Losser v. Bradstreet

• Decision Date: 28 March 2008
• Docket Number: Docket No. 33932.
• Citation: 145 Idaho 670,183 P.3d 758
• Parties: Charles Oliver LOSSER, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Shauna Rae BRADSTREET, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

183 P.3d 758

145 Idaho 670

Charles Oliver LOSSER, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Shauna Rae BRADSTREET, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 33932.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, January 2008 Term.

March 28, 2008.

Rehearing Denied May 12, 2008.

Uranga & Uranga, Boise, for appellant. Louis Uranga argued.

Gale L. Merrick, Boise, for respondent.

HORTON, Justice.

This appeal arises from an independent action for recovery of attorney fees incurred in earlier litigation. Shauna Bradstreet appeals from the district court's decision, on intermediate appeal, reversing the magistrate's judgment dismissing Charles Losser's lawsuit and awarding Bradstreet her attorney fees and costs. This Court is asked to decide whether Losser is permitted to bring an independent action to recover attorney fees and costs incurred in earlier probate proceedings. We reverse the decision of the district court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Losser and Bradstreet are siblings and the sole heirs of their mother's estate. Upon their mother's death, Bradstreet submitted a holographic will for informal probate. Bradstreet was appointed personal representative of the estate. Losser objected, alleging the will was forged.¹ Three days before a scheduled trial on the matter, Bradstreet withdrew the holographic will from probate and submitted a formally executed will that predated the holographic will. Losser and Bradstreet stipulated that the formally executed will could be admitted to probate and a disinterested third person would serve as the personal representative of the estate.

Losser incurred attorney fees and costs in connection with the disputed holographic will. He elected not to pursue recovery of those fees and costs in the probate proceeding; rather, Losser filed a complaint in district court seeking to recover the costs and attorney fees he incurred contesting the validity of the holographic will. Losser's complaint reflected his intention to seek an award of punitive damages. Losser's decision to forego attempts to recover fees and costs in the probate proceeding and to pursue the independent action was based upon his belief that he is entitled to an award of punitive damages.

Bradstreet moved to dismiss Losser's complaint or, in the alternative, transfer the matter to the probate court of the magistrate division. The district court granted the alternative relief, transferring the matter to the magistrate division of the district court. The magistrate assigned to probate proceedings in Ada County granted Bradstreet's motion to dismiss, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Accordingly, on May 30, 2006, the magistrate entered an order dismissing the action with prejudice. Thereafter, by way of judgment entered on August 18, 2006, the magistrate awarded Bradstreet attorney fees and costs incurred in the defense of the independent action. The award of attorney fees was based on I.C. § 12-120(1) and I.C. § 12-121. Losser appealed from the order of dismissal and the subsequent judgment. The appeal was assigned to a different district judge. The district court, acting in its appellate capacity, reversed the magistrate's order of dismissal and award of attorney fees and costs. The district judge assigned to the appeal "remanded" the case to the district judge who was originally assigned to Losser's independent action. Bradstreet appeals from this decision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have repeatedly stated that when reviewing a decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity, this Court will review the record and the magistrate court's decision independently of, but with due regard for, the district court's decision. E.g. Carter v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373, 378, 146 P.3d 639, 644 (2006). However, we take this opportunity to clarify a procedural issue that we have created in cases involving appeals from the district court in which the district court has served as an intermediate appellate court.² The structure of the Idaho Appellate Rules (I.A.R.) clearly reflects that our role is to review the decisions of the district court. I.A.R. 4 provides that "[a]ny party aggrieved by an appealable judgment, order or decree, as defined in these rules, of a district court ... may appeal such decision to the Supreme Court....." I.A.R. 2(b)(1) defines "district court" and provides that "`[d]istrict court' shall include the district courts of all judicial districts but shall not include the magistrates divisions thereof." I.A.R. 11(a)(2) provides that a party may appeal, as a matter of right to this Court "[d]ecisions by the district court dismissing, affirming, reversing or remanding an appeal." After this Court has rendered a final decision in such an appeal, a remittitur is issued and filed with the district court. I.A.R. 38(c). This remittitur "shall advise the district court ... that the opinion has become final and that the district court ... shall forthwith comply with the directive of the opinion."

In Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981), we discussed the interplay between the standard of review and the procedure governing appeals:

Our previous decisions involving appeals from district courts which have acted as courts of appeal from decisions of magistrate courts do not set forth a clear standard of review to be utilized by the Supreme Court. We deem the appropriate standard of review at the Supreme Court level to be: The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure.

102 Idaho at 561, 633 P.2d at 1139 (citation omitted).

By 1991, this Court's opinions began to directly address the decisions of the magistrates, without reference to the "matter of procedure" addressed in Nicholls. See Walborn v. Walborn, 120 Idaho 494, 817 P.2d 160 (1991) (affirming magistrate's decision in part, vacating in part and remanding to magistrate for reconsideration). Thus, for nearly two decades, we have effectively ignored the structure of our appellate rules and issued opinions in which we have directly addressed the decision of the magistrate. Indeed, we have done so recently. See Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 179 P.3d 303 (2008) (vacating the magistrate court's grant of partial summary judgment). We have determined that this practice represents an erroneous conflation of our standard of appellate review with the structure of our appellate rules. In this decision, and henceforth, our decisions will reflect our application of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

When this Court reviews an order dismissing an action pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), we apply the same standard of review we apply to a motion for summary judgment. Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 667, 115 P.3d 756, 758 (2005). "After viewing all facts and inferences from the record in favor of the non-moving party, the Court will ask whether a claim for relief has been stated." Id. (citing Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 398, 987 P.2d 300, 310 (1999)). "The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is `entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.'" Sumpter v. Holland Realty, Inc., 140 Idaho 349, 351, 93 P.3d 680, 682 (2004) (quoting BHA Inv., Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 348, 350, 63 P.3d 474, 476 (2003)).

III. ANALYSIS

Losser's complaint asserts his right to recover attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with the contested holographic will. Bradstreet argues: (1) Losser does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (2) assuming arguendo Losser states a valid claim, the claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata; and (3) the magistrate court correctly awarded Bradstreet attorney fees below. Both parties seek attorney fees on appeal.

A. Losser's complaint was properly dismissed because it failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Our resolution of the question whether Losser's complaint was properly dismissed requires us to consider two distinct issues: (1) whether a party may maintain an independent action solely to recover attorney fees and costs incurred in earlier litigation involving the same parties; and (2) whether we recognize the tort of attempted interference with expectancy of inheritance as a ground for recovery of attorney fees and costs. We conclude that the district court erred when it determined that Losser's complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.

1. A party may not pursue an independent action to recover attorney fees and costs incurred in an earlier lawsuit involving the same parties.

For purposes of this appeal, we accept the truth of Losser's claim that Bradstreet forged the holographic will and submitted it in the probate proceeding for the purposes of fraudulently depriving Losser of his share their mother's estate. It is undisputed that Losser may have sought relief in the probate proceedings to recover the attorney fees and costs he incurred in connection with the dispute over the holographic will under the statutes and court rules governing frivolous conduct in civil litigation.

Idaho Code § 12-123 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(1) As used in this section:

(a) "Conduct" means filing a civil action, asserting a claim, defense, or other position in connection with a civil action, or taking any other action in connection with a civil action.

(b) "Frivolous conduct" means conduct of a party to a civil action or of his counsel of record that satisfies either of the following:

(i) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the civil action;

(ii) It is not supported in fact or warranted under...