Lost v. Phelps Dodge Corp..

• Decision Date: 09 November 1927
• Docket Number: No. 3069.,3069.
• Citation: 33 N.M. 15,261 P. 811
• Parties: DE LOST et al.v.PHELPS DODGE CORPORATION, STAG CANON BRANCH.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

33 N.M. 15

261 P. 811

DE LOST et al.

v.PHELPS DODGE CORPORATION, STAG CANON BRANCH.

No. 3069.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Nov. 9, 1927.

Syllabus by the Court.

General conclusion on mixed question of fact and law cannot be reviewed, in absence of specific exceptions.

Review of judgment under Workmen's Compensation Act limited to correction of errors of law.

Appeal from District Court, Colfax County; Leib, Judge.

Claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act by John De Lost and Helena De Lost, claimants for the death of Joseph De Lost, their son, opposed by the Phelps Dodge Corporation, Stag Canon Branch, employer. From a judgment for the employer, claimants appeal. Affirmed, and cause remanded.

Supreme Court will not weigh evidence to determine preponderance thereof in reviewing judgment under Workmen's Compensation Act; being limited to correction of errors of law. Comp.St.1929, § 156-101 et seq.

F. S. Merriau, of Raton, for appellants.

Crampton & Darden, of Raton, for appellee.

WATSON, J.

[1] Appellants, as dependent parents, filed a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Laws 1917, c. 83, as amended. Dependency was the only issue made by the pleadings, or litigated. As to that, the court found:

“That the said John De Lost and Helena De Lost, on the 8th day of February, A. D. 1923, were not dependent upon the deceased Joseph De Lost within the meaning of the provisions of chapter 83 of the 1917 Session Laws of the state of New Mexico, or at all, to any extent whatsoever.”

This so-called finding, with others, and with conclusions of law, was included in the final judgment denying compensation. Appellants requested no findings and took no exceptions, other than a general one allowed in the judgment. Their contention here is that the finding of nondependency is erroneous.

The difficulty of reviewing this general conclusion on a mixed question of fact and law is manifest. If the trial court believed the testimony for appellants, there is ground for urging that he entertained an erroneous view of the law of dependency as developed in Merrill v. Penasco Lbr. Co., 27 N. M. 632, 204 P. 72, and Gonzales v. Chino Copper Co., 29 N. M. 228, 222 P. 903. But, before applying the law, this court must either have facts submitted to it or must find them itself.

Appellee contends that this record presents no question for review. It cites McGonigle v. Eagle Town-Site Co., 25 N. M. 625, 187 P. 546, and Stumpf v. Pohle, 28 N. M. 606, 216 P. 498, to the effect that specific exceptions or requests for specific findings are essential. This, as a general proposition, appellants do not question. They endeavor to distinguish the case.

It is first urged that, where a single issue is expressly and necessarily decided, an exception serves no purpose and is not required. That proposition is correct as applied to a case which depends on a single question of law presented and decided. Fulghum v. Madrid, 31 N. M. 91, 240 P. 990; King v. Doherty, 32 N. M. ---, 258 P. 569. But this is not such a case. Here we have a mere general conclusion dependent for its correctness on the facts established and the law of dependency. The trial court's theory as to either facts or law is undisclosed. A proper review of the decision “on the same grounds as those on which it was made” is impossible. Morrow v. Martinez, 27 N. M. 354, 200 P. 1071.

It is true, as contended by appellants, that their testimony, and that of their witnesses, is not directly contradicted. Yet other facts were adduced by appellee having a bearing on the question of dependency. Appellee points in argument to inherent improbabilities and suspicious circumstances in appellants' claim. We cannot say that there are none. If the trial court recognized them, he had a right to consider them in reaching his conclusion as to the facts. Martinez v. Floersheim Merc. Co., 27 N. M. 245, 199 P. 905. So we cannot say that the case is before us on admitted or undisputed facts.

Appellee also contends that the rule invoked should not be applied in a compensation case. From section 13 of the act, it appears that the claim is to be informal and the hearing summary. These and other provisions, and the familiar history of the legislation, indicate an intent, so far as possible, to dispense with and avoid the formalities, the delays, and the expense incident to ordinary litigation, as well as to correct the particular evils resulting from applying the old law of master and...