have been based on the...