Lorenz v. Tyson Foods, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 December 2015
• Docket Number: No. C14–4057–LTS,C14–4057–LTS
• Citation: 147 F.Supp.3d 792
• Parties: Carol Lorenz, Plaintiff, v. Tyson Foods, Inc., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

147 F.Supp.3d 792

Carol Lorenz, Plaintiff,

v.Tyson Foods, Inc., et al., Defendants.

No. C14–4057–LTS

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Western Division.

Signed December 3, 2015

Mary C. Hamilton, Hamilton Law Firm, Storm Lake, IA, for Plaintiff.

Michael R. Reck, Emily M. Schirmer, Kelsey J. Knowles, Belin McCormick, P.C., Des Moines, IA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

LEONARD T. STRAND

, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before me on defendants' motion (Doc. No. 22) for summary judgment. Plaintiff has filed a resistance (Doc. No. 23) and defendants have filed a reply (Doc. No. 27). No party requested oral argument. The motion is fully submitted and ready for decision.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Carol Lorenz (Lorenz) filed this action in the Iowa District Court for Cherokee County on June 3, 2014, and filed a first amended petition (Doc. No. 2) on June 19, 2014. The named defendants are Tyson Foods, Inc., d/b/a Tyson Deli, Inc., and Tyson Deli, Inc. (collectively “Tyson”). Lorenz alleges that she was employed by Tyson at its plant in Cherokee, Iowa, until being discharged. She further alleges that the discharge was based on her age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA).

On July 10, 2014, Tyson filed a notice (Doc. No. 1) of removal to this court. Tyson then filed a motion (Doc. No. 4) to dismiss for failure to state a claim, while Lorenz filed a motion (Doc. No. 5) to remand the action to state court. On September 9, 2014, United States District Judge Mark W. Bennett filed an order (Doc. No. 8) denying the motion to remand and granting the motion to dismiss. However, Judge Bennett gave Lorenz leave to file an amended complaint to plead her claims adequately. Doc. No. 8 at 11–12.

Lorenz filed her amended complaint (Doc. No. 9) on October 9, 2014. Tyson then filed an answer (Doc. No. 14) denying Lorenz's claims. This case was referred to me (Doc. No. 12) on October 22, 2014, after the parties unanimously consented to trial, disposition and judgment by a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)

. Discovery closed September 1, 2015, and trial is scheduled to begin January 4, 2016. See Doc. Nos. 18, 19.

III. RELEVANT FACTS

Except as otherwise noted, the following facts are not in dispute:¹

Lorenz was employed at Tyson's plant in Cherokee, Iowa, from October 1985 until December 6, 2012, when her employment was terminated. She was 62 years old at the time of her discharge. During the relevant period of time, she worked in the Quality Assurance/Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (QA/HACCP) department, primarily as a technician in the department's HACCP division. While Lorenz's position was once considered to be an exempt management position, it ultimately became a “management support” position. This was a non-exempt, overtime-eligible position that required Lorenz to record her time worked.

Tyson acknowledges that Lorenz performed her job duties competently but notes that her record included some behavioral and attendance issues. For example, in 2008 her then-supervisor, Jerry Davis, determined that Lorenz repeatedly arrived late but concealed her tardiness by falsely recording that she arrived on time. Lorenz acknowledged that she documented incorrect times. A letter of counseling was issued in response to the situation and Lorenz was warned that the next violation of Tyson's time card policy would result in discharge. Lorenz does not claim that Davis investigated her actions because of any age bias.

In 2011, while supervised by Ashley Palmer, Lorenz had additional tardiness issues. On October 24, 2011, she signed a Management Support Attendance Notification that addressed two attendance-related concepts. First, the document indicated that an unexcused tardy is counted as one-half of an unexcused absence, and that two unexcused absences in a 12–month period would result in termination. Second, she was advised that she had been charged with four “attendance instances” and that incurring eight attendance instances during a 12–month period would result in termination.² These issues occurred at a time when the Cherokee plant was struggling and Tyson was seeking more accountability from its employees. Lorenz testified that she understood that Tyson was requesting more accountability at this time.

Tyson ultimately installed a time clock system that automatically reported instances of tardiness. On October 18, 2012, Lorenz signed another Management Support Attendance Notification that itemized three alleged instances of tardiness during 2012, with the most-recent being October 8, 2012. The document indicated that Lorenz was just one attendance notification short of being discharged.

On December 5, 2012, Lorenz was late again, this time by less than two minutes. She contends that she stubbed her toe that morning with enough force to make her believe she may have broken it. It is undisputed that she did not call Tyson to report that she would be late. The following day, Kendra Saunders, who was Tyson's Human Resources Manager at the Cherokee plant, advised Lorenz that she was being discharged because she had exceeded the maximum allowed tardiness. Lorenz told Saunders about the stubbed toe situation but that explanation did not affect the decision. Lorenz had worked for Tyson for 27 years at the time her employment was terminated.

The record is not entirely clear as to who made the decision to terminate Lorenz's employment. In its statement of undisputed facts, Tyson employs the passive voice: “Ms. Lorenz was terminated due to attendance points in 2012.” Doc. No. 22–2 at ¶ 30. This statement avoids the issue of which individual (or individuals) at Tyson actually made the discharge decision. In her statement of additional material facts, Lorenz alleges that she “was terminated by the then QA Manager, Ashley Palmer.” Doc. No. 23–3 at ¶ 38. Tyson admitted this statement by failing to cite any portion of the record supporting its denial. Doc. No. 27–1 at ¶ 38. Tyson also confirmed that the discharge “was approved by Kendra Saunders a/k/a Schmidt, the on-site Human Resources manager, and Mr. John Cebuhar, Tyson Corporate District Human Resources manager.” Id. at ¶ 39. In viewing the record most favorably to Lorenz for purposes of Tyson's motion for summary judgment, I must conclude that Palmer made the decision to terminate Lorenz's employment, that the decision was approved by Saunders and Cebuhar, and that Saunders communicated the decision to Lorenz.

Additional facts will be discussed as necessary in analyzing the parties' arguments.

IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Any party may move for summary judgment regarding all or any part of the claims asserted in a case. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)

. Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

A material fact is one that “ ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’ ” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)

. Thus, “the substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Id . Facts that are “critical” under the substantive law are material, while facts that are “irrelevant or unnecessary” are not. Id .

An issue of material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the record, Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir.1992)

(citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ), or when “ ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party’ on the question,” Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir.2005) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). Evidence that only provides “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, or evidence that is “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, does not make an issue of material fact genuine.

As such, a genuine issue of material fact requires “sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute” so as to “require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49, 106 S.Ct. 2505

. The party moving for entry of summary judgment bears “the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which show a lack of a genuine issue.” Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and by depositions, affidavits, or otherwise, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Mosley v. City of Northwoods, 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir.2005)

. The nonmovant must show an alleged issue of fact is genuine and material as it relates to the substantive law. If a party fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of a claim or defense with respect to which that party has the burden of proof, then the opposing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

In determining if a genuine issue of material fact is present, I must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587–88, 106 S.Ct. 1348

. Further, I must give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Id. However, “because we view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we do not weigh the evidence or attempt to...